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This dissertation argues that the Guatemalan Revolution (1944-1954) was a 
transformational moment that hastened the adoption of modern, industrial agriculture throughout 
the country and facilitated the opening of new agrarian frontiers like the Pacific Coast. Between 
1944 and 1954, technicians and bureaucrats adopted a new language for speaking about 
Guatemala’s economic problems that emphasized the links between dependency on coffee, rural 
poverty, and the threat of deforestation and soil erosion. Experts created rural development 
initiatives that were supposed to remake Guatemala into a more efficient agricultural producer. 
These efforts were challenged by landowners, labourers and campesinos who tried to define 
policy that best served their interests. While large landowners initially rebuffed modernization 
schemes, campesinos quickly adopted new agricultural technologies and pushed the state to 
experiment with financial and land reforms that were necessary for small farms to prosper. One 
of the important conclusions of this dissertation is that supposedly traditional campesinos were 
responsible for the success of agrarian modernization in Guatemala. The dissertation also 
explores the long-term social and environmental consequences of the 1952 agrarian reform. 
Historians have often depicted the agrarian reform as an isolated political event that created 
impressive, but short-lived improvements in the lives of campesinos. Using case studies from the 
Pacific Coast, the dissertation demonstrates that land use changed dramatically between 1952 
and 1954. Thousands of campesinos obtained new land that they rapidly cleared and developed. 
At the same time, large landowners raced to deforest and colonize new land with annuals like 
cotton so that they could limit their exposure to expropriation. After the coup, Guatemalan elites 
rejected government efforts to redistribute land and restructure the economy. However, large 
landowners embraced the new productive technologies—fertilizers, pesticides, hybrid seeds and 
mechanization—introduced during the Revolution. On the Pacific Coast, large landowners 
replaced campesino farms with industrial crops including cotton, corn and sugar. This new 
agricultural model created wealth for a small elite but caused long-term environmental problems 
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 In Miguel Angel Asturias’ experimental masterpiece Hombres de Maíz, there is a 
memorable encounter in the remote reaches of the Guatemalan highlands. As he travelled 
between villages, a postman named Nicho encountered an old man who told him to “feed-up” his 
sad-looking dog and eat him. This shocked the postman, who insisted that it was more civilized 
to eat maize. The old man reminded Nicho that “maize costs the sacrifice of the earth, which is 
also human. I’d like to see you carry a maize field on your back like the poor earth does.” He 
urged Nicho to take notice of the signs of disarray and environmental ruin caused by planting 
maize for profit: “[B]are slopes where the water runs only over stones, plots without that 
vegetable covering made of the hair of dead men who were made of flesh and dead men who 
were made of wood; stubble fields so full of stones it withers your soul.”1 The old man warned 
that the earth’s fertility could not be sustained without sacrifices. He challenged Nicho to 
consider if those sacrifices would be made willingly—in the form of worship and labour—or if 
the earth would exact vengeance on the sons and daughters of corn merchants by forcing them to 
die and die hungry.2 
The old man’s language was grizzly, but he captured the essence of a very real problem 
facing Guatemala in the 1940s. Over several centuries Guatemalan ladinos—those of Spanish or 
European descent—had monopolized the country’s best land and progressively displaced the 
much larger indigenous population into the highlands and other areas with more marginal soils.3 
                                                     
1 For further discussion of Asturias’ work and politics see Chapter 2. Miguel Angel Asturias and Gerald 
Martin, Men of Maize, (London: Verso, 1988), 203, 205 
2 For non-western interpretations of the human connection with the natural world cemented by labor see Elizabeth 
A. Povinelli, “Do Rocks Listen? The Cultural Politics of Apprehending Australian Aboriginal Labor,” American 
Anthropologist 97, no. 3 (1995): 505-18. For Mayan context see Nancy Marguerite Farris, Maya Society Under 
Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Survival, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a 
broader Latin American analysis of indigenous ways of knowing the natural world and the connection with Western 
thought see Marisol de la Cadena, Earth Beings: Ecologies of Practice Across Andean Worlds, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015). 
3 In Guatemala, Ladino colloquially indicates those of Spanish or European descent who have power over the larger 
indigenous community. This definition conflates power and ethnicity and prevents discussion about heterogeneity 
within ladino communities. As Charles Hale has noted, ladinos often have indigenous ancestry and some have 
recently tried to define alternate positions that are not part of the ladino-indian binary. Charles R. Hale, Más Que Un 
Indio: Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala (Santa Fe: School of the Americas 
Research Press, 2006), 3. For more about the connections between ladino and indigenous identities see Jeffrey L. 
Gould, To Die in This Way: Nicaragua and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965, (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 10-13, 136. For an Andean perspective on the importance of power as part of the idea of 
ladino and mestizo see Mary Weismantel, Cholas and Pishtacos: Stories of Race and Sex in the Andes (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), xxxii. 
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This process accelerated in the 19th century as coffee production expanded along the Pacific 
Slope and in the northern region of Alta Verapaz. Most campesinos had access to small plots of 
land in the highlands, but these were often insufficient to support growing families and many 
supplemented their harvests with waged labour on coffee plantations.4 Although indigenous 
campesinos coaxed good yields from their land by interplanting and careful fertilization, because 
they had limited access to fertile land they had to shorten fallows to keep up with sustained 
population growth throughout the 20th century.5 Over time, this led to a progressive reduction in 
forest cover, increased soil erosion and static or slowly falling yields throughout the highlands. 
This agricultural system generated great wealth for large landowners but it was precarious: 
unexpected droughts or tropical storms could—and did—cause crop failures and food shortages 
that threatened to destabilize the country. The Revolutionary government that came to power in 
1944 after decades of dictatorship tried to solve the crippling social and environmental problems 
facing Guatemala by modernizing agriculture. 
 The Guatemalan Revolution (1944-1954) was a transformational moment that hastened 
the adoption of modern, industrial agriculture throughout the country and facilitated the opening 
of new agrarian frontiers like the Pacific Coast. Between 1944 and 1954, technicians and 
bureaucrats adopted a new language for speaking about Guatemala’s economic problems that 
emphasized the links between dependency on coffee, rural poverty and the threat of deforestation 
and soil erosion. The government’s agricultural policy during this period was driven by experts 
                                                     
4 Campesino refers to people who were relatively poor, lived in the countryside and usually had access to land, 
rented, owned or communally managed. They produced primarily for their household but also engaged in the market 
as producers and laborers. Campesino farms used family labor as the main means of agricultural production and 
were only lightly capitalized. Investments in hand tools—machetes, digging sticks and azadones—represented the 
main recurrent expense. There was a tendency toward intercropping, which diversified production and enabled 
campesinos to survive crop losses. The local community also played an important role in production, with family 
and community members informally sharing resources and labor. William Loker, “‘Campesinos’ and the Crisis of 
Modernization in Latin America,” Journal of Political Ecology vol. 3 (1996): 71-73. For the flexibility of campesino 
as a political category for rural organizing see Ingrid Yulisa Castañeda, “Dismantling the Enclave: Land, Labor, and 
National Belonging on Guatemala’s Caribbean Coast, 1904-1954,” PhD Dissertation. (Yale University, 2014), 118. 
For a modern discussion of the historical definition of a campesino identity and its limits see Christopher Boyer, 
Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 2-3, 44-45. 
5 During the Revolution, most of the rural population was indigenous and, therefore, most campesinos were 
indigenous. However, the correlation between campesino and indigenous identity often varied according to the 
region. In the southeast especially, there was a higher prevalence of campesinos who also self-identified as ladino. 
In Guatemala, the ladino identity is largely oppositional: to be ladino means to reject an indigenous identity and 
claim Spanish heritage. Thus there an important political dimension to the indigenous-ladino identity discussion. 
Most of the sources used in the dissertation do not identify class and ethnicity at the same time. Instead, small rural 
farmers are usually described as campesinos or indigenous. Only in rare instances were they called ladino. 
3 
 
who believed in the transformative power of state-led development and embraced agrarian 
modernization as the solution to endemic production problems. They were adherents of an 
ideological view that James Scott has called “high modernism,” which was characterized by a 
fervent belief in the power of science and planning to make nature productive and foster social 
order.6 Throughout the Revolution, agrarian modernizers—agronomists, policymakers and 
farmers—tried to understand the problems facing Guatemala by drawing on an international 
discourse of conservation and rural development. Experts emphasized the connections between 
scientific management of the environment, agricultural productivity and the economic well-being 
of the nation. 
In the early years of the Revolution, advocates of agrarian modernization identified two 
barriers to Guatemala’s progress: the state’s dependency on coffee exports and the ubiquity of 
traditional maize cultivation. Agronomists and policymakers devised plans for rural development 
that promoted regional crop specialization supported by fertilizers, hybridized seeds, and 
tractors.7 They tried to create a new Guatemalan economy that balanced domestic production 
with exports. Policymakers encouraged large landowners to diversify their plantations with new 
exports like cotton and high-yielding corn varieties, but the state lacked the power to compel 
elites to diversify.8 Modernizers quickly refocused their development efforts on campesinos, 
whom they wanted to transform into small, market-oriented farmers. Experts argued that 
traditional corn production caused deforestation and soil erosion and they encouraged 
campesinos to adopt more marketable and environmentally appropriate crops like cotton and 
henequen. By emphasizing the destructiveness of corn, modernizers misunderstood the basic 
nature of the problem. It was a shortage of land and capital that prevented indigenous 
campesinos from diversifying their fields, not a lack of interest in new farming practices and 
crops. Campesinos often surprised agricultural extension agents by enthusiastically engaging in 
                                                     
6 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5; J.T. Way, The Mayan in the Mall: Globalization, Development, and the 
Making of Modern Guatemala (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 5, 42, 88. 
7 They also borrowed aspects of “revolutionary forestry” from Mexico. Christopher R. Boyer, Political Landscapes: 
Conservation, Forests and Community in Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 12; Joseph 
Cotter, Troubled Harvest: Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880-2002 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
2003); Deborah Kay Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 5-7. 
8 Large landowners includes Guatemalans and foreign owners who operated large plantations. These farms were 
focused on export production and reliant on a paid workforce. There are of course exceptions to the general 
characterization, as some large plantations produced corn and sugar for domestic consumption. 
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modernization initiatives. This enthusiasm challenged elite and middle class ideas about race and 
class in Guatemala, but the possibilities for rural development were fundamentally constrained 
by the unequal distribution of land and capital. 
By 1950, roughly 72% of Guatemala’s most fertile land was controlled by just 2% of the 
country’s farms. This left 88% of the population to subsist on 14% of the country’s farmland: 
over half of Guatemalan farms controlled less than 2 manzanas.9 Leading modernizers, including 
the new President Jacobo Arbenz, believed that a substantive land reform was necessary to put 
underutilized land into production and guarantee rapid increases in rural production. The 
Agrarian Reform Law (Decree 900) passed in 1952 was the culmination of nearly a decade of 
rural experimentation, extension work, and legal reforms. Between 1952 and 1954, the state 
redistributed fertile land to thousands of campesinos and offered beneficiaries hybridized corn 
and cotton seeds. The government hoped that democratizing land tenure would quickly diversify 
crop production, helping Guatemala overcome perennial food production problems and 
strengthening the economy. The Arbenz administration was again unprepared for the enthusiasm 
of Guatemalan campesinos, who pushed for a more aggressive land reform and demanded the 
fertilizers, seeds and tractors promised by the state.10 Working together in the countryside with 
campesinos forced technicians especially to rethink their preconceptions about indigenous and 
campesino productivity. 
The 1952 Agrarian Reform Law unleashed powerful social and environmental changes 
across Guatemala that President Jacobo Arbenz and his advisors struggled to manage. Large 
landowners vehemently opposed reform efforts and used a variety of legal strategies to delay or 
prevent expropriation. They rapidly cleared underutilized land and planted it with crops like 
cotton, which was heavily promoted by the state and grew quickly. The agrarian reform 
engendered widespread opposition from Guatemalan elites, who resented the expropriation of 
land and feared the rising power of campesinos and the perceived advance of communism in 
Guatemala. A U.S. backed coup in 1954 prematurely ended the agrarian reform and created the 
                                                     
9 Conversions for common measurements are as follows. The smallest properties were measured in cuerdas, where 1 
cuerda =0.3 acres. Medium properties were in manzanas, where 1 manzana = 1.73 acres = 0.70 hectares. Larger 
properties are measured in caballerias, where 1 caballeria = 64 manzanas = 110 acres = 45 hectares. Jim 
Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 82.  
10 Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala’s October Revolution (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 196. 
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socio-economic conditions that enabled large landowners to consolidate their control over the 
nation’s most fertile land on Guatemala’s Pacific Coast.11 After the coup, almost all the land 
distributed through the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law was returned to landowners who alleged that 
beneficiaries wasted productive land by planting corn. This claim dismissed campesino efforts to 
obtain new seeds and fertilizers and the coup itself prevented most agrarian reform beneficiaries 
from moving beyond the initial phase of land colonization.  
Large landowners, paradoxically, benefitted tremendously from the free labour Decree 
900 beneficiaries had invested in clearing new land. They utilized technical and financial reforms 
introduced during the Revolutionary-era to open new land and plant new export crops, including 
cotton. The displacement of land reform beneficiaries destabilized domestic corn supplies and 
the decade after 1954 was characterized by corn shortages, inflation and speculation that 
adversely affected the food security of the rural poor. Without the active support of the state, 
campesinos were unable to afford the costs associated with modern agriculture and the benefits 
of agrarian modernization were limited to well-capitalized plantations.12 Guatemala’s poorest 
once again had to supplement their small plots with seasonal migrations to the Pacific Coast, 
where they laboured under the hot sun harvesting cotton, sugar, bananas and more. Cotton 
workers especially suffered from malnutrition and pesticide poisoning even as Guatemala’s 
landowning elite enjoyed an economic bonanza. Bereft of an agenda for social change and a 
conservation ethos, the commodification of corn and cotton that began during the Revolution 
facilitated the rapid deforestation of the Pacific Coast and the impoverishment of Guatemalan 
campesinos that manifested as chronic malnutrition. 
Throughout the Revolution, Guatemalan policymakers and agronomists preached the 
gospel of modernization in newspapers, trade journals and public demonstrations. However, they 
also were citizens and historical actors situated in a tumultuous and transformative historical 
moment when many Guatemalans were experimenting with new political freedoms after an era 
of dictatorship. Expert-led initiatives to remake rural Guatemala were challenged by landowners, 
labourers and campesinos who tried to define policy that best served their interests. One of the 
                                                     
11 This term is used to refer to the major agricultural departments facing the Pacific, especially Escuintla, 
Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu and Santa Rosa. Jutiapa and San Marcos are less prominently featured, partly because 
there was far less coastal land in these departments relative to their neighbours. The San Marcos region was also 
well examined by Cindy Forster.  
12 David Carey, “Guatemala's Green Revolution: Synthetic Fertilizer, Public Health, and Economic Autonomy in the 
Mayan Highland,” Agricultural History 83, no. 3 (2009): 283-322. 
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important conclusions of this dissertation is that supposedly traditional campesinos were 
responsible for the success of agrarian modernization in Guatemala. While large landowners 
initially rebuffed modernization schemes, campesinos quickly adopted new agricultural 
technologies and pushed the state to experiment with financial and land reforms that were 
necessary for small farms to prosper.  
I also emphasize the long-term social and environmental consequences of the 1952 
agrarian reform. Historians have often depicted the agrarian reform as an isolated political event 
that created impressive, but short-lived improvements in the lives of campesinos. The violent 
reversal of the agrarian reform after the 1954 coup is often used to conclude the story of the 
Revolution. It demonstrates the failure of an ambitious effort to “legislat[e] a new social order” 
and presages Guatemala’s slide into repression and civil war.13 Using case studies on the Pacific 
Coast, I demonstrate how land use changed dramatically between 1952 and 1954. Thousands of 
campesinos obtained new land that they rapidly cleared and developed. At the same time, large 
landowners raced to deforest and colonize new land with annuals like cotton so that they could 
limit their exposure to expropriation. After the coup, Guatemalan elites rejected government 
efforts to redistribute land and restructure the economy. However, large landowners embraced 
the new productive technologies—fertilizers, pesticides, hybrid seeds and mechanization—
introduced during the Revolution.  On the Pacific Coast especially, large landowners replaced 
campesino farms with industrial crops including cotton, corn and sugar. The threat of state and 
landowner violence effectively suppressed campesinos activism and allowed large landowners to 
assert unprecedented control over land and labour. The Revolution and its abrupt reversal 
enabled large landowners to rapidly transform the Pacific Coast into Guatemala’s newest—and 
most important—agro-export zone. This demonstrates the unexpected durability of the 
Revolution and subverts the conventional narrative that emphasizes the coup as a moment of 
rupture.14 
                                                     
13 Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom, 2. For other examples of this narrative arc see Jim Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside; Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2000). 
14 For a synthesis of this narrative see Timothy J. Smith and Abigail E. Adams. After the Coup: An Ethnographic 




The dissertation uses a mix of government records, newspapers, specialist periodicals and 
files from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of State. There are also files 
drawn from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome. I use archival 
records from the Ministry of Agriculture and its dependencies, which cover the period between 
1930 and 1956. These files offer unprecedented insight into the activities of government agents, 
especially during the Arévalo and Arbenz administration. This allowed me to reconstruct 
attempts to impose agrarian modernization initiatives on the countryside and analyze the reaction 
of large landowners and campesinos. These records are located in Guatemala’s Archivo General 
de Centro America, but they have been overlooked by most historians examining the Revolution. 
A notable exception is Stephen Kent O’Brien’s examination of environmental change in 
Escuintla. O’Brien, however, only drew on a small selection of files and used this information, in 
conjunction with US documents, to argue that the Guatemalan state was wooed by the 
productivity of US agriculture and United Fruit Company plantations.15 His bias reflects both a 
historiographical tradition that has focused on the U.S. role in Guatemala during the Revolution 
and his use of files that feature the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional (IAN).16 IAN quickly lost 
power and influence among progressives because of its links to the United States and 
conservative landowners.17 In 1948 it was supplanted by the Institute for Encouraging 
Production (INFOP), a semi-autonomous development organization that was created to rapidly 
modernize Guatemalan. 
 This dissertation examines the agrarian modernization ideas that developed within 
Guatemala, which borrowed from international discourses but were profoundly shaped by 
Guatemalan history and politics. I examined INFOP’s records for insight into rural development 
                                                     
15 He argues that the Guatemalan government “enthusiastically adopted techniques and ideas from the U.S., a 
country considered racially superior.” Stephen Kent O’Brien, On Perilous Ground: A Social and Environmental 
History of Escuintla on Guatemala’s South Coast, 1928-1962 (Phd Dissertation, Yale University, 2007), 162, 183. 
16 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge, 
Massachusets: Harvard University, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2005); Pierro Gleijeses, 
Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992); Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy Intervention (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1982); Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (New York: Octagon Books, 
1979, 1958); O’Brien, On Perilous Ground, 171. 
17 IAN worked with the USDA on rubber cultivation in the 1940s and with the Rockefeller Foundation on wheat 
hybridization at the same time experiments were ongoing in Mexico. INFOP and IAN scientists had competing 
research stations that used very different approaches to hybridization. Manuel Elgueta, Report to Instituto de 
Fomento de la Producción. June 14 1949. p5. Min. Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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and agarian modernization initiatives that were heavily influenced by the political priorities of 
the Revolution. Established in 1948, the semi-autonomous agency integrated many of the 
modernization initiatives introduced during the Arévalo administration including extension work, 
crop experimentation and farm financing. INFOP left no distinctive archive, however, the traces 
of its activities are found throughout the Ministry of Agriculture files. I have also drawn on their 
journal the Monitor del INFOP, which was published between 1949 and 1954. This rich source 
includes editorials about development issues, expositions on INFOP’s work, and agricultural 
advice from Guatemalan and international experts.  
The Ministry of Agriculture files and INFOP records tend to privilege the activities of 
modernizers, without critically examining the drawbacks of state-led agricultural development. 
The activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and INFOP were contextualized by drawing on 
newspapers and periodicals including the main daily, El Imparcial, the communist newspaper 
Octubre and the Ministry’s publication Revista Agrícola. I have included perspectives from 
campesinos, labourers and large landowners that challenged agrarian modernization initiatives 
deployed by the state. The dissertation also includes newly available papers from President 
Jacobo Arbenz’s plantation El Cajón. These highlight tensions between agrarian modernization 
as an ideal and the unexpected problems that arose when it was applied in the countryside. The 
conservation and rural development policies that were deployed in Guatemala during and after 
the Revolution cannot be understood without reference to local power struggles, class, and race 
dynamics. These tensions were evident on Arbenz’s plantation.  
Finally, I examine the legal files created during the application of the Agrarian Reform 
Law, also known as Decree 900. These files have previously been used to explore the political 
significance of the agrarian reform in the countryside, especially for labourers and campesinos.18 
However, the records also offer rich information about the land use: agronomists were routinely 
sent out to examine land prior to its expropriation and a similar process was repeated after the 
reversal of Decree 900 in the summer of 1954. Using these sources, I was able to document the 
intensification of agriculture throughout the Pacific Coast. There are limitations to these legal 
documents that are especially evident after the coup. They offer a fragmented vision of the 
countryside that focuses on a single plantation and it is often difficult to reconstruct the historical 
relationship of the farm to the surrounding region. Moreover, agronomists who surveyed the 
                                                     
18 Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom; Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside. 
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plantations after 1954 did not make fair assessments about how campesinos used the land they 
were given. Their reports were a pretext for the return of land to Guatemalan elites who 
promised the state that they would intensify production and modernize their plantations. 
Nevertheless, these documents offer important clues about the environmental consequences of 
this rapid transition between two very different agroecosystems.19 
Geography and Environment 
 Guatemala is defined by its climatic, biological, and ethnic diversity. Though the country 
is small—approximately the same size as Newfoundland or Tennessee—it contains fourteen 
ecoregions. Within these broad climatic regions there are 66 unique ecosystems. Guatemala’s 
mountainous topography and its position between North and South American created the ideal 
conditions for the evolution of many distinctive species.20 This biological diversity is mirrored in 
Guatemalan culture and politics. In addition to Spanish, there are 23 officially recognized 
indigenous languages. Most of these are Mayan, but there are also unique languages including 
Xinca and Garifuna. Although there is significant diversity within Guatemala, for much of the 
20th century official statistics have emphasized the divide between indigenous and ladino 
populations. The 1950 census reported that out of 2,790,868 residents—an approximation 
because residents could not be reliably counted—53.6% of the population was indigenous. The 
ratio of indigenous to ladino varied widely between regions: the heaviest concentration of 
indigenous Guatemalans were in the Highlands and ladinos dominated the Oriente. The 
countryside is also divided into twenty-two departments that govern over 331 municipalities 
(Figure 1). The most important socio-ecological zones in Guatemala are the Highlands, the 
Pacific Coast, the Northern Lowlands, the Petén and Caribbean Lowlands.21  
                                                     
19 An agroecosystem is the human organization of nature to benefit domesticated plants and animals that feed, or 
otherwise benefit, people. Economic factors often shape the agroecosystem, but all farms have natural limits: 
photosynthesis, soil quality, and non-human organisms. Humans can push these natural boundaries, but there are 
consequences for going past natural limits. As Donald Worster notes, “It is a rearrangement, not a repeal, of natural 
processes.” Donald Worster, “Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History,” The 
Journal of American History vol. 76, no. 4 (1990): 1093-1094. 
20 USAID, “Guatemala Biodiversity and Tropical Forest Assessment,” (2002), 4. Accessed July 9, 2017. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadf213.pdf  
21 This section draws on Carol Smith, “Social Relations in Guatemala Over Time and Place,” in Guatemalan Indians 
and the State: 1540 to 1988, ed. Carol A. Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 6-7; Edward C. Higbee, 
“The Agricultural Regions of Guatemala,” Geographical Review, Vol. 37. No 2 (1947): 177-201; Felix McBryde, 
Cultural and Historical Geography of Southwest Guatemala (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947). 
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Guatemala’s defining geographic features are the mountain chains that run through the 
middle of the country. These major peaks influence weather patterns and defined agricultural 
possibilities for most of the country. The Sierra de los Cuchumatanes dominates the northern 
edge of the Highlands and this transitions eastward into the Chacus, Chama, and Santa Cruz 
Sierras. As this series of mountains subsides, they give way to the Northern Lowlands. The 
Sierra de las Minas defines the eastern edge of the Highlands, framing the Motagua and Polochic 
rivers that flow to the Pacific Ocean. The Sierra Madre stretches down from Mexico through to 
El Salvador, bordering the Pacific facing section of the Highlands. There are 33 active volcanoes 
in this mountain chain and their frequent eruptions have deposited rich soil across the Pacific 
Slope that has drifted toward the coast over thousands of years. 
 
Figure 1: Political map of Guatemala (2000)22  
 
The Highland region is divided between the Occidente—the heavily indigenous Central 
Highland region—and the Oriente—a more arid landscape found in the Southeastern mountains 
and plains. The Central Highlands is between 1500 and 3000 metres above sea level, with higher 
peaks concentrated in the Sierra los Cuchumatanes. This rugged topography has made travel and 
                                                     
22 Map in the public domain, access provided by University of Texas Library. “Guatemala (Political), 2000.” U.S. 




trade difficult, but it has also created a wide variety of micro-climates within close proximity. 
Though much of the Highlands is known as “tierra fria” because of the spring-like weather that 
lasts through most of the year, high peaks often give way to small mountain valleys. This has 
enabled communities to grow a wide variety of produce in a compact area, including corn, 
wheat, potatoes and a wide variety of fruit. There is an abundance of water throughout the 
Central Highlands, because the rough terrain is cut through with fast moving streams fed by 
mountain run off and natural springs. There is a four to five month dry season that begins in late 
November, but mountains mists and dew allow campesinos to begin planting milpa before the 
rainy season returns in earnest in late May. There are several major valleys in the Highlands that 
have become agricultural hotspots, including an interconnected series of valleys between 
Totonicapán and Quetzaltenango and the Chimaltenango-Tecpán-Patzún triangle.23  
The transition between the Central Highlands and the Southeast begins around Guatemala 
City. This area is between 1500 and 500 metres above sea level and includes land in El Progreso, 
Jutiapa, Jalapa, Zacapa and parts of Santa Rosa, Quiché, and Baja Verapaz.  The Southeast 
includes some of the driest and warmest regions in Guatemala: less than half a meter of rain falls 
annually in El Progreso. Historically, most communities formed beside major watersheds and 
crop production was limited by the accessibility of water.24 During the Revolution, farmers grew 
corn, cotton, tomatoes, chiles, tobacco and other tropical fruits that did well in the hot climate. 
Cattle ranching was also common.25 The arid interior departments of El Progreso and Zacapa 
were mostly ladino but this trend did not hold for Jalapa, where more than 50% of the population 
was indigenous.26  
The Pacific Coast includes three regions: the Upper Pacific Piedmont, the Lower Pacific 
Piedmont, and the Coastal Plain. The Upper Piedmont is a band of land between 500 and 1,500 
metres above sea level that follows the edge of the mountains that run from Mexico to El 
Salvador. The landscape is often rugged but the nearby volcanoes deposited a rich layer of 
volcanic soil that is extremely fertile, although prone to erosion and leeching. The region 
receives between three and four metres of rainfall per year, but this decreases south of Escuintla. 
This was historically one of the most important coffee producing regions, although throughout 
                                                     
23 Higbee, 181. 
24 Simmons et. al., Clasificación de los Suelos de Guatemala, 83. 
25 Higbee, 188-189.  
26 VI Censo de Población, Vol. 2 (Guatemala, 1950), xxxii, xlvi. 
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the 20th century planters experimented with other tree crops including cinchona. Below this is the 
Lower Pacific Piedmont, between 100 and 500 metres above sea level. This area also has rich, 
fertile volcanic soils, which have been deposited by eruptions and washed down from the 
mountains. There is ample water in this region, with heavy rainfall during the wet season and 
year round water available from the many rivers that flow from the Highlands. The vegetation in 
this area is largely tropical moist forest.27 This area was historically dominated by cattle ranches, 
some bananas and scattered sugar plantations. The character of this region changed rapidly 
during the Revolution, when it was identified as an important, accessible and underutilized 
agricultural frontier that was well suited to mechanization. In 1947, geographer Edward Higbee 
argued that mechanization, agricultural research and public health initiatives to control malaria 
could transform this promising tropical frontier into “the garden spot of Central America.”28 
Finally, the Pacific Coastal Plain was a 15 to 40 kilometer wide band of land between the 
ocean and 100 metres above sea level. The highest part of this region shared most of the same 
attributes as the Pacific Piedmont, but rainfall became scarce as the land approached the ocean. 
Unlike the Upper and Lower Pacific Piedmont, this region was still heavily forested in the 1940s, 
with brushlands, natural pastures and swamps breaking up the landscape. Most of this forested 
area was tropical dry forest, although limited rainfall in some areas favoured very dry forest 
vegetation and areas near the coast were occupied by mangroves.29 The major economic 
enterprise on the Pacific Coastal Plain was the United Fruit Company plantation in Tiquisate, 
which had constructed irrigation for reliable production. Most large landowners grazed cattle 
throughout the region. Outside of the United Fruit Company plantations, endemic malaria-risk 
kept population low relative to productivity of the land.30  In general, the population 
                                                     
27 This is a generalization because topographical changes heavily influence the vegetation in a specific area. Lesley 
Holdridge, “Mapa de la Republica de Guatemala: Vegetación,” Los Bosques de Guatemala (INFOP: Guatemala, 
1950), 10. 
28 McBryde, 5-6; Higbee, 194, 200; Simmons, et. al., Clasificación de los Suelos de Guatemala, 311-312, 278-279. 
29 Holdridge, Los Bosques de Guatemala, 12-13. The tropical dry forest has been cleared across Central America 
and Mexico as industrial agriculture has expanded. For more on this forest type, its range and threats to its see 
Daniel Janzen, “Tropical Dry Forests: The Most Endangered Tropical Ecosystem,” in Biodiversity, ed. E. O. Wilson 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988); Daniel Janzen, Guanacaste National Park: Tropical, Ecological, 
and Cultural Restoration (San José: Editorial UNED, 1986); Robert H. Roubichoux and David Yetman, eds., The 
Tropical Dry Forest of Alamo: Biodiversity of a Threatened Ecosystem in Mexico (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 2000); Paul S. Martin, et al., eds., Gentry’s Rio Mayo Plants: The Tropical Deciduous Forest and Environs of 
Northwest Mexico (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998). 
30 McBryde described “heavy gallery forests” that bordered streams and rivers throughout the coast. Park-savanna 
dominated the area between rivers, likely sustained by cattle ranching and inconsistent rainfall. This was a 
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concentration was highest in the Upper Pacific Piedmont and dropped off close to the coast. The 
composition of the population varied widely throughout the Pacific Coast. The indigenous 
population was below 25% in the southerly departments of Jutiapa, Santa Rosa, and Escuintla. 
However, the indigenous population was much higher in Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, and San 
Marcos.31 These departments had close kinship and political connections to powerful highland 
communities like Quetzaltenango. 
The final regions are the Northern Lowlands, the Caribbean Lowlands and the Petén. At 
the beginning of the Revolution, the Guatemalan government was eager to develop the 
agricultural capacity of these regions but environmental and political factors encouraged them to 
refocus on the Oriente and the Pacific Coast. The Northern Lowlands is on the northern edge of 
the Central Highlands and includes land between 500 and 1500 metres above sea level. This 
climate in this region is like the Upper Pacific Piedmont, but the region does not have the 
accumulation of volcanic soils that make the Pacific Coast so fertile. The soil quality is thus 
significantly worse and export crops like coffee produce inferior yields compared to the Pacific 
Coast. The German plantation owners who dominated this region in the 19th and 20th century 
were able to compete because they had better access to ports and used cheap labour to 
compensate for the marginal soils.32  
The Caribbean Lowlands includes the Caribbean strip near Lake Izabál and the Franja 
Transversal del Norte, a band of land running through northern parts of Izabál, Alta Verapaz, 
Quiché and Huehuetenango. The most fertile parts of the Caribbean Lowlands were the major 
river valleys, including the Polochic, Sarstún and the Motagua. In the first decade of the 20th 
century, the Guatemalan government made major land concessions to the United Fruit Company 
including large parts of the Motagua Valley that the company transformed into industrial 
plantations that produced bananas and abaca.33 There were also important railway lines that ran 
through these river valleys, connecting Guatemala City and Alta Verapaz to the Caribbean Coast. 
Most of the Caribbean Lowlands and the Petén were lightly populated and campesinos practiced 
                                                     
generalized observation, since McBryde only descended to the coast in Suchitepéquez. McBryde, 4-5, Map 7, Map 
4; Higbee, 201. 
31 Sexto Censo de Población, xxxii. 
32 Higbee, 190-191; Simmons et. al., Clasificación de los Suelos de Guatemala, 
33 Paul Dosal, Doing Business with the Dictators, 46-47, 62, 78. Paul Dosal, Power in Transition: The Rise of 
Guatemala’s Industrial Oligarchy, 1871-1994, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 42-43. 
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swidden agriculture, which was well suited to the limits of soil.34 Much of the soil in the Petén is 
acidic, and even where soils are moderately fertile, poor drainage, thin and rocky topsoil and 
access to water is a common issue.35 This was not evident to the Arévalo administration who—
impressed by the fecundity of the tropical vegetation in the Petén—tried to establish an 
agricultural colony in the 1940s. The Poptún colony was an expensive failure and the 
government’s attention turned to other promising agricultural regions including the upper 
Motagua Valley and the Pacific Coast.36  
Creating Commodities 
There are still very few environmental histories about Guatemala. Those that exist focus 
on the rise of coffee production in the 19th century or the expansion of industrial agriculture after 
the 1970s.37 As a result, there is an important gap in the historiography between the 1930s and 
the 1960s. This was a formative moment in Guatemalan agriculture when modernizers 
introduced many of the most important technologies and techniques of the nascent Green 
Revolution. During this period, large landowners and campesinos adopted hybridized seeds, 
mechanization, fertilizers, and pesticides. David Carey argues that the popularization of green 
revolution technologies throughout the Guatemalan Highlands occurred during the late 1950s 
and 1960s, which was due in part to heavy promotion by USAID technicians.38 This dissertation 
                                                     
34 For a contemporary discussion of this system see Laura Hurtado Paz y Paz, Dinámicas Agrarias y Reproducción 
Campesino en la Globalización: El Caso de Alta Verapaz, 1970-2007 (Guatemala, C.A.: F&G Editores, 2008), 22-
23. 
35 Simmons et. al., Classificación de los Suelos de Guatemala, 587; Higbee, 177-180; 
36 The Petén and especially the Transveral became more important for cattle and exports like sugar and oil palm in 
the 1960s onward. Liza Grandia, Enclosed: Conservation, Cattle, and Commerce Among the Q'eqchi' Maya 
Lowlanders (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012).  
37 For works on coffee Stefania Gallini. Una Historia Ambiental del Café en Guatemala: la Costa Cuca entre 1830 y 
1902 (Ciudad de Guatemala: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala, 2009); Christian 
Berth, “Between ‘Wild Tropics’ and ‘Civilization’: Guatemalan Coffee Plantations as seen by German Immigrants,” 
in Comparing Apples, Oranges, and Cotton: Environmental Histories of the Global Plantation, Frank Uekötter, ed. 
(Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2014). For work on the industrial agriculture, including cattle ranching 
see Liza Grandia, Enclosed: Conservation, Cattle, and Commerce Among the Q'eqchi' Maya Lowlanders (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2012); Stephen Kent O’Brien, On Perilous Ground: A Social and Environmental 
History of Escuintla on Guatemala’s South Coast, 1928-1962 (Phd Dissertation, Yale University, 2007); Daniel 
Faber, Environment Under Fire: Imperialism and the Ecological Crisis in Central America (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1993); For extractive industries see Luis Solano, Guatemala: Petróleo y Minería en las Entrañas del 
Poder. (Guatemala: Inforpress Centroamericana, 2005); Luis Solano, “Development and/as Dispossession: Elite 
Networks and Extractive Industry in the Franja Transversal del Norte,” in War By Other Means: Aftermath in Post-
Genocide Guatemala. eds., Diane Nelson and Carlota (Durham: Duke University, 2013), 119-142. For an overview 
of the environmentalism and the state, especially in the Petén see Susan Berger, “Environmentalism in Guatemala: 
When Fish Have Ears,” Latin American Research Review, Vol 32. No. 2 (1997): 99-116 
38 Although the consequences of industrial agriculture have been in explored in the literature on cotton production, 
scholars still know relatively little about how campesinos interacted with green revolution technologies. Carey 
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demonstrates that the Revolution was a key moment in Guatemala’s agrarian modernization that 
established the basic infrastructure of the Green Revolution. This contextualizes the rapid spread 
of the new seeds and chemicals described by Carey.  
During the Revolution, the government promoted modern agricultural technologies that 
enabled the spread of new commodities like hybridized corn and cotton. Cotton and corn have 
little in common at first glance. One is used for clothing and textiles, the other a staple food for 
Guatemalans and their livestock. Yet these crops are bound together in a tale of hope, hunger, 
and dispossession that this dissertation traces throughout the 1940s and 1950s. During the 
Revolution, the government distributed   cotton seeds to large and small farmers and tried to 
replace traditional maize with high yielding corn varieties that would be grown on coastal 
plantations. Agrarian modernizers believed that if corn was plentiful indigenous campesinos 
would abandon subsistence agriculture and become market farmers. This strategy betrayed the 
overconfidence of modernizers who—especially at the beginning of the Revolution—knew very 
little about the countryside they sought to transform.  
For Mayan campesinos corn has immense spiritual and material value. Mayan 
communities revolve around corn production and consumption: no meal is considered complete 
without tortillas and campesinos always set aside some land for milpa.39 The bewildering 
diversity of maize varieties in Guatemala is a testament to the resiliency of campesinos who 
survived crop failure, displacement and dispossession.40 This social history is embodied in the 
seeds saved by communities and remembered during the planting of the maizefield. This is a 
moment of spiritual importance among the Maya because it is crucial for the social reproduction 
of the community and the family. 41  Although corn is sacred, Mayans have always sold and 
exchanged surplus corn for other goods they needed. The same holds true for cotton, a crop that 
                                                     
explores one dimension of this issue by examining indigenous perspectives on fertilizers see David Carey Jr., 
“Guatemala's Green Revolution: Synthetic Fertilizer, Public Health, and Economic Autonomy in the Mayan 
Highland,” Agricultural History 83: no. 3 (2009): 295. 
39 Milpa is a combination of corn, beans and squash that are commonly interplanted. See Chapter 2 for further 
discussion. 
40 For seeds as agents of culture, especially during moments of diaspora or forced migration see Judith Carney and 
Richard Nicholas Rosomoff, In the Shadow of Slavery: Africa’s Botanical Legacy in the Atlantic World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009), 76-77. 




was domesticated in Central America and was commonly refined into clothing by Mayan 
communities.42  
The Revolution marked a turning point in the Guatemalan relationship with corn and 
cotton. Modernizers established the economic and technological framework that tried to 
transform these crops into commonplace commodities defined primarily by their market value. 
This transformation helped to obscure the social and environmental inequalities that occurred 
during their production.43 Following historian Ted Steinberg, I examine how the struggle to 
control natural resources that were turned into clothing, food and shelter “created and reproduced 
social inequalities.”44 The hybridization of corn excited modernizers who believed that 
traditional milpa cultivation was a barrier to rural development that caused deforestation and soil 
erosion. Like their Mexican contemporaries, Guatemalan reformers embraced a modern 
agriculture that promised increased productivity by means of mechanization, hybrid seeds, and 
fertilizers.45 These technologies increased yields but the social, economic and environmental 
costs of productivity were often deferred into the future.46 Experts did not seriously entertain the 
notion that indigenous farmers had knowledge and experience that might aid efforts to improve 
rural productivity. By emphasizing cultural barriers to development, modernizers misunderstood 
many of the environmental problems they observed and narrowed the field of possible solutions 
for deforestation and soil erosion. As Jim Handy argues, the uncertain embrace of Guatemala’s 
                                                     
42 The most common variety of cotton cultivated around the world today, G. hirsutum, was first domesticated in 
Central America  Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015), xix, 3, 6; 
Jonathan F. Wendel, Curt L. Brubaker and A. Edward Percival, “Genetic Diversity in Gossypium Hirsutum and the 
Origin of Upland Cotton,” American Journal of Botany 79, no. 11 (1992): 1291-310; C. Wayne Smith and J. Tom 
Cothren, eds., Cotton: Origin, History, Technology and Production (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 11. 
43 Drawing on Marx, David Harvey notes the commodity is an abstraction that “‘coagulates’ or ‘congeals’” the labor 
required to produce it and resulted in a “thing that has value and the thing that had the objective qualities.” David 
Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, (London and New York: Verso, 2010), 34, 41. 
44 Ted Steinberg, “Down to Earth: Nature Agency and Power in History,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 
107, No. 3 (June 2002): 803.   
45 For an overview of the Green Revolution in Mexico see Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War 
Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), Chapter 1. For more detailed 
analysis see Joseph Cotter, Troubled Harvest: Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880-2002 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2003). For a strong opposition to agrarian modernization and efforts to create an alternative 
model of agronomy see, Matthew Caire-Pérez, “A Different Shade of Green: Efraím Hernández, Chapingo, and 
Mexico’s Green Revolution, 1950-1967,” PhD diss, University of Oklahoma (2016). 
46 For Maya Kaqchikel reflections on the costs of modern agriculture, which they began to realize in the 1960s, see 
David Carey, Our Elder Teach Us: Maya-Kaqchikel Historical Perspectives (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 2001), 106. Also David Carey Jr., “Guatemala's Green Revolution: Synthetic Fertilizer, Public Health, and 
Economic Autonomy in the Mayan Highland,” Agricultural History 83: no. 3 (2009): 283-322. For the classic 
critique of the Green Revolution see Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World 
Agriculture, Ecology, and Politics (London: Zed Books, 1991). 
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indigenous population by educated progressives hampered the Revolution, slowing its spread 
through the countryside and weakening the Government’s potential base of support.47 
Many intellectuals who sympathized with the Maya harbored doubts about their ability to 
abandon traditional agriculture—and the focus on community it connoted—to embrace markets 
and the nation. The writer Miguel Angel Asturias struggled throughout his life to understand 
how predominantly indigenous countries like Guatemala could become modern.48 His 1923 
thesis El Problem Social del Indio (1923), argued for forced assimilation of Guatemala’s 
indigenous population. Only by “transfus[ing] new blood into his veins” wrote Asturias, could 
Guatemala modernize Mayans and thereby secure the nation’s economic prosperity. Yet by 
1949, Asturias rejected assimilation and adopted an indigenista position.49 This movement of 
Latin American thinkers embraced indigenous tradition as the basis for a unique national 
identity. Indigenista writing often conflated Marxist rhetoric with indigenous culture, creating a 
unique ideological position that saw utility in indigenous customs as an antidote to rapid 
modernization and technological change. Yet there was often little consideration of modern 
indigenous peoples, their struggles and demands.  As José Coronado notes, “lettered indigenismo 
operates as a mechanism that constantly evokes an indigenous object” while marking a distance 
between indigenous peoples and Spaniards.50 
In his 1949 book Hombres de Maíz, Miguel Angel Asturias offered a poetic analysis of 
the struggle to commoditize corn. His novel was a bewildering and fantastic recapitulation of 
modern Guatemalan history that was inspired by the narrative structure of Mayan literature 
                                                     
47 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 206. 
48 Men of Maize was largely written while Asturias was living in France, where his interactions with the Maya were 
mediated through memory, experts, and artifacts in museums. Asturias qut. In Joel Wainwright, Decolonizing 
Development: Colonial Power and the Maya, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2008), 128. 
49 For a classic indigenista statement see José Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997). This struggle to balance a desire for development with respect for 
indigenous tradition was articulated by José Martí, who argued that indigenous resistance to exploitative laws in 
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Oscar Montero, Jose Marti: An Introduction, (London: Palgrave MacMilllan, 2004), 62. 
50 Jorge Coronado, The Andes Imagined: Indigenismo, Society, and Modernity. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 29, 35. For the political development of this movement in Latin America see Marisol de 
la Cadena, Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000). 
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including the Popul Vuh and the Book of Chilam Balam.51 The central tragedy in Hombres de 
Maíz was set in motion by ladinos who cleared the sacred forest with fire to grow corn for 
commerce. Asturias wrote: 
What guerillas do to men in times of war, the maizegrower does to the trees. Smoke, 
flames, and ashes…Sown to be eaten it is the sacred sustenance of the men who were 
made of maize. Sown to make money it means famine for the men who were made of 
maize…The earth will become exhausted and the planter will take his little seeds off 
somewhere else, until he too begins to waste away like a discolored seed fallen in the 
midst of fertile lands ripe for planting.52 
 
The indigenous leader Gaspar Ilóm, in an attempt to set right the balance between nature and 
man, killed the maizegrowers. Within a few pages, state reprisals destroyed the people of Ilóm, 
driving Gaspar to commit suicide. The ladino maizegrowers returned to the mountains to resume 
clearcutting the sacred forest, which Asturias believed was a harbinger of disaster.53 Like many 
educated Guatemalans, Asturias struggled to describe a reality where Mayans were neither 
modern nor traditional; where they could be campesinos and engage in the market without losing 
their identity and destroying the environment. Indeed, many of the poor maizegrowers he 
described in conflict with Gaspar Ilóm were indigenous but Asturias believed that they became 
ladinos once they surrendered to the market.  
Historians and anthropologists have recently drawn attention to the resilience of 
indigenous communities that successfully negotiated the often destructive expansion of state 
power and capital in the 19th and 20th century.54 Scholars have identified how cultural markers 
like clothing have changed as Guatemala’s indigenous communities adapted to state-backed 
attempts to assimilate them.55 However, they have treated the maizefield—the space that sustains 
                                                     
51 Guatemala is never explicitly mentioned, as the work addresses themes common to most Latin American 
countries. Miguel Ángel Asturias and Gerald Martin, Men of Maize, (London: Verso, 1988), xviii, xxiii.  
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cultural reproduction—as a durable nucleus of Mayan culture which is insulated from the 
coercive effects of the market.56  Studying modern food systems in Mexico, Lauren Baker argues 
that maize is “a symbol to describe agricultural and food practices grounded in practical farming 
knowledge, culinary traditions, and local economic exchanges.” In contrast, Baker argues that 
corn is representative of the commoditization of “food production, processing and 
consumption.”57 This binary draws attention to the benefits of indigenous agriculture, but it also 
obfuscates the traditional heritage of modern corn hybrids.58 Anthropologist Laura Fitting 
similarly recognizes the distinction made between maize and corn, but she cautions that that the 
emphasis on a “millennial culture of corn obscures how maize-producing communities (or 
peasantries) are made and remade in interaction with larger [market] forces and processes.”59 
Corn seeds appear static and immutable, but the numerous varieties planted by farmers 
today are the product of generations of careful selection, migration and exchange. In a 1946 
report, plant breeder Irving E. Melhus observed that Guatemala’s rich diversity in corn landraces 
was the by-product of trade and migration. Mayans farmers, he wrote, took corn seeds with them 
wherever they went and planted them in the ground wherever they lived.60 However, the 
relationship between campesinos and their seeds began to change rapidly during the 1940s as 
plant breeders used indigenous varieties to create new, highly productive corn hybrids. Like their 
Mexican counterparts, Guatemalan scientists created new hybrids that were well adapted to 
industrial agriculture.61 INFOP used its experimental plantations to demonstrate the productivity 
of hybrids and mechanization. In a 1951 press tour of INFOP’s Cuyuta plantation, reporters were 
awestruck by the “golden river” of corn that was being dried. They believed this was a “symbol 
                                                     
56 Elizabeth M. Fitting, The Struggle for Maize: Campesinos, Workers, and Transgenic Corn in the Mexican 
Countryside (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011), 13. 
57 Lauren E. Baker, Corn Meets Maize Food Movements and Markets in Mexico (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), 49. See also Jim Handy, “The ‘non-economy’ and the Radical Dreams of Food 
Sovereignty,” Paper Presented at Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue. Yale University, September, 2013.  
58 The use of genetically modified seeds, or GMO’s is restricted in Guatemala. However there is growing concern 
that corn seeds have become contaminated by GM corn imported for consumption. Liza Grandia, “Modified 
Landscapes: Vulnerabilities to Genetically Modified Corn in Northern Guatemala,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
41:1 (2014): 86. 
59 Fitting, The Struggle for Maize, 13.  
60 Irving E. Melhus, J.R. Wallin, and George Semeniuk, “A Summary of Some Maize Researches in 
Guatemala,” Plant Research in the Tropics (Iowa: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College, 1949), 541. 
Melhus was searching for corn varieties that could strengthen North American commercial corn crops. For more on 
this north-south exchange see Tore C. Olsson, Agrarian Crossings: Reformers and the Making of the U.S. and 
Mexican Countryside (Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 2017). 




of the increase of production by mechanical means.”62 The Revolutionary government hoped that 
these new hybrids would be adopted throughout the countryside, but their main purpose was to 
enable industrial-scale corn production on the Pacific Coast. 63 Hybrid corn and cotton seeds 
were the wedge that helped to open a new agricultural frontier for industrial agriculture, the 
Pacific Coast.  
Hybrids did not initially represent a problem for campesinos, who were at best curious 
about the seeds and at worst indifferent. Throughout the Revolution campesinos continued to 
cultivate corn—hybrids and criollo varieties—in addition to new crops. As an open pollinator 
“promiscuous” corn is biologically predisposed to cross-breed with other varieties and can be 
fertilized by far away fields. This made it difficult to control and commodify the seed.64 INFOP 
and other government agencies tried to push hybrids into circulation during moments of social 
upheaval, including as disaster relief in 1950 and as material support for Decree 900 
beneficiaries in 1952. These initiatives were also supposed to support campesinos and the state 
provided campesinos with technical and financial support. The widespread transition to 
hybridized seeds and new farming technologies occurred after the coup, driven by changes in 
land tenure, increased pressure to enter the market and accelerating hunger.  
As the demand for plantation labour expanded after the coup and the productivity of 
highland farms fell, many campesinos had to use fertilizers and pesticides to sustain their 
production on shrinking plots of land. The promise of these technologies was undermined by 
their long-term side-effects. As campesinos and smaller farmers adopted input-oriented 
agriculture, they lost control over the means of production and became dependent on chemicals 
and seeds that they had to buy on the market. In his influential analysis of hybrid corn in the 
United States, Jack Kloppenburg argued that 20th century farmers went through “a process of 
primitive accumulation characterized by the progressive separation of the farmer from certain 
(though not all) of the means of agricultural production (e.g., seed, feed, fuel, motive power), 
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which come to confront him as commodities.” 65 Small producers often struggled to keep up 
production after an initial burst of productivity, applying increasing quantities of fertilizers and 
pesticides with deleterious effects on their health and the surrounding environment.66 The 
dependence on inputs also exacerbated social inequality within indigenous communities.67 
Guatemalan experts often blamed these problems on campesinos, but it was part of the 
externalized environmental costs of export agriculture and it intensified significantly after the 
coup.68 
Guatemalan elites have historically celebrated large coffee, banana and cotton plantations 
as symbols of progress while campesino corn fields have been derided as backward and even 
destructive. However, this ignored the fundamental connection between these two agricultural 
systems: the productivity of modern plantations was underwritten by the impoverishment of 
campesinos. For example, the rapid growth of coffee production in the 19th and early 20th century 
undermined the viability of many indigenous communities by curtailing their access to land. This 
was especially evident on the Pacific Piedmont. Impoverished campesinos migrated seasonally to 
labour on coffee plantations. The impoverishment of Highland communities created pools of 
seasonal, migrant labourers. Plantation owners paid migrant campesinos low wages and offered 
them minimal benefits, aware that most were driven to work on coffee plantations because of 
hunger and debt. Commenting on the state of coffee production in the early 20th century, 
historian David McCreery concluded that seasonal migration damaged the health of indigenous 
labourers and had negative effects on their maizefields. Over decades, campesino fields suffered 
“in a crisis of decapitalization, neglect, and overcropping.”69 
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Industrial agriculture presents an attractive vision of bountiful harvests, but high yields 
are sustained by deferring the social and ecological costs of production onto neighboring eco-
regions or into the future.70 This contradiction was especially evident on Guatemalan cotton 
plantations, which benefitted tremendously from the new technologies and financial supports for 
farmers introduced during the Revolution. They rejected any efforts to regulate cultivation and 
focused narrowly on maximizing productivity. Without state regulation, cotton growers were 
notorious for their disregard for workers and their excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers. 
These plantations maintained artificially high yields by deferring the costs of production on 
workers and the surrounding environment. Plantations recorded high yields on new land for 
roughly five years, but after the initial store of nutrients were exhausted cotton growers used 
pesticides and fertilizers to sustain high yields. Uneducated and very poor migrant labourers 
were also frequently exposed to diseases and pesticides that caused illnesses and death.71 Charles 
Brockett’s survey of Central American export agriculture identified internal migration as the 
engine that powered modern Guatemalan plantations and by the 1970s, 60% of the working 
population in the highlands migrated to the coast.72 Lester Schmid’s study of migratory labour 
found that living conditions on cotton plantations were worse in just about every respect—except 
pay—than those on sugar or coffee farms. Their costs of living still exceeded income by nearly 
100% and most migrants depended on small pieces of land in the highlands to survive during the 
off-season. Migrants regularly ate double the recommended amount of corn and excessive 
amounts of beans and sugar. 73  
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In the 1970s, anthropologist Richard Adams wrote a short but influential indictment of 
the cotton industry which criticized growers for focusing on economic growth at the expense of 
the environment and workers. “Such growth,” concluded Adams, “is illusory, since there is 
hardly any cumulative product for the nation aside from the loss of good land.”74 Across Central 
America, cotton production began a sudden, precipitous decline in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, 
Guatemala’s cotton boom was over and most plantations on the Pacific Coast began a transition 
to new agro-industrial crops including oil palm.75 This sudden reversal in fortunes was driven by 
a drop in global cotton prices and the rising costs of fertilizers and pesticides. After the cotton 
industry collapsed, environmental activists and scholars documented the disturbing social and 
environmental costs of cotton production.76 This work helped to expose the link between 
agricultural modernization, environmental destruction and state violence. 
Historians have—justifiably—emphasized the overwhelmingly negative political and 
social consequences of commodity production and export agriculture in Guatemala.77 This focus 
on the violence of industrial agriculture and its association with the post-coup era has 
inadvertently simplified the complex social and environmental history of agriculture in 
Guatemala.78 Scholars have overlooked efforts by campesinos and workers to engage with new 
commodities and agricultural technologies.79 They have also tended to regard the state as 
inherently insensitive to the needs of the rural poor. As a result, scholars have not explored 
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Revolutionary-era efforts to introduce new crops, agricultural technologies and financing 
opportunities as a means to build a more equitable and sustainable economy. This effort to 
modernize Guatemalan agriculture was not without problems. Experts, for example, ignored the 
complexity of indigenous maize cultivation and imposed a replacement that was heavily 
dependent on costly inputs including fertilizers, pesticides and seeds. However, exploring 
agrarian modernization as it was implemented during the Revolution sheds light on an alternative 
model for economic development that tried to balance productivity with greater social equality. 
This aspiration was enshrined in INFOP’s motto: “Produce More to Live Better.” 
Chapter Overview 
The dissertation emphasizes the role of the environment and campesinos on the 
Guatemalan Revolution, complicating the traditional political narrative. In June of 1944, the 
dictator General Jorge Ubico resigned after almost fourteen years in office. He was forced to 
relinquish power by a coalition of students, professionals and workers. After Ubico left, 
Guatemalans began organizing new political parties and two major parties emerged: the Popular 
Liberation Front (FPL) and the National Renovation (RN). They also began to search for 
candidates that could run in the upcoming presidential election. Progressives eventually settled 
on Juan José Bermejo, a moderate professor living in exile in Argentina. Meanwhile, 
conservatives found a new leader in Federico Ponce Vaides. He quickly emerged as the leader of 
a military triumvirate that assumed power after Ubico resigned. Ponce declared his intention to 
run for President, and used the military to repress students and professionals. On October 20th of 
1944, members of the Guardia de Honor and the company of cadets led a revolt that ousted 
Ponce and established a new junta. This included Major Francisco Arana, Captain Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán, and the civilian Jorge Toriello. The new junta helped to draft a new 
constitution and then, in March 1945, they passed power to President Arévalo.80 
 Arévalo’s term in office was marked by political strife and turmoil. Shortly after he was 
elected, the FPL and RN merged to form the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR). This union was 
short lived and the PAR began splintering again in 1946, amidst concern that the party was 
moving too far left. The PAR continued to be the most important political party throughout the 
Revolution, but there was significant political conflict between rival parties. Despite this, 
                                                     
80 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 23-25, 31-32.  
25 
 
Arévalo’s administration successfully passed a rash of new laws that reshaped the country’s 
labor laws, created new opportunities for campesinos to access land, and opened up new 
government offices dedicated to social security and rural development. These legislative changes 
were impressive on paper, but they did not effectively redress systemic inequality. This was a 
byproduct of Arévalo’s own belief in a “spiritual socialism,” that emphasized self-discipline over 
material redistribution. This was compounded by Arévalo’s political dependence on the 
conservative Major Francisco Arana, who actively prevented the President from implenting 
reforms that favored workers and campesinos. Following the death of Major Arana in 1949, the 
Arévalo administration purged the military of his hardline supporters and this created an 
opportunity for substantive change in Guatemala.81 
 The election of Jacobo Arbenz marked a major shift in the Revolution. He came to power 
promising major land reforms as a means to address systemic inequality and chronic food 
production problems. His government drafted and then passed an Agrarian Reform Law in 1952 
that was both well-implemented and unusually decentralized. The government asked campesinos 
to organize in Local Agricultural Committees and initiate an expropriation process. The 
denunciations were then evaluated by an agronomist, a Departmental Agrarian Committee and 
the National Agrarian Department before they were reffered to the President. Thousands of 
families received land through the Agrarian Reform Law, but the massive transfer of land from 
elites to campesinos angered Guatemalan conservatives and multinationals operating in the 
country. They alleged that Arbenz had let communists take over the country, transforming the 
banana republic into a communist safe-haven. When the U.S. helped organize a coup in 1954, 
Arbenz was forced to resign because the military abandoned him. Along with Guatemalan elites, 
conservatives in the military were afraid that the growing power of Guatemala’s largely 
indigenous campesino population would plunge the country into political turmoil. In most 
historical accounts, the resignation of Arbenz was the moment the Revolution ended. The 
following chapters complicate and nuance this narrative by demonstrating that campesinos were 
active participants in the rural development projects undertaken during the Revolution. I 
emphasize how environmental factors—drought, deforestation, and tropical storms—shaped the 
political events that unfolded during and after the Revolution. 
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Chapter 1 explores government efforts during the early 20th century to diversify the 
Guatemalan economy and reduce the country’s dependency coffee production. Early 
modernization efforts were influenced by the United Fruit Company, which successfully 
established banana plantations in agrarian frontiers that had not been heavily developed. The 
United Fruit Company conquered these new regions by deploying “the machine,” using new 
agricultural technologies to produce bananas for export. This was not a sustainable model of 
production, but its evident productivity influenced the Guatemalan government and encouraged 
them to promote new exports like cotton on the Pacific Coast. Though the coastal plains were 
extremely fertile, farmers struggled unsuccessfully to establish cotton plantations because their 
crops were quickly destroyed by pests, pathogens, and weather conditions. Apprehensive about 
crop failures, large landowners focused their efforts on coffee production because it offered 
reliable income. By 1944, proponents of agrarian modernization broadly agreed that Guatemalan 
agriculture was stagnating because farmers had not embraced new productive technologies and 
rural poverty was detrimental to productivity. Conservatives and progressives disagreed about 
potential solutions. More conservative modernizers believed that the state should focus on 
disseminating productive technologies and increasing the capital available for farmers, especially 
large landowners. Progressive modernizers believed that Guatemala could diversify the economy 
and reduce inequality by encouraging campesinos to become modern farmers.  
The second chapter examines early agrarian modernization initiatives and government 
efforts to reform campesino agriculture. Modernizers believed that traditional corn cultivation 
was inefficient and caused rural deforestation that precipitated soil erosion and landslides that 
threatened lowland communities and plantations. This expert analysis was driven by ideology 
and did not accurately reflect the benefits of traditional corn cultivation, which were reported by 
scholars who worked closely with indigenous communities. Modernizers focused narrowly on 
the perceived threat to Guatemalan agriculture and used the threat of deforestation as a pretext 
for urgent government intervention in the countryside. The state considered paternalistic 
conservation measures to save the Maya from poverty, including resettlement. These regulations 
often reflected the profound discomfort of Guatemalan elites who did not know how to 
incorporate indigenous citizens into the state. Government efforts to transform milpa cultivation 
ignored systemic factors driving deforestation and soil erosion, including overpopulation, land 
shortages and poverty. It was the expansion of export agriculture throughout the 19th and 20th 
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centuries that fostered unsustainable land use patterns throughout the highlands, rather than a 
purportedly traditional indigenous agriculture.  
Chapter 3 explores efforts to encourage campesinos to modernize during the Presidency 
of Juan José Arévalo (1945-51), which led to the creation of the Institute for Encouraging 
Development (INFOP) in 1948. Progressives realized quickly that they had relatively little 
concrete knowledge about the landscape they hoped to transform, and they funded research led 
by international experts which assessed soil quality, forest resources and new crops including 
hybrids. As new information came in from throughout the countryside modernizers were both 
elated by Guatemala’s agricultural prospects and desperately concerned about Guatemala’s 
pronounced dependency on coffee and corn. Extension work and experimental farms became the 
main focus of rural development work during this period and the state hoped to awe campesinos 
and farmers with visions of abundance secured using new productive technologies: fertilizers, 
pesticides, hybrid seeds and mechanization. The Ministry of Agriculture created General Agents 
of Agriculture who were anointed as “apostles” in the government’s fight against soil erosion 
and deforestation. They travelled widely throughout Guatemala’s countryside, establishing new 
experimental farms and demonstrating the benefits of modern agriculture. The agents also 
became conduits for state power. Campesinos circumvented local authorities by addressing 
complaints to agents, who relayed them directly to the Minister of Agriculture. Their reports 
offered detailed insight into the complex financial and political problems restricting agricultural 
growth. It quickly became apparent that extension work could not secure rapid modernization 
without substantive rural reforms that challenged Guatemala’s large landowners.  
The fourth chapter examines the creation of INFOP, a semi-autonomous government 
agency that integrated extension work and research. The new government agency implemented 
an ambitious and progressive rural development agenda focused on the financial, technological 
and political barriers to modernization. INFOP worked to create a diversified rural landscape, 
which included a broader range of crops grown by campesinos and large landowners. Their 
mandate was ambitious, but even sympathetic landowners (like the future President Jacobo 
Arbenz) struggled to introduce agrarian modernization on their farms because doing so 
challenged existing social and environmental arrangements. INFOP was able to secure broader 
participation in agrarian modernization after a disastrous hurricane in 1949 which displaced 
thousands and destroyed food crops. The institute freely distributed hybridized seeds and began 
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aggressively promoting a new “conservationists doctrine” which encouraged rural development 
schemes that prioritized long-term agrarian productivity. They utilized their own Cuyuta 
plantation to experiment with new crops and land tenure arrangements, incubating new hybrids 
of corn and cotton. The social and agricultural changes introduced during this period catalyzed a 
transformation of Guatemalan agriculture which preceded the better known Agrarian Reform 
Law, passed in 1952.  
Chapter 5 explores the social and environmental consequences of the Agrarian Reform 
Law (Decree 900), which was passed in the summer of 1952. When Jacobo Arbenz became 
President in 1951, one of his first actions in office was to address growing anxiety about food 
prices which had spiraled out of control after the 1949 rainstorms. He insisted that the 
government would investigate the causes of potentially destabilizing food problems and pledged 
his continuing commitment to an agrarian reform that would rapidly modernize Guatemalan 
agriculture. The Agrarian Reform Law allowed campesinos to organize and denounce plantations 
that did not utilize their land effectively. Large landowners tried to prevent expropriation by 
rapidly clearing and planting their land with crops favored by the government, including cotton. 
Nearly 100,000 families received land across the country. The lightly populated Pacific Coast 
was gripped by rapid and unprecedented environmental change, as landowners and campesinos 
cleared forests and intensified agricultural production on former pasture land. When the agrarian 
reform was overturned after the 1954, large landowners argued that campesinos wasted the land 
they obtained. This chapter contends that Decree 900 beneficiaries worked closely and 
enthusiastically with technicians to modernize and improve their new land. However, the Arbenz 
government lacked the financial and technical capacity to properly support thousands of new 
farm operators and so many recipients were forced to plant traditional crops to survive their first 
year on new land.  
The sixth chapter documents the agrarian landscape that was created after the coup. The 
new regime and large landowners embraced agrarian modernization’s potential to increase 
yields, but they rejected efforts to reform financial and technical infrastructure to benefit 
campesinos. The rapid and violent reversal of the agrarian reform after the 1954 coup devastated 
food production and allowed large landowners to consolidate their power over labourers. 
President Castillo Armas mitigated the collapse of rural corn production by importing food aid 
from the United States. He blamed economic problems on the misguided policies of Arbenz and 
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the new administration created a rural development plan that heavily favored private capital. The 
government borrowed large amounts from the United States and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to fund an ambitious infrastructure project designed to 
facilitate the growth of export agriculture. Cotton production exploded during this period, as 
large landowners contracted generous and cheap loans from the state which encouraged them to 
rapidly develop new land. At the same time, the government tried to contain and capture the 
rhetoric of the agrarian reform with planned Agrarian Development Zones that resettled a 
handful of carefully selected farmers on coastal plantations. During the Revolution modernizers 
tried to transform Guatemala’s agrarian production by empowering Guatemala’s poorest, but 
after the coup the state actively supported large landowners and encouraged campesinos to work 
on coastal plantations. Agricultural modernization was supposed to decrease rural inequality and 
foster crop diversity, but after 1954 Guatemalan elites used the new technologies introduced 








Chapter 1: Guatemala’s Lost Paradise 
 On October 20, 1944, a popular revolution removed the last remnants of Jorge Ubico’s 
administration, bringing a definitive end to a 14-year dictatorship. There was widespread elation 
in Guatemala and within months Juan José Arévalo became the country’s first democratically 
elected President. Arévalo inherited a country that was heavily dependent on coffee production 
and struggling with chronic food shortages. Guatemala had endured several years of bad weather 
in the 1940s, causing crop failures and reduced yields throughout the countryside. By early 1945, 
systemic problems in Guatemala’s food system became apparent and the country faced 
widespread corn scarcity, inflation, and speculation.82 This moment of crisis followed decades of 
rhetoric by elites who promoted Guatemala as a paradise in constant bloom. This land of eternal 
spring was sold to potential investors as a region apt for agricultural development, with fertile 
soil, a favorable climate and abundant labour. Yet elite faith in the fecundity of Guatemala’s 
tropical soils also fostered widespread neglect of domestic agriculture. Progressives worried that 
Guatemala’s paradise had been lost to greed and neglect.  
The Revista Agricola, the Ministry of Agriculture’s official periodical, tried to identify 
the precise cause of Guatemala’s food shortages and declining productivity. In January 1945, 
they wrote: 
If there is a country where agricultural production is incalculable it is Guatemala. We are 
with reason children of the land, but by repeating the story of the eternal spring, we have 
come to believe that we are in Jauja. But when you look closely around us the illusion of 
Jauja disappears and we are left with a gloomy picture. How is it possible that there is 
scarcity, [and] that the crops do not yield enough to feed the country modestly?83 
 
The idea of Jauja—a land of milk and honey or a paradise—recalled the famous poem “La Tierra 
de Jauja” written by Lope de Rueda in 1547. The story features two hungry thieves who conspire 
to steal food from a simple man, by distracting him with tales about the paradise of Jauja.84 The 
Revista Agricola indicted the Ubico administration for misleading Guatemalan people about the 
country’s agricultural riches. They argued that Ubico’s agricultural policy had rendered 
Guatemala dangerously dependent on coffee: a monoculture that produced wealth for small 
limited elite and was susceptible to the fluctuations of global markets. The editors of the Revista 
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Agricola endorsed an alternative model of “polyculture” that supported a diverse array of crops. 
They believed that new crops would create economic opportunities for small farmers; their 
growth would democratize the countryside, generate new revenue streams, and stabilize food 
production.85 
Though progressives couched their crusade against monoculture in a rhetoric of social 
welfare, they were not the first Guatemalans to identify the threat posed by dependency on 
coffee. The following chapter examines government efforts to address Guatemala’s dependency 
on coffee and instabilities in food production before 1944. In the early 20th century, agronomists 
and policymakers attempted to diversify agricultural production by introducing alternative crops 
and expanding the area under cultivation to include the Pacific Coast. This early modernization 
work was inspired by the perceived productivity of United Fruit Company plantations, which 
flourished in the undeveloped lowlands that Guatemalans associated with pestilence. Elites 
largely agreed that large, export-oriented plantations were the most effective tools for producing 
economic growth for the state and jobs for the rural masses. The state encouraged private growth 
by keeping taxes and regulations minimal. However, they created few effective incentives to 
encourage farmers to adopt new crops and efforts to promote alternative crops like cotton, oil 
palm and rubber had limited success. The failure of these early diversification initiatives opened 
up a political space for critique framed in the language of agrarian modernization. On the eve of 
the Revolution, critics advocated for a new model of rural development that embraced agrarian 
modernization but focused on the necessity of empowering campesinos and small farmers.  
Wealth of the Tropics 
Guatemala’s anemic rural development and her modern reliance on large monocultures 
like coffee were caused by centuries of resource extraction by elites searching for quick riches. 
During the colonial era, conquistadors and their descendants roamed across Central America 
searching for easy wealth in silver, slaves and cacao.86 Guatemalan elites continued their search 
for a stable, lucrative export commodity throughout the 18th and 19th century. Indigo, cochineal, 
and, for a brief time, cotton were favored as exports but each commodity collapsed under a 
combination of external competition, plant diseases and poor transportation infrastructure that 
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made affordable exportation nearly impossible.87 In the mid-19th century, coffee emerged as a 
promising commodity. Guatemala’s social, economic and environmental landscape was rapidly 
transformed as plantation owners tried to satisfy growing global demand for coffee. The success 
of coffee encouraged the Guatemalan government to prioritize export-led development as a 
means of economic development, discouraging investments in alternative crops or domestic 
agriculture.  
When Guatemalan farmers began experimenting with coffee in the 1840s, few 
understood the ideal conditions needed to grow this non-native shrub. Coffee was initially 
introduced as a supplement to cochineal, a popular export that was light and easily transported 
across Guatemala’s rugged terrain. Landowners in established regions like Amatitlán and 
Antigua intercropped coffee with cochineal because they believed the shrub was a “hedge against 
the dangers of monoculture.”88 In less established agricultural zones like the Lower Pacific 
Piedmont, plantation owners often gambled on new crops like coffee hoping that they might 
become hot trade commodities. In the 1860s, coastal landowners searching for the next big crop 
tore up “flourishing cacao plantations to plant cotton that soon succumbed to diseases, and then 
coffee trees that withered and died in the heat.”89 These plantations tried to prevent disease by 
applying lessons learned from Colo5mbian and Costa Rican coffee growers, but local conditions 
differed enough that this did not help them avoid devastating crop losses.90  
Coffee growers eventually focused their cultivation efforts in two relatively undeveloped 
regions: Alta Verapaz and the Upper Pacific Piedmont.91 Experts encouraged plantation owners 
to establish their farms on undeveloped land where the rich layer of hummus and organic matter 
helped delicate coffee trees grow. Newly cleared land was highly productive and required less 
upkeep to control pathogens, pests and weeds. Successful plantations also tried to control large 
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swathes of land, because soil fertility varied considerably across the Pacific Piedmont. 
Problematically, the best agricultural land in this region was already actively used by the Maya.92 
Many indigenous communities farmed land in the highlands and on the coast to reduce the risk 
of crop failures. This strategy also greatly increased dietary diversity because tropical crops 
grown on the coast like cacao, sugar, fruits and corn—which can be harvested twice a year on 
the coast—complemented temperate crops grown in the highlands.93 
The expansion of coffee and other exports throughout the 19th century displaced 
indigenous communities and progressively undermined their subsistence options. Prior to the 
1870s, communities lost land to private interests in a piecemeal fashion. René Reeves argues that 
during the mid-19th century the ruling Conservatives “turned a blind eye as ladino after ladino 
invaded the coastal territory of indigenous towns” and established new, export-oriented 
plantations. The state intervened selectively to repress communities that tried to resist 
displacement.94 The Liberal Reforms of 1871 escalated this assault on indigenous land by 
privatizing communal land campesinos used for foraging and firewood.95 Most communities 
were already impoverished by decades of exploitation and they lacked the financial resources 
and political capital to effectively defend their territorial interests on the Pacific Coast.96 The 
rapid privatization of land enabled coffee planters to rapidly expand during the late 19th century. 
It gave large landowners the ability to borrow against their land—mitigating capital shortages 
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that historically hindered agricultural growth—easy access to fertile land, and a plentiful pool of 
labour for new plantations.97  
Coffee growers and the Liberal government sought to weaken but not destroy subsistence 
production. Large landowners wanted to encourage migration to the coast during the coffee 
harvest, but they did not want to maintain labourers on the plantation year-round. By retaining 
access to land in the highlands, indigenous labourers could combine seasonal labour on coffee 
plantations with subsistence-oriented agriculture on their small plots.98 However, economic need 
was not always sufficient to compel campesinos to work on coffee plantations, where they were 
paid little and often contracted debts and tropical diseases. To ensure a steady stream of 
labourers, in the 1870s Liberals resurrected colonial-era forced labour drafts, or mandamientos, 
and passed new vagrancy laws that imprisoned those without an official occupation. By design, 
these coercive measures forced campesinos in the coffee growing region to take refuge in debt-
labour contracts with plantations, which was the only legal protection against conscription. As 
labour drafts exhausted the supply of workers available for conscription in the vicinity of coffee 
plantations, government agents moved further into the Highlands seeking fresh bodies.99 Coffee 
transformed the landscape of the Pacific Coast, but it also reshaped the Highlands where 
campesinos depended on waged labour on plantations to supplement their household production.  
Liberal reforms to the mandamiento system blurred the boundaries between wage and 
slave labour and precipitated rapid changes in Mayan communities. K’iche’ elites around 
Quetzaltenango, the epicenter of coffee production, tried to protect their privileges by mobilizing 
indigenous labourers to work on coffee plantations. As labour demands grew, K’iche’ elites 
offered loans to community members. Though this enabled some K’iche’ to avoid conscription, 
turning “indigenous relations of reciprocity into relations of class” precipitated rapid internal 
differentiation within communities.100 Government efforts to legislate labour fostered destructive 
tensions within Mayan communities, but these laws also created opportunities for unexpected 
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98 Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala, 112. 
99 McCreery, Rural Guatemala, 222-223; David McCreery, “Debt Servitude in Rural Guatemala, 1876-1936." The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 63, no. 4 (1983): 735-59; David McCreery, “‘An Odious Feudalism’: 
Mandamiento Labor and Commercial Agriculture in Guatemala, 1858-1920," Latin American Perspectives 13, no. 1 
(1986): 99-117. 
100 “This dependency on money,” writes Greg Grandin, “within a more commodified economy transformed 
indigenous relations of reciprocity into relations of class.” Even as they curried favor with the state, K’iche’ leaders 
also tried to establish themselves as leaders of a national movement for “regeneration of the Indian [which] would 
lead to civil and political equality.” Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala, 2, 126. 
35 
 
alliances. As Julie Gibbings notes, petitions contesting forced labour on coffee plantations in 
Alta Verapaz highlighted disagreements between those who believed “Mayas were anti-modern 
hangovers or actors in making the future.” Importantly, those debates often exposed alliances 
between “ladino indigenistas and Maya patriarchs” that crossed ethnic boundaries and 
challenged the separation between Maya and Ladino that has defined historical writing about 
Guatemala.101 This formed the basis for Revolutionary-era arguments that blamed economic 
stagnation and poverty on the exclusion of the Maya from the political fabric of the nation.  
By the end of the 19th century, Guatemala’s economic fortunes were almost wholly 
dependent on coffee. As long as prices were high, good times prevailed: railway lines were built, 
telegraph systems installed and the new, coffee growing elite consumed European imports 
conspicuously.102 Yet the international price of coffee was volatile and Guatemala competed with 
many other tropical countries to secure European markets. Guatemala’s wealth was her cheap, 
skilled workforce, fertile soils and intimate connections with German markets.103 Like cochineal 
and cotton, coffee experienced a major crisis in 1897 when global prices crashed in response to 
Brazilian overproduction. The crash sent the Guatemalan economy into a decade-long 
depression. During this period, many Guatemalan coffee growers lost their farms, which were 
acquired by more efficient, well-capitalized German plantations that remained more competitive 
throughout the depression.104 The concentration of land and capital in the hands of German 
coffee producers created serious economic problems for Guatemala, as a large amount of capital 
derived from exports was being redirected overseas. This economic imbalance resulted in a 
significant deficit in the country’s balance of payments that limited the money available for 
imports.105 
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After the crash, President Estrada Cabrera put renewed emphasis on crop diversification 
in a belated effort to limit the state’s dependency on coffee exports and to control the “constant 
threat” of grain shortages. Estrada Cabrera ruled Guatemala for twenty-two years after his 
predecessor was assassinated in 1898. During his time in office he greatly strengthened the 
power of the state, which had been previously beholden to Guatemala’s elite. In 1899, the 
Directorate General of Agriculture was formed, with the goal of using the unemployed to 
colonize underproductive, or “virgin” areas of Guatemala. Those who accepted lands were 
forced to plants crops dictated by the new Directorate, a subsidiary of the Ministry of 
Development.106 The Estrada Cabrera regime encouraged colonization to diffuse simmering rural 
tensions over access to land and avoid destabilizing corn shortages, but beneficiaries were often 
pressured to sell land to large plantations. The government passed new regulations in 1912 to 
discourage land speculation. They forced beneficiaries to wait ten years before they could sell 
and demonstrate that one third of the land had been put into production.107 These policies were 
undermined by the President who secured his own power by dispensing land to favorites and 
checking access to land for rivals.108 
Government efforts to restructure land use and diversify agriculture after the crash were 
largely ineffective. Even though coffee prices fell significantly after 1897, growers were still 
profiting from coffee exports and they were hesitant to make costly investments in new crops.109 
Estrada Cabrera’s capriciousness compounded this problem, since his ego could quickly ruin 
carefully planned modernization initiatives. When the Samayoa brothers refused to name Estrada 
Cabrera as a partner in their new lemongrass operation, he denied the authorizations they needed 
to proceed. The brothers refused to accede to Estrada Cabrera’s demands and the project came to 
nothing, even though they had already negotiated contracts with farmers and bought equipment 
to process the oil.110  
In 1900, “La Republica” Agrícola published a special bulletin dedicated to agricultural 
issues that promoted diversification and intensification of agricultural production. The first issue 
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discussed Guatemala’s lackluster economic performance after the 1897 coffee crash, citing the 
decline of the cattle industry, the barriers to cotton farming and the high cost of flour. Fernando 
García, a prominent farmer and columnist for “La Republica” Agrícola, speculated that 
agricultural diversification was hampered by a weak state that did little to educate farmers or 
encourage them to take economic risks. García argued that farmers were reluctant to experiment 
with cotton and other new exports because they already knew how to cultivate coffee and could 
predict their yields and annual returns. He alleged that the chief obstacles to cotton cultivation 
were “ignorance and routine,” factors that could only be overcome by an aggressive campaign of 
education.111  
To this end, “La Republica” Agricola” published a series of articles promoting cotton as 
an easy to cultivate and lucrative crop. These articles inadvertently demonstrated the problems 
with the government’s diversification initiative, which struggled to overcome the ecological 
problems that had abruptly destroyed the first attempt to plant cotton commercially. In the 1860s, 
the American Civil War reduced US cotton exports and this created an opportunity for Latin 
American producers to enter into cotton production.112 In an effort to reduce their dependence on 
American cotton, British emancipation societies and the textile industry sent seeds to 
Guatemalan planters.113 These incentives helped spur production, as did high prices for 
Guatemalan cotton—considered better than most North American cotton—in London.114 
However, Guatemala’s cotton boom was short-lived; pests ravaged the fields in 1864 destroying 
crops at the peak moment of global demand. The tropical paradise that created bountiful harvests 
was also inviting to pests and pathogens that thrived on crops grown in monoculture. 115  
Farmers at the beginning of the 20th century remained apprehensive about possibility that 
their cotton crops might be eradicated by factors beyond their control, but the high price 
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encouraged some to experiment. In 1901, J.E. Felice described his various attempts to start a new 
cotton farm in the Eastern region of Panzos using seeds distributed by the Ministry of 
Development. Felice urged his fellow farmers to plant cotton because it produced quick returns 
with minimal risk. Whereas a coffee tree might take 5-7 years to mature, cotton was an annual. If 
farmers lost cotton plants to disease, weather, or faced low international prices, they could 
quickly recover their costs the following year or switch to a more lucrative crop. To secure a 
good harvest, plantation owners needed a steady supply of labour and Felice urged the 
government to regulate day labourers by “energetically” tackling vagrancy and “laziness” in 
communities. 116  
This dismissive attitude toward local agriculture proved to be the undoing of Guatemala’s 
second wave of cotton farmers, many of whom lost successive crops to bad seeds, pests and 
pathogens. A letter from award-winning coffee producer J.J. Rodriguez, of Finca Capetillo near 
Antigua, complained that the first samples of Sea Island cotton seeds given out by the Ministry 
of Development failed to germinate. He persisted, planting again the next season and he was 
eventually rewarded with a good cotton crop. Rodriguez attributed his eventual success to inter-
planting cotton with corn, a technique that was commonly used by Q’eqchi’ farmers. Though 
Rodriguez’s determination eventually paid dividends and he harvested a good cotton crop, his 
experimentation was heavily subsidized by his award-winning coffee plantation.117 Rodriguez’s 
case was unique and by 1903, production remained low. There was limited growth on the coast, 
especially around Escuintla, but most Guatemalan cotton was still produced in the inland 
Departments of Sololá and Alta Verapaz where traditional cultivation techniques dominated.  
In 1904, Orator Cook, a biologist for the United States Department of Agriculture, visited 
indigenous communities in Alta and Baja Verapaz, searching for the secret that allowed local 
farmers to harvest respectable yields of cotton despite the presence of the boll weevil. Cook 
noted that pests and pathogens had caused the “uniform failure” of commercial plantations, 
which forced Guatemala to import cotton. Cotton cultivated in the Baja Verapaz towns of 
Salamá and Rabinal was a dry upland variety similar to that grown in Texas except that it was a 
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perennial, not an annual. He hypothesized that the boll weevil did not ravage indigenous cotton 
stands because of a confluence of cultural and biological factors that suppressed the weevil. 
Cotton stands were almost always found close to homes, and were cut back to the ground every 
year to promote rapid maturation. Cook believed that domestic turkeys and chickens were 
“weevil destroyers” because they ate potential pests before they could harm cotton plants.118 This 
combination of social and ecological controls on weevils enabled early-maturing cotton plants to 
produce a respectable yield. 
Cook also examined a different, but equally successful strategy of cotton cultivation 
among the Q'eqchi' of Alta Verapaz. The Q'eqchi' were largely swidden farmers, and grew corn 
and cotton in fields that could be up to 50 miles from their homes. Whereas cotton was densely 
clustered around homes in the Rabinal region, Q'eqchi' growing in the Cahabón area of Alta 
Verapaz separated cotton plants by 3 to 4 feet and planted only six seeds in an area. Two to three 
plants produced roughly the equivalent yield as one large plant from Texas, or ten to twenty five 
bolls. Importantly, indigenous farmers inter-planted cotton with peppers and would tear out the 
cotton after the first wave of bolls opened. This selected for early maturing cotton plants which, 
in conjunction with a local ‘kelep’ ant that preyed on the boll weevil, allowed Q'eqchi' farmers to 
produce a respectable yield of cotton. Though smaller than boll’s harvested in Texas, analysis 
showed that the cotton fibers were good quality and suitable for sale in the US. Cook’s interest in 
Guatemalan cotton was driven by an acquisitive desire to collect, return and introduce boll-
weevil eating kelep ants Texas.119 He was fixated on the kelep ant as a means of boll-weevil 
control. He dismissed the role of indigenous farmers, whom he characterized as primitive and 
“unconscious” actors in the process of cotton cultivation.  
Though flawed, Cook’s work demonstrated that Guatemala could successfully grow 
cotton. Mayan campesinos produced cotton “under cultural and climactic conditions that in 
Texas would result in the total destruction of the crop.”120 Plantations that stubbornly tried to 
impose a modern, monoculture model of cotton cultivation were unlikely to prosper without 
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significant ecological interventions to stave off attacks from local pests and plant diseases. 
However, farms that learned from indigenous cultivation practices and grew cotton as part of a 
diverse farm system could produce respectable yields. Absent active and sustained government 
support, entrepreneurial spirit by itself could not overcome the ecological challenges to cotton 
production on the Pacific Coast. In 1908, the Estrada Cabrera regime tried unsuccessfully to 
force an increase in cotton production with a law that obligated all municipalities with the proper 
climate and soil to plant cotton.121 This attempt to force diversification failed because the 
government did not invest in crop research and extension work, leaving farmers to bear the costs 
of crop experimentation. 
More than a decade after the 1897 crash, the government had only taken symbolic steps 
to encourage diversification. Although some large landowners dabbled with alternative crops, 
most established plantations were hesitant to diversify as long as coffee continued to offer large 
returns. Notwithstanding cyclical dips in production caused by global conflict and economic 
downturns, Guatemalan coffee exports grew steadily throughout the early 20th century. True 
diversification was unlikely to occur organically and required robust state support—price 
controls, experimentation and incentives—that the Guatemalan government did not offer. 
Instead, the government tried to artificially diversify the economy by offering foreign companies 
like the United Fruit Company generous concessions.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, the United Fruit Company (UFCo) 
exercised tremendous influence over the Guatemalan government and the economy. In a 
misguided effort to help Guatemala recover from the 1897 crash, President Estrada Cabrera 
surrendered control in major economic sectors—railroads, ports, power, and agriculture—to 
American companies.122 Between 1902 and 1908, he awarded 139,500 hectares of land to the 
United Fruit Company (UFCo) and its sister company the International Railways of Central 
America (IRCA).123 The government gave the UFCo a monopoly over rail transportation and 
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control over Guatemala’s major port, Puerto Barrios. The UFCo was also granted generous rights 
to divert rivers and streams for irrigation projects. Even where legal regulations existed to protect 
watersheds, the government changed the law to benefit the UFCo.124 These concessions were 
controversial and landowners, government officials, and workers contested Guatemala’s 
transformation into a banana republic.125 
“The Machine” 
The United Fruit Company had many political opponents, but even critics lauded the 
UFCo’s ability to transform the hot and humid lowlands into productive spaces. Influential 
promoters crafted the image of the UFCo as leading the vanguard of modernization. In 1914, 
UFCo promoter Frederick Upham Adams argued that the banana was created by “the Machine”: 
a fusion of global commerce and industrial agriculture that linked American cities with the 
tropics.126 He lauded the Americans who transformed the deadly swamps of Central America 
into gardens for the world, driven by the “instinctive spirit…to face and conquer the frontier.”127 
Promoters like Adams established a strong narrative about the UFCo as a transformative force 
that brought agricultural modernization to formerly peripheral regions. He argued that the 
conquest of the tropics transformed global food production that enabled the world to feed “the 
ever-increasing hunger of the city-housed multitudes” with cheap and nutritious tropical 
produce.128 
The UFCo provided Guatemalan planners with a template for modernization that that 
embraced the ability of engineers and planners to organize nature into large, well-capitalized 
plantations. Observers were often impressed by the disjuncture between a chaotic nature and the 
carefully planned banana fields. In the 1920s, American Frank Carpenter claimed that no other 
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country could rival the productivity of the UFCo’s plantations in Izabal’s Motagua Valley.129 
This productivity, however, was not sustainable. The UFCo maintained artificially high yields by 
opening new land and investing heavily in irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides.130 In his 
examination of banana production in Honduras, John Soluri argued that “[i]ntensification is often 
equated with ‘modernization,’” despite evidence that “boosting yields extracts enormous 
environmental, economic and social costs.”131  
The rapid expansion of bananas and other exports across Latin America was facilitated 
by the expansion of rail lines and other transportation infrastructure. This enabled plantations to 
rapidly colonize “virgin territories.”132 Though yields were initially high, overextension and 
mismanagement of the stored soil nutrients led to declining yields. Pests and pathogens 
flourished on large plantations that specialized in a few exports. Stuart McCook argues that 
epidemic plant diseases like coffee rust, sugar mosaic and sigatoka disease became more 
prevalent as export agriculture expanded and intensified throughout the 19th and 20th century in 
Latin America. Where land was abundant, planters could defer the environmental costs of 
production by constantly opening up new land, but this was a short term solution that most 
landowners could not sustain. Once the frontier was exhausted, large landowners and the state 
invested heavily in scientific interventions to maintain high yields.133 Planters, however, often 
viewed cyclical fluctuations in production caused by disease and falling soil fertility as 
“technical problems of production rather than as structural problems with the underlying 
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model.”134 Latin American plantation operators tried to compensate for rising costs by reducing 
labour costs. They did so by mechanizing plantations and suppressing organized labour to keep 
wages low.135  
Though banana plantations were celebrated as a model of modernization throughout the 
early 20th century, they were designed to be ephemeral and transitory.136 In the 1920s, the UFCo 
moved to acquire new land on the Pacific Coast. This largely undeveloped frontier had rich soils 
and was well-situated to export crops to US markets on the West Coast. The Company’s 
lobbying efforts coincided with a moment of a democratic opening following the end of the 
Estrada Cabrera regime.137 In 1927, Guatemala’s major newspapers and the Asociación General 
de Agricultores—a powerful landowner’s organization—launched a campaign against the UFCo. 
They worried that the United Fruit Company would drive independent banana producers out of 
business.138 More broadly, they objected to the UFCo’s huge demand for labour which was 
tantamount to a “‘coup de grace to the nation’s agriculture.’”139 The UFCo was undaunted and 
pressed the sympathetic government of Lazaro Chacón (1926-1930) to push through new 
concessions that would also secure its control over the Pacific Coast, including exclusive control 
of a new port. Despite growing public anger about government corruption, the President made 
several unsuccessful attempts to get concessions for the UFCo through Congress. Chacón 
persisted until 1930, when he was forced to resign the Presidency following a stroke.140 
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After Jorge Ubico was elected in 1931, the charismatic President ended the political 
freedoms that had briefly flourished in the 1920s. He imposed order on the Guatemalan economy 
and countryside, purging the government and eliminating officials suspected of corruption or 
liable to dissent. The legislature was also transformed into an arm of the executive and Ubico 
pushed through the UFCO contracts, claiming that he had secured better terms than Chacón.141 
Concessions to the UFCo did not succeed in greatly diversifying Guatemala’s agrarian 
production, rather they fostered increased dependency on export agriculture as mode of 
economic development.142 Guatemala’s chosen path for economic development was shared by 
many Latin American countries that exported primary products to industrial countries like the 
United States, Germany, France and Great Britain.143 Although the government made half-
hearted efforts to diversify after the 1898 crash, Guatemala’s economic fortunes were still 
heavily dependent on coffee. 
When the Great Depression hit, world coffee prices dropped precipitously from $0.22 to 
just $0.08 cents per pound.144 In Guatemala the value of exports collapsed almost 40% between 
1928 and 1932, and government spending fell by half during the same period.145 Victor Bulmer 
Thomas argues that Guatemala was one of the few countries where economic policy, including 
promotion of traditional exports and import substitution, allowed for a quick economic recovery. 
Where larger countries like Mexico and Brazil relied heavily in import substitution 
industrialization, Guatemala and countries along the Caribbean trended toward import 
substitution agriculture. Across Central America and the Caribbean, enclaves specializing in 
export food production—like the UFCo banana plantations—created a large internal market for 
domestic agriculture. 
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Throughout his fourteen-year dictatorship, President Ubico tried to improve corn 
production so that more campesinos could leave their small farms and work on large 
plantations.146 Ubico initially took steps that seemed to favor campesinos, including allowing 
uncultivated land to be rented in usufruct and repealing debt peonage in 1934. These initiatives 
put more land into production and ended unpopular labour practices, allowing him to cultivate a 
reputation as a strong President who stimulated the economy and imposed order on the 
countryside.147 However, many of Ubico’s policies had adverse consequences for campesinos. 
Debt peonage was replaced by a more complicated set of vagrancy laws that compelled poor 
campesinos with little to no land to work for at least 100 days. Though some campesinos 
preferred this system because they could choose their employer, it was still fundamentally 
coercive and enabled the state to strengthen its authority over the countryside.148 In 1936, the 
government reversed regulations that allowed campesinos to rent uncultivated land and instead 
encouraged their sale to large landowners.149 Endemic land shortages coupled with the vagrancy 
laws meant that many campesinos had to either seek work outside of their communities or they 
were drafted by the state to work on infrastructure projects. 
The Ubico administration used vagrancy laws to compel landless labourers to build an 
extensive network of new roads, linking the subsistence-oriented Highlands to export regions 
like the Pacific Coast.150 This integration created a significant boost for domestic-use agriculture 
because the roads enabled campesinos to access urban markets and the coastal plantations.151 In 
the late 1930s, the President tried to facilitate this increase by ordering Guatemalans to plant corn 
on ejidos and national land across the republic. The state eagerly claimed credit for the near 
doubling in corn production between 1936 and 1937, but this miracle was only partly due to 
Ubico’s agricultural policy. The most important factors boosting production were improvements 
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in statistical techniques and the proliferation of roads that enabled remote regions to participate 
more easily in the market.152  
Ubico’s emphasis on increasing production did not deal with chronic supply problems 
that disproportionately affected small producers. In good years corn prices were depressed by 
oversupply, but in bad years weather and pests could cause precipitous price increases. For 
example, in 1937 a drought coupled with the invasion of grasshoppers and white worm 
dramatically reduced crop and seed yields across the country. The shortages encouraged 
speculation and inflation in corn prices. This supply problem could be solved, but it required a 
large infrastructure investment in grain storage that the Ubico government did not pursue. As a 
result, grain prices and supply continued to shift unpredictably throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 
Guatemala’s corn problems were worsened by the increased dependence of campesinos on 
seasonal plantation labour. Near the end of the decade, the Governor of Chimaltenango observed 
that most campesinos travelled to work on coastal plantations during the harvest and he 
anticipated low corn yields as a result.153  
Ubico’s focus on import substitution agriculture compounded the problematic divergence 
of Guatemalan agriculture into subsistence-oriented production in the highlands and export-led 
development on the coast. A 1934 report on wheat production justified this division by insisting 
that campesinos did not rotate their crops or apply fertilizers, despite official efforts to promote 
modern techniques. The government praised large landowners because they secured 
“magnificent results” by preparing the land, using machinery and importing wheat. They did not 
mention how inequality and limited access to land artificially constrained campesino 
productivity, but instead focused on the fecundity of the coastal frontier. The Revista Agricola 
punctuated their argument with photos of modern plantations growing wheat in the low-lying 
areas of Suchitepéquez. They wrote enthusiastically that the spread of wheat to the coast could 
“open a new era for agriculture in Guatemala” because there was an abundance of underutilized 
land.154 The Ubico administration eagerly produced guides promoting potential crops that could 
be grown in this new frontier, but they leaned on large landowners to drive modernization. There 
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were relatively few agricultural agents to demonstrate new techniques, large machinery was in 
short supply and modernization efforts focused almost exclusively on large plantations.155  
The Ministry of Agriculture was quick to refute any perceived slight concerning the 
productivity of Guatemalan agriculture. In 1933, the Revista Agricola, the official organ of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, published an extended rebuttal of an unnamed young agronomist who 
dismissed Guatemalan agriculture as “incipient.” The Revista’s editors offered an extensive list 
of the crops produced in Guatemala and emphasized new initiatives to train indigenous labourers 
to drive and maintain tractors, despite their lack of “scientific reasoning.” They also recognized 
that the indigenous population produced the country’s main domestic staple, but they made no 
mention of the quantity or quality of corn production. These weak efforts to defend agricultural 
productivity under Ubico reflected the state’s precarious dependency on coffee and bananas. The 
existence of new commodities in Guatemala was not synonymous—no matter how much the 
government cared to believe—with their effective or efficient production.156 
Field reports published in the Revista Agricola blamed the failure of previous 
diversification efforts on farmers and campesinos. In March 1934, agricultural inspector Juan 
Antonio Alvarado found that once extensive cinchona plantations across the Pacific Coast had 
suffered “criminal devastation,” which he attributed to planter preference for coffee and 
excessive bark harvesting by campesinos.157 In the late 19th century, President Justo Rufino 
Barrios (1873-1885) had mandated that cinchona trees be planted so that Guatemala could tap 
into the surging global demand for quinine, a derivative of cinchona bark.158 Unfortunately, the 
government distributed Cinchona succiruba and not Cinchona ledgeriana, which was preferred 
for the higher percentages of quinine in the bark. By the 1930s, cinchona cultivation had fallen 
out of favor and formerly extensive plantations were in disarray. On the Finca Mercedes in 
Coatepeque, Quetzaltenango, little remained of the nearly 5,000 trees planted during the Rufino 
Barrios era and the owner told Alvarado that he was inclined to destroy his cinchona trees 
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because they were poor shade trees for coffee. The lone exception to this trend of decay was the 
Finca San Pablo, where careful management had kept cinchona trees much more productive than 
the regional norm. 159 Though the Ministry of Agriculture was eager to shift responsibility onto 
producers, the collapse of cinchona production was caused by a combination of market 
conditions, poor state planning and weak technical support for new exports. 
Guatemala’s agricultural sector began to recover from the Depression in the mid-1930s 
and the Ministry of Agriculture escalated its efforts to foster diversification. The failure of 
cinchona encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture to focus its diversification efforts outside of 
area dominated by coffee production. Very few crops competed effectively against coffee in its 
ecoregion, with the exception of rubber, which was grown on large, well-capitalized plantations 
and supported by the US demand for strategic resources during WWII.160 The government 
engaged in an education campaign that emphasized the untapped agricultural potential of the 
South Coast, publishing instructional guides that promoted a range of potential exports including 
sugar, cacao and cotton production.161 The Ministry believed that cacao, for example, could 
become a national drink of choice given its popularity with indigenous communities.162 Yet it 
was cotton that emerged again as an ideal crop for the Pacific Coast, promising large landowners 
high returns and minimal start-up time, 
 Early cultivation guides for cotton emphasized the similarities between it and corn, 
indicating that the Ubico government wanted to engage small and medium farmers in export 
production. A 1932 report urged farmers to devote part of their cropland to cotton because “man 
cannot live on bread alone.”163 By 1937, the Ministry of Agriculture described cultivation in 
Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu, and Alta Verapaz as “limited” and they emphasized the need to 
“intensify” production. With notable frustration, they commented that their efforts to encourage 
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cultivation practices that discouraged the emergence of diseases had met with limited success. 
The Ministry rejected traditional intercropping strategies used by indigenous farmers and 
instructed farmers to plant on alternate years and burn the crop remnants after the harvest.164 To 
facilitate the spread of cotton along the South Coast, the Ministry also supported small producers 
with fertilizers and insecticides and they imported quality seed from El Salvador where cotton 
cultivation was more established.165 These initiatives successfully increased cotton production 
and the area under cultivation grew dramatically between 1936-37 and 1942-43, from 384 
manzanas to over 4,000 manzanas.166  
Although cotton production expanded rapidly during the Ubico period, the amount of 
land under cultivation was insignificant compared to coffee. In a market dominated by coffee 
growers, cotton and other new commodities were unlikely to succeed unless the government 
incubated the industry by researching ideal varietals, identifying best practices for growth and 
offering some financial protections. Guatemalan landowners were unwilling to dedicate their 
plantations to cotton, because its value remained unproven and there was reasonable 
apprehension about the economic risk posed by boll weevil and other pests. In 1937, the Ministry 
of Agriculture announced the need for government to set up experimental farms, so that they 
could impress upon landowners the economic value and productivity of modern cultivation 
techniques and new crops. “Our farmer,” they observed, “is timid as regards all those plantations 
which are not coffee and for this reason we have sufficient necessity for experimental farms, the 
basis for agricultural development.” 167 
The agricultural legacy of the Ubico-era was mixed. Kenneth Grieb argues that the Ubico 
government implemented a sweeping economic modernization program that transformed 
Guatemala for generations. His government successfully expanded roads, which increased the 
trade and the flow of labour between Guatemala’s export zones and the interior regions 
dominated by subsistence agriculture. The final years of Ubico’s dictatorship were marked by 
economic growth and a surge in exports.168 More broadly, he expanded the role of the state and 
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encouraged the development of a new middle class constituted of managers, bureaucrats and 
technicians. Many of these new professionals subsequently turned against Ubico, demanding 
more freedoms and greater social equality.169  
Modernization initiatives were discussed by agronomists and policymakers, but they 
were implemented piecemeal and agricultural growth continued to depend on the innate fertility 
of Guatemala’s soils and the labour power of indigenous labourers. This policy was especially 
evident in the Northern Lowlands around Cobán, where the soils were objectively worse than on 
the Pacific Coast but coffee planters remained relatively competitive. When Higbee asked about 
this dynamic, a local elite told him bluntly that it was “[n]ot the soil but rather the low wages of 
our labourers [that] are the wealth of the Cobán…[w]ithout them we could not exist.”170 Many 
landowners neglected new technologies and crops because they could artificially increase 
margins by exploiting cheap labour. The Ubico administration’s measures increasing corn 
production reinforced the dominance of export agriculture: landowners could pay low wages if 
corn prices remained stable and campesinos were less able to avoid wage labour if the returns 
they could get on their corn was low. 
During the Ubico period, modernization and diversification remained limited to a handful 
of large, well-capitalized plantations that experimented with new crops as a hedge against future 
coffee crashes. Although the administration encouraged greater corn production, the state did not 
invest heavily in crop experimentation or extension work that might have enabled campesinos to 
increase their yields and reduce their reliance on the plantations. The export wealth generated 
during the Ubico period enriched a small, economic elite while the majority of Guatemalans 
coped with increased poverty and food insecurity. Campesinos who lived during Ubico’s 
dictatorship told historian Cindy Forster that constant hunger drove them to work on plantations 
under conditions that approached slavery.171 The Ubico administration’s rhetoric of productivity 
in the land of eternal spring described a reality that only a small elite enjoyed. 
“Emerald Fields” 
On the eve of the Revolution, modernizers from across the political spectrum believed 
that agriculture was in decline, but they did not agree on the causes and potential solutions for 
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this perceived deterioration. In 1945, Atherton Lee, an agronomist for the UFCo, offered an 
influential analysis of the issues facing Guatemalan agriculture.172 Lee used corn yields as a 
barometer of agricultural problems. In 1936, Guatemala had an average yield of fourteen bushels 
per acre. This compared well to Mexico, where the average was eight bushels, but it was much 
lower than the nearly sixty bushels per acre achieved in Iowa. Those high yields were achieved 
through corn hybridization programs, mechanization and intensive fertilization: all practices 
uncommon in Guatemala.173 Lee argued that the high cost of Guatemalan corn was troubling in a 
country where 73% of the population subsisted on a diet of corn and beans. Many campesinos 
could not afford meat or even fruit.174 Lee argued that Guatemala’s production problems could 
be solved by colonizing the Pacific Coast and the Petén. This would reduce population pressure 
in the Highlands and create new economic opportunities for large landowners. “In this era of 
civil engineering,” wrote Lee, “[we] can make available hundreds of thousands of these rich 
lands for the descendants of the Maya now crowded on the infertile mountainous highlands.”175 
Surveying the export sector, Atherton Lee argued that Central America’s competitive 
advantage—proximity to the United States, soil fertility, and cheap labour—was undermined by 
the failure to adopt new production techniques like mechanization and fertilizers. He contended 
that agricultural knowledge in the tropical Americas was 20 to 50 years behind Java and other 
former colonies in South East Asia.176 Lee encouraged the government to expand aggressively 
into the Pacific Coast, using experimental farms to disseminate seeds to farmers and propagate 
new production techniques. In conjunction with her fertile soils, Lee argued that Guatemala’s 
cheap labour gave it a special edge in economic competition with Asian countries. “Guatemala,” 
opined Lee, “…has the best opportunity to compete with the low wage scales of Eastern 
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countries. We are liberals and want to improve the ‘standards’ of living of the people of Central 
America.”177 He encouraged the state to invest in corn hybridization and create varieties that 
thrived on large, coastal plantations, where easy mechanization, soil fertility and climate allowed 
for multiple large harvests per year.178 If food was plentiful, reasoned Lee, wages could be kept 
low and labourers would be healthier and more productive. Lee’s report appealed primarily to 
large landowners and conservatives who wanted to increase agricultural production without 
altering land tenure or class relations.  
Leopold Zeissig, a representative of the Department of Rural Economy, and Argentinian 
Engineer Ángel Núñez Aguilar criticized Atherton Lee’s diagnosis in their book, Guatemala: 
Paraíso Perdido. They agreed with Lee concerning some of the fundamental problems facing 
Guatemala, including soil erosion and deforestation. However, they cautioned that Lee’s analysis 
unduly shifted blame for Guatemala’s agricultural problems onto the Maya. Zeissig and Núñez 
Aguilar argued that inequality created the country’s agricultural problems. This began in the 
colonial era when a small clique of Spanish landowners used cheap labour and fertile soils to 
enrich themselves at the expense of the indigenous majority.179 They argued that the exclusion of 
the Maya from the nation was the “gravest error of our history.” As a result, Guatemala’s 
“emerald fields” were underutilized by “intelligent and vigorous” Mayans who struggled against 
nature and neglect to produce food. They believed that desperate campesinos unintentionally 
caused deforestation and soil erosion as they cleared new land and intensified production on 
existing plots.180  
At the beginning of the Revolution, reformers sought to ameliorate social inequality and 
pass rural land and labour reforms for the benefit of indigenous campesinos. Zeissig and Núñez 
Aguilar argued that Guatemala’s agricultural decline and food production problems could be 
reversed if technicians introduced campesinos to new technologies and techniques. “Our place,” 
they argued, “is at the side of the Indian, in front of our fertile fields.”181 They called for every 
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mayor to be trained as an agronomist so that government could be more active in local affairs, 
unlike the Ubico era when many bureaucrats were patronage appointments.182 This was a 
definitive step-forward in the relationship between the state and rural poor, although progressive 
modernizers continued to dream up schemes for agrarian modernization without consulting 
affected communities. Zeissig and Núñez Aguilar were proponents of large-scale agrarian 
production and wanted campesinos to become market farmers. Campesinos, however, surprised 
reformers by engaging in rural modernization projects, agitating for better access to new 
agricultural technologies and pushing for structural reforms that slowly radicalized the 
government’s rural development plans. 
There was also a nascent but growing concern that the model of industrial agriculture 
popularized by the United Fruit Company was irredeemably flawed. Guatemalan writers like 
Miguel Angel Asturias captured this dilemma in his novel The Strong Wind, which harshly 
criticized the UFCo’s Pacific Coast operations. Set amidst the verdant jungle, Asturias’ banana 
stands were modern, mechanical marvels that thrived by consuming labourers and new land. The 
opening passage described the end of the initial conquest of the Pacific Coast: workers and 
machines had rerouted rivers and opened up new roads that “carried men and crops, hunger and 
food” into this new frontier. The company, wrote Asturias, erected plantations on the remains of 
the verdant jungle: a “poor fabulous beast, tamed, demeaned, but still alive.”183  
There was a lingering horror about the act of coastal colonization described in the novel: 
it promised modern productivity but claimed lives and drove people mad. The plantation 
overseer Adelaido Lucero described the plantation as “‘[a] land that swallows people up.’” There 
was a constant demand for labourers, coordinated by the telegraph fulfilled by trains that carried 
already tired bodies to the coast.184 Lucero also noted that the orderly plantation—“so much alike 
and so symmetrically planted that they looked like the same plant”—was bewildering in its 
uniformity and often disoriented newcomers. Even the administrators who worshipped the power 
of the fruit company, wondered about the loss of humanity that accompanied this new model of 
organizing land and labour. The American John Pyle told his wife that once the frontier had been 
conquered, the adventurers were replaced by the lifeless organizers, “the ones who aren’t good or 
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bad, happy or sad, just machines.”185 Critics like Asturias worried that the high productivity 
observed on plantations destroyed land and communities without contributing to national 
development.186 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the Revolution, policymakers, landowners and technicians broadly 
agreed that agriculture needed to be modernized: tropical nature needed to be made productive 
with an infusion of technology, capital, and expert knowledge. Modernizers were inspired by the 
United Fruit Company depicted by Adams, who argued that the “Machine” transformed 
Guatemala’s formerly pestilent peripheries into islands of modernity. This idealized history of 
the UFCo ignored the political, labour and environment problems that dogged UFCo plantations 
on the Atlantic and Pacific Coast. These were problems that were common to most large 
plantations, but they were magnified in the carefully engineered farms run by the UFCo. Many 
critics who favored modernization struggled to reconcile their opposition to export-led 
development with their admiration of the UFCo’s innovative agricultural practices. 
Guatemalans were divided between different approaches to agrarian modernization. 
Large landowners adopted a conservative interpretation of modernization. They argued that the 
state should limit itself to incremental financial reforms and new technologies that would boost 
productivity. They were inspired by the UFCo and the American-model of agricultural 
industrialization that used mechanization, hybridized seeds, fertilizers and pesticides to increase 
yields and reduce labour costs.187 The second group agreed on the importance of new 
technologies but also called for sweeping land and labour reforms that would redistribute more 
wealth produced from Guatemalan soils to campesinos. These reformers emphasized the 
importance of agricultural extension and cultivated a powerful rhetoric that cast modernization as 
the solution to endemic rural poverty and a requirement for national sovereignty. These were the 
reformers who would eventually help create the legal and policy framework for Guatemala’s 
agrarian reform in 1952. 
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Chapter 2: Milpa, Deforestation and the Specter of Disaster 
‘Why my country is a New Atlantis. It is disappearing beneath the ocean.’ 
              Anonymous Guatemalan, 19461 
 
Maize dominates the modern Guatemalan countryside, but it is especially prevalent 
throughout the highlands. Campesinos plant corn virtually anywhere they can and it is not 
uncommon to see fields of maize clinging tenaciously, impossibly, to the side of a steep slope or 
ravine. The modern geography of corn cultivation was partly created by centuries of exploitation 
by Guatemalan elites who seized the country’s best land and limited indigenous communities to 
the highlands. However, the ubiquity of maize is also an indication of its cultural and spiritual 
importance for indigenous Guatemalans. Maize is an essential food—no meal is truly complete 
without a stack of tortillas or tamalitos—and it has sacred value because cultivating corn 
symbolizes the Mayan connection with the earth.2 It was this spiritual dimension of maize 
production that vexed government officials who wanted to reform, modernize and systematize 
Guatemalan agriculture during the Revolution. Modernizers, who revered science, had trouble 
understanding that Mayan campesinos could simultaneously celebrate spirits in the natural world 
and be thoughtful and innovative farmers. Government efforts to reform maize production tried 
to turn the Maya into modern, market-oriented farmers. This ambition dovetailed with Arévalo’s 
ideology of “spiritual socialism” that sought to “liberate men psychologically…[and] make each 
worker a man in the absolute fullness of his psychological and moral being.”3 
At the beginning of the Revolution, modernizers sought to turn the chaotic mess of corn 
varieties, crop rotations, and productive techniques into a category that could be governed and 
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controlled: milpa. As James Scott notes, modern states governed by simplifying the countryside 
into legible categories that served as “a convenient, if partly fictional, shorthand” that the state 
turned into an imperfect reality using laws and other methods of coercion.4 Milpa is generally 
defined as corn interplanted with other companion crops, including beans that fixed nitrogen and 
squash that offered shade and naturally suppressed weeds. This crop complex was an iconic 
symbol of indigenous agriculture in the countryside, but policymakers were keen to replace it 
with new exports. Modernizers argued that milpa was wasteful and inefficient because 
indigenous campesinos worked land until it was exhausted and then abandoned it for new land 
that they cleared using fire. Most reformers could not readily conceive of the indigenous 
population as active and engaged participants in a larger modernization project. They ignored 
evidence from researchers who worked closely with communities and recognized campesinos as 
careful farmers with a keen sense of the crops and lands they cultivated. 
 Drawing on new technologies of surveillance—aerial photos, mapping, and census 
data—reformers argued that traditional maize production caused deforestation and soil erosion 
that heightened the risk of devastating landslides. In newspaper articles and advertisements, 
modernizers defined campesinos as ignorant agents of destruction. Experts promised that the 
Revolutionary state could use education to transform campesinos into productive citizens who 
were engaged in market-oriented production. The state also used the discourse of conservation as 
a pretext to shape agrarian relations along more economically productive lines, warning that 
inaction would lead to disaster. Modernizers used the threat of disaster as an opportunity to 
reform agriculture and systematize Guatemala’s fractured agrarian landscape so that each region 
specialized in agricultural goods that suited local climate and soils. This approach to agriculture 
required considerable oversight and centralized planning, but experts promised that it would 
create a more resilient economy that respected the differences between agricultural regions. 
Policymakers confronted the limits of their agricultural knowledge in the Oriente, where plans to 
transform the Motagua Valley into a new commodity zone were scuttled by environmental 
limitations. The failure of this early modernization scheme demonstrated the importance of 
building relationships with communities and focused government attention on the Pacific Coast.  
                                                     




The first full year of the Revolution was full of promise, anticipation, and planning for 
agrarian modernization that would transform the countryside. The editors of Revista Agricola, 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s periodical, urged the government to invest in rapid modernization. 
They argued that new techniques would enable higher corn yields and stem the “terrible problem 
of scarcity” caused by inflation and food shortages.5 The Directorate General of Statistics 
reported that prices for the thirteen major foods consumed in Guatemala had almost doubled 
since 1938.6 Though there were different approaches to modernization, experts agreed that 
campesino agriculture constituted one of the main barriers to further development. Reformers 
argued that campesinos lacked the technical training to produce corn efficiently; yields were 
often low compared to modern varieties and over-cropping on marginal land caused soil erosion. 
Ideologically, reformers identified maize with the past and they believed its continued cultivation 
connoted an unnatural preoccupation with local needs and tradition at the expense of 
Guatemala’s future. This section explores ideas about corn production that influenced agrarian 
modernizers during the Revolution and juxtaposes these with community-level studies that 
challenged negative stereotypes about indigenous milpa cultivation.  
In the opening years of the Revolution, modernizers knew very little about the 
countryside they wanted to reform. Policymakers and agronomists based their early analysis of 
agricultural issues on a handful of reports produced by foreign observers. These reports fixated 
on campesinos as agents of environmental destruction, without taking into account the historical 
factors that precipitated the intensification of corn production throughout the highlands. In 1919, 
Orator F. Cook, an agronomist with the United States Department of Agriculture, documented 
the widespread practice of “milpa cultivation.” He reductively described this as “the planting of 
crops in temporary clearings.” Cook was an influential expert on tropical agriculture who had 
conducted extensive fieldwork in Latin America on a variety of crops, including rubber, cacao 
and cotton.7 “[M]ilpa agriculture,” observed Cook, “appears well adapted to the needs of very 
primitive peoples, since only a minimum of labor and equipment is required. The ax or the 
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cutlass is the only tool that is required.”8 His observations about corn cultivation emphasized the 
immediate utility of swidden agriculture, but he implied that campesinos did not adapt their 
cultivation strategies to compensate for soil fertility, climate and population density.  
Cook’s work challenged the widespread belief that tropical soils were inexhaustible by 
focusing on the destructive potential of indigenous agriculture. He argued that indigenous 
peoples across Central America rejected European tools and crops in favor of primitive maize 
cultivation that relied on extensive deforestation. Campesinos used fire to rapidly clear land 
during the corn-planting season, but Cook argued that these fires often escaped their control and 
roamed “wherever there is fuel to carry them.” Seen by night, the slopes of distant hills 
“gleam[ed] with lines of light like the streets of distant cities.” Though this system was initially 
productive, repeated burning transformed once lush regions like the Valley of Salamá, in the 
Department of Baja Verapaz, into “artificial deserts cleared by human agency.”9 Cook’s 
observations, couched in technical language, reinforced racial prejudices that denigrated the 
Maya as uninspired farmers occupying rich and fertile land that could be used for exports.  
Cook’s depiction of a destructive “milpa agriculture” also reflected growing international 
concern about the environmental costs of overpopulation in the developing world. He concluded 
that systems of agriculture that failed to maintain soil fertility were “nomadic and predatory” and 
would bring ruin to their practitioners.10 He noted that the lack of virgin forest in Central 
America testified to previous occupation by indigenous inhabitants: “Nations may pass without 
history, and yet leave marks of their devastation.”11 Cook argued that the Maya had engineering 
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their own collapse by overworking delicate tropical soils until they were exhausted.12 However, 
he uncritically generalized his observations about milpa production in the Verapaces—a forested, 
lightly populated region where most soils could not sustain heavy cropping—without exploring 
how the Maya adapted their production techniques to different agro-ecological conditions.13 In 
spite of its limitations, Cook’s research on the Maya joined a wider scholarly literature that 
explored the links between deforestation, soil erosion and the collapse of civilizations.14 
The link between overpopulation, poverty and environmental decay was popularized by 
William Vogt, Chief of the Conservation Section of the Pan American Union.15 In 1945, Vogt 
published “Hunger at the Peace Table,” in The Saturday Evening Post. The article called 
attention to soil erosion and overpopulation in Latin America; forces that threatened to 
undermine global peace and prosperity and throw the world back into war. Vogt hinged his story 
on the plight of Juan Pérez, a young Mexican forsaken by “modernity.” Farming a slope with a 
60% incline, Juan slowly lost the best topsoil to erosion and he was forced to abandon corn 
cultivation in favor of grazing goats. As the land produced less, Juan and his family pulled their 
belts tighter in an effort to forget their hunger. “[H]is babies,” wrote Vogt, “who ought to be 
sleek and smiling, already betray their ecological—that is to say, environmental—kinship to the 
skinny dogs that one so often sees in that country.” Vogt contended that without technical 
interventions and peasant education to stem erosion, the loss of soil fertility was sure to conclude 
in war and famine.16  
In his bestseller Road to Survival (1948), Vogt argued that tropical deforestation was 
driven by cultural factors that could be remedied through education. He wrote that the region 
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suffered from Spain’s “cultural lag” coupled with indigenous resistance to change, all 
“reinforced by the modern competitive economic system [which] has resulted in one of the most 
vampirish, extractive economies existing anywhere in the world today.”17 Much of Road to 
Survival built on Vogt’s work for the Pan American Union, during which he toured and produced 
reports on several Latin American countries, including Mexico, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Yet 
it was his interaction with one Guatemalan that anchored his observations and was the parting 
vignette in three different publications. Vogt wrote: 
A Guatemalan Indian—a literate one—summed up the problem well. I had been showing 
him, for the first time, the meaning of gullies through the corn and wheat fields, the 
chocolate color of the river that flowed by. He watched me for a long time, standing with 
me in the rain; then he said, ‘Why my country is a New Atlantis. It is disappearing 
beneath the ocean.’18 
 
The story, almost certainly apocryphal, captured Vogt’s belief that patient education and 
leadership by technicians could stem soil erosion and bring balance to Latin America’s ravaged 
lands.19 He encouraged experts to blend technical outreach that promoted conservation 
techniques with adult education strategies that encouraged campesinos to engage with new 
technologies. 
Vogt’s story was alarming for Guatemalan readers, especially when coupled with his 
1946 report on El Salvador. He concluded that Salvadorians had deforested much of the 
countryside, attempting to maintain food production as the population exploded. With an average 
calorie consumption of 1500—lower still for the poorest—Salvadorians suffered from hunger 
and its attendant diseases. Though many parts of Guatemala remained heavily forested in the 
1940s, experts warned that the populous highlands were threatened by deforestation and soil 
erosion on a scale that surpassed even El Salvador. In 1941, forestry expert Paul Standley 
catalogued the existence of extensive forests throughout the highlands and Guatemala’s Pacific 
Coast. Yet, he warned that deforestation moved with “sad rapidity” in the highlands because 
overpopulation and a shortage of land forced peasants to cultivate “almost perpendicular” plots. 
Campesinos joked that they planted their cornfields with a shotgun but these slopes were prone 
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to gullying and devastating landslides. The Sija Valley, North of Quetzaltenango, was cited by 
Standley and then Vogt as an example of deforestation that threatened food security. Standley 
wrote that trees in the Valley had been “exterminated.” Campesinos stoked fires using the roots 
of grasses, and to save fuel they prepared boiled tamalitos instead of traditional tortillas.20 
Foreign experts like Cook, Vogt, and Standley, cultivated an image of Central American forests 
in disarray and decay, threatened by the careless cultivation habits of poor and uneducated 
peasants and rapacious capitalists. In their search for general information about maize production 
and its links to overpopulation and deforestation, experts ignored indigenous efforts to adapt 
milpa to local conditions.  
Although maize fields were ubiquitous, the techniques campesinos used to produce milpa 
varied according to climate, soil quality and the availability of land.21 Geographer Felix 
McBryde argued that the destructive “milpa agriculture” that Cook, Vogt and Standley criticized 
was actually an intentional and productive agricultural system. McBryde, a student of respected 
geographer Carl Sauer, travelled widely throughout the Highlands and the Pacific Coast during 
the 1930s and 40s and observed a wide variety of cultivation techniques used to produce milpa. 
McBryde insisted that the milpa was a flexible category that accommodated significant 
variations in growing practices along a spectrum from swidden to sedentary agriculture. Even 
though indigenous communities in the Highlands carefully maintained the same fields for 
decades, there was “not an individual in the entire area who would not call his cornfield 
‘milpa’…as that is the one universal word for it, there being no general synonym.”22  
To emphasize his point, McBryde compared two towns on Lake Atitlán. Campesinos 
living around the picturesque lakeside town Panajachel expected a good maize harvest for five 
years, then the land was left to fallow for 5 years before replanting. In contrast, most of the land 
around Santiago de Atitlán—on the opposite side of the Lake—was planted for only three to four 
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years and then allowed to rest for fifteen to twenty years. McBryde speculated that residents of 
Santiago Atitlán practiced short rotations—compared the regional norm of 5 years—because 
they had more “good land per capita” than other comparable communities. There was also 
significant variation around these towns because the Lake was surrounded by volcanoes and this 
created several micro-climates in close proximity. The low-lying land around Santiago Atitlán 
could be planted for ten to fifteen years before it was rested because the weather was warm and 
the soils were fertile. At higher altitudes rotations were shorter and common practices like inter-
cropping were not used because the added weight of beans made milpa more susceptible to wind. 
23 McBryde’s work demonstrated that milpa cultivation was heavily influenced by environmental 
and political factors that varied even in a relatively contained region like Lake Atitlán.  
In 1940, anthropologist Raymond Stadelman challenged the belief that milpa cultivation 
caused wanton deforestation in a broad survey of maize production strategies in the northerly 
Department of Huehuetenango. He demonstrated that what critics like Cook labelled 
deforestation was actually a complex long-fallow system. Stadelman noted that most of the 
communities he surveyed maintained forests that were “continually being cleared and planted” to 
support the community.24 Newly cleared forests offered the highest corn yields—nearly 33 
bushels per acre—and this land could be planted for up to ten years before it had to be rested.25 
After three years, campesinos burned away the secondary brush and replanted the land in a cycle 
that continued until the roots were all but destroyed. During this time, yields fell off from a high 
of twenty five bushels per acre to a low of four to eight bushels. When the land was no longer 
productive enough, it was left as grassland for fifteen to twenty years and—except at high 
altitudes where regrowth was slow—it returned naturally to forest.26 Critics travelling through 
communities did not observe these long-term fallow patterns, which indicated a careful and 
measured approach to milpa cultivation that prioritized long-term productivity. Instead, they 
complained that indiscriminate burning caused forest fires and accelerated soil erosion. 
Stadelman defended fire as an efficient tool for clearing land that destroyed potential pests and 
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added nutrients to the soil. The most serious drawback of repeated burning was soil erosion and 
nutrient leeching that occurred when newly cleared land was exposed to intense rainfall.27 
However, campesinos mitigated some nutrient loss and soil erosion by using contour-furrows 
and fertilizing fields.28 
Collecting fertilizers was a time intensive process that demonstrated an effort to plan for 
the future and conserve precious soils that did not agree with official rhetoric about careless 
milpa production. McBryde argued that “fertilizing of the land is common and widespread” in 
the Highlands although “seldom practiced” in the extremely fertile lowlands. Campesinos used a 
variety of fertilizers based on local agro-ecosystems: residents of the lake area relied on maize 
leaves whereas animal manure was common in Sololá and in the cattle towns of Cajolá, 
Chiquilajá and San Andrés Xecul.29 Although campesinos had little capital and less land, they 
had a surplus of labor power that they applied judiciously to make their land productive. 
Raymond Stadelman found that campesinos enjoyed higher returns from land that had been 
fertilized and many were willing to invest the extra labor needed to collect fertilizer and manure. 
In Todos Santos Cuchumatán fertilization was “recognized by Indians as the salvation of the soil, 
without which the highlands would soon become useless for maize production.”30  
The sustainability of milpa cultivation was heavily dependent on political and population 
dynamics that were driven by the shift from communal land to private property that began in the 
19th century. The amount of communal land held by indigenous communities declined 
throughout the 20th century, however, milpa production on these lands was carefully controlled 
by tradition that favored long-term productivity. In the community of San Antonio Huista, 
Huehuetenango, communal land was divided into two large areas: one was cultivated and the 
other was left fallow and often used to graze animals. In the area open to cultivation, campesinos 
claimed small plots—roughly 2.7 acres in size—by clearing a strip around their new maizefield. 
From afar, this pattern of land use seemed chaotic but in practice milpa production was regulated 
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by established community norms. Liza Grandia, examining the enclosure of common land in the 
Petén, argues that for the Q’eqchi’ “commons are not only material places but also the 
relationship of an individual to his or her community.”31  
The dissolution of communal land increased social inequality and exacerbated 
environmental problems. In communities where private property was the norm, campesinos had 
to own or have access to significantly more land than those living in areas with communal land. 
Depending on local soil fertility, it took between three and six acres of land to keep milpa 
productive because half of the holding had to be left in fallow at all times.32 In the early 1940s, 
anthropologist Charles Wagley argued that growing inequality in Santiago Chimaltenango, 
Huehuetenango was driven by a shift to private land. Social prestige in among Chimlatecos was 
determined by access to the region’s most precious resource, land. However, there were very few 
winners in the transition to private land. “With many of the wealthier,” Wagley wrote, “the lands 
they inherit form the foundation for future accumulation…[b]ut when a family owns only fifty or 
sixty cuerdas, equal division between two or three brothers leaves each almost landless.”33   
Families that fell below the threshold to support themselves had several options. Some 
campesinos migrated to the coast to work on plantations, but they often used a portion of their 
wages to pay family members to care for their milpa.34 If they could afford to, many campesinos 
also rented milpa land in neighboring communities. Although coastal migrations were well 
documented, internal migrations were not always evident to observers because campesinos 
collected their corn and returned to their home community. For example, Stadelman noted that 
the community of Todos Santos was known as “the granary of Huehuetenango” but most of the 
maize sold in markets had been produced elsewhere. Stadelman argued that without this 
additional influx of corn “starvation would be the rule rather than the exception” because there 
was a shortage of arable land in Todos Santos.35 
Mayan milpa cultivation was productive and relatively sustainable, provided 
communities had sufficient land. Over generations, campesinos created a thoroughly humanized 
                                                     
31 Liza Grandia, Enclosed: Conservation, Cattle, and Commerce Among the Q'eqchi' Maya Lowlanders (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2012), 4. 
32 Stadelman, 105. 
33 Charles Wagley, “Economics of a Guatemala Village,” Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association 43, 
no. 3 (1941): 31-44. For an updated perspective see John Watanabe, Maya Saints & Soils in a Changing World 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 76. 
34 Stadelman, 103. 
35 Ibid., 102, 125.  
65 
 
landscape and forests were slowly converted into grasslands and open forests. Though 
modernizers worried that Guatemala’s forests were disappearing, this transformation created 
mosaic landscapes that increased species diversity and encouraged the growth of wild edibles.36 
However, steady population increases throughout the 20th century coupled with rising inequality 
placed considerable stress on the milpa agroecosystem. This problem was aggravated by the shift 
from communal land to private property. To compensate for their limited access to land and 
population growth, campesinos often had to shorten fallows or rent new land that could be used 
for milpa. Over time, this created some of the environmental problems that modernizers were 
concerned about, including soil erosion. However, government officials also often had trouble 
differentiating between deforestation—which they saw everywhere—and carefully constructed 
long fallows that utilized fire as a tool for clearing and preparing land. This disjuncture was 
caused by policymakers and agronomists who wanted to radically reorganize Guatemala’s 
agrarian landscape and saw milpa as an obstacle to this mission.37      
Maize as Monoculture 
 Government reports in the 1940s followed Cook, Vogt and Standley, blaming milpa for 
widespread deforestation and soil erosion. Traditional corn cultivation was frequently depicted as 
an obstacle to modernization that endangered Guatemalan forests, naïve campesinos and low-
lying communities. A 1949 report from the Soil Conservation Division urged officials to pay 
serious attention to Guatemala’s flagging soil fertility. Citing high population density and the 
abundance of rugged terrain with inclines ranging between 25-90%, they concluded: “Guatemala 
is a country in which the optimism about fertility should be decreased.”38 The Division 
highlighted several problems including the poor maintenance of pastureland and the loss of 
nutrients due to frequent burning to clear new land. Speaking of the highlands, they warned that 
the “merciless action of hatchet and fire” had stripped the land bare forcing campesinos to burn 
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roots and dried manure. “The soil in many of these areas,” concluded the report, “has 
disappeared and where it remains it is deficient in organic matter.”39  
The Division portrayed campesinos as a force of nature and that could not be restrained 
by fines or regulations, even close to Guatemala City. They blamed this feverish rush to clear 
and plant land on “rudimentary” maize production, which the Division concluded was the “only 
wealth” of most campesinos. Although they recognized that maize was important to campesinos, 
the Division condemned maize as a monoculture that “degrades our soils”40 This was a counter-
intuitive use of the word monoculture, but it appeared frequently in government correspondence 
throughout the Revolution. Modernizers believed that traditional corn was a monoculture for 
ideological and practical reasons. As discussed in the previous section, many experts simply did 
not recognize the complexity of indigenous milpa cultivation and so they disregarded the 
complex interplanting patterns used by most campesinos. However, the Ministry of Agriculture 
also believed that milpa cultivation discouraged campesinos from making the transition from 
subsistence-oriented production to market farming. The characterization of corn as a 
monoculture also reflected a nationalist discourse that urged all farmers to embrace crop 
diversification because it created a stronger, more modern national economy.  
Zealous reformers who wanted to rapidly modernize Guatemala emphasized indigenous 
predation on soils and forests, minimizing the role export agriculture played in accelerating 
deforestation in new commodity frontiers like Quetzaltenango, the Pacific Coast and the 
Motagua Valley.41 A report from the Department of Forestry calculated that nearly 80% of 
deforestation was caused by forest fires that began when campesinos burned land for maize 
production. They characterized intentional burning as “one of the principal causes of the 
impoverishment of our agricultural soils.”42 The Department argued that the shortage of land and 
dwindling soil fertility in the highlands placed pressure on indigenous farmers to continually 
open up new land for subsistence cropping. They described a system in which campesinos 
wastefully abandoned land cultivated with corn for only 2-3 years and “continued their 
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destructive actions with the axe, saw and machete, opening the mountains and leaving behind a 
cemetery of burned trees and soils prepared for the invasion of the destructive action of 
erosion.”43 The Soil Conservation Division estimated that across the highlands, nearly 120,000 
hectares were highly vulnerable to erosion. Visitors to Chimaltenango, Quetzaltenango or the 
Verapaces would quickly encounter dramatic evidence of destructive erosion, as torrential 
rainfall common to the region created rills and gullies on exposed slopes. They concluded that, 
“No crop has caused so much damage in this sense as corn.” 44 
Throughout the 1940s, the government focused on indigenous agriculture as the obstacle 
to agricultural modernization because this narrative fit within centuries of racial discourse about 
the Maya, but it was also politically expedient. Transforming the labor habits of powerless 
indigenous farmers was far easier than implementing a land reform that challenged the power of 
large landowners. The campaign was inspired by the U.S. New Deal, which was unsurprising 
given that President Arévalo had publicly declared his admiration for Franklin D. Roosevelt.45 In 
1945, the Ministry of Agriculture began a conservation campaign that promoted the value of 
forests to farmers and campesinos. The Ministry of Agriculture created a Soil Conservation 
Division that documented the extent of rural deforestation and soil erosion. They travelled to 
remote communities to demonstrate techniques for conservation and they created films and 
photographs that a made a powerful, even visceral, argument justifying state intervention in the 
countryside.46 The Ministry of Agriculture also published editorials, information pieces, and 
poems which tried to convince Guatemalans that rampant deforestation threatened the stability of 
the nation and the lives of farmers.47 
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The Guatemalan government’s vision of conservation was narrowly focused on the ‘wise 
use’ of nature’s resources over preservation.48 The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged farmers 
to protect the environment and they frequently emphasized the financial value of Guatemalan 
forests and watersheds. Historian Samuel Hays argued that this utilitarian definition of 
conservation favored “rational planning to promote efficient development and the use of all 
natural resources.” This definition of conservation emphasized the importance of scientists and 
technicians as shepherds of abundance, enabled by a political system that prioritized efficiency.49 
Yet a conservation campaign that did not engage the rural population as equals, often imposed a 
state-mandated definition of ‘wise use’ that reflected national priorities but poorly addressed 
local concerns. 
Articles and editorials examining the extent and causes of deforestation began appearing 
with regularity following the election of President Arévalo. Though they were often couched in 
scientific language, many of these early editorials criticized the Ubico administration. In January 
1945, the effects of erosion in the Oriente were discussed in an exchange between Nicanor and 
Juan Arrivillaga.50 The former—an editorialist for Guatemala’s major daily, El Imparcial—
included dramatic pictures of eroded lands found on the haciendas of El Rosario, Cerro Redondo, 
and La Pastoría. The roots of massive trees were exposed for several feet below the base of the 
tree; proof of the loss of several feet of soil in the last few decades (Figure 3). Nicanor argued 
that deforestation was an urgent problem, noting that the effects of rampant deforestation and 
erosion in the Oriente could be seen from the benches of Guatemala City’s Parque Central. He 
blamed deforestation on Ubico administration’s failure to protect Guatemala’s precious soils and 
forests:  
How many centuries will be needed to replenish the immense damage caused by soil 
erosion as a result of the merciless cutting of forests throughout the Republic? 
Throughout the trip [to Gualán], from the exit of the Capital, on both sides of the railroad, 
all you see are clearings and, who would believe it, where damages are most manifest, is 
in the farm of Doctor Cruz, our ex-Minister of Agriculture and External Relations…? 
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Where are the six million trees that the hypocrite Ubico claimed, in his annual reports, to 
have planted?51 
 
He reminded readers that the fall of societies was linked to deforestation, and urged Guatemala 
to follow the example of the United States where reforestation to combat erosion was a national 
priority.52 If action was not taken quickly, Nicanor quipped that the country might find itself with 
only the earth found in a campesino’s belly button. 
In his response to Nicanor’s letter, Juan Arrivillaga affirmed the seriousness of the 
problem and offered strategies for preventing or arresting soil erosion. He acknowledged that 
plowing up new land could contribute to erosion, but he focused on peasant agriculture as the 
pressing problem. “Our routine hoe cultivation,” he wrote, “without the care of the good farmer, 
have taken to the bottom of the sea the best of our farmland, leaving the subsoil exposed, as it 
were pure bone.”53 He advised farmers to open land selectively instead of “clearing and burning 
it as is common custom, to get two or three crops of maize and lose the earth to erosion.”54 
Arrivillaga believed that modern agriculture permitted intensification without causing 
deforestation and soil erosion and he was optimistic that experts could find technical fixes for 
modern erosion issues.55 His analysis of milpa cultivation ignored evidence that campesinos 
routinely used contour furrows and other techniques to limit erosion.56 
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Figure 2: Photo demonstrating topsoil loss due to erosion57 
Focusing on campesinos as agents of deforestation enabled modernizers to articulate a 
state-led plan for rural intervention that engaged large landowners as partners. An editorial in 
Revista Agrícola warned ominously that over generations “the barbarous custom of burning” to 
clear land had rendered Guatemala’s forests incapable of natural regeneration.  The Revista’s 
editors warned that many productive regions were on the verge of becoming deserts and they 
implored large landowners to allow the state to plant valuable trees on their land. This scheme 
would rapidly increase forested land, improve the health of watersheds and give landowners 
preferential access to precious lumber. The Revista Agrícola’s editorials and advertisements 
appealed to the rich on the basis of economic potential, but their message to the campesinos 
emphasized that deforestation would lead to poverty, hunger, and forest fires. They encouraged 
                                                     
57 Arrivillaga, “Efectos de la Erosion en Tierras del Sur Oriente y Medios para Evitarla,” 134. 
71 
 
the state to regulate forest resources to protect campesinos, arguing that deforestation would 
destroy the previous watersheds that the poor needed to survive.58  
 The Ministry of Agriculture responded to growing concern about deforestation by 
drafting a new law protecting forests that was passed with amendments by Congress in October 
1945.59 The Ministry published a draft version in June, justifying it as a needed update to the 
existing forest law that had been passed 20 years earlier. The overarching goal of the legislation 
was to give the state the power to compel private landowners to preserve forests along major 
watersheds, rivers and on slopes with inclines over 15%. The Ministry alleged that the 1925 law 
was too vague and lacked enforcement mechanisms, allowing private landowners to effectively 
manage land as they wished. They argued that landowners—driven by “ignorance or lack of 
scruples”—had over-exploited forests on private lands. This was construed by the Ministry as 
both a long-term financial loss for the nation and a cause of serious erosion that threatened 
productive areas of the country with flooding and other calamities including famine.60  
The state tried to assert control over the countryside by leveraging the threat of national 
disaster, but though its legal authority grew its practical control over the countryside remained 
limited. One of the most controversial aspects of the new law was Article 5, which required 
landowners to acquire state consent prior to cutting down forests. This article was enforced by 
forest rangers, but these were heavily concentrated in the lightly populated Department of El 
Petén.61 In a 1946 issue of the Revista Agrícola, the Ministry assured landowners that the intent 
of Article 5 was not to seize private land, but rather to foster rational forestry with long term 
financial benefits instead of cutting for immediate gain. The law exempted agricultural land with 
slopes under 15% and areas with crops needing shade trees, which protected coffee producers on 
the Pacific Slope.62 The Forest Law was more stringently enforced in the Petén, where the 
government tried to protect chicle and valuable trees, and throughout the highlands than on the 
Pacific Coast.63  
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 Comparing the draft drawn up by the Ministry of Agriculture and the final law highlights 
areas where policymakers struggled to come to a consensus. Article 24 of the Forest Law forbade 
the use of fire to clear new land, a practice that was closely identified with subsistence corn 
production. In order to “eradicate this practice,” the draft version of Forest Law published in 
June 1945 gave the State authority to resettle “reluctant cores” to areas where agriculture would 
do less damage to forest resources.64 This language was eliminated from the final law, and 
replaced with a commitment to convince farmers of the value of forests through education and 
demonstration. The rationale for this change was likely a mix of political pragmatism and input 
from more progressive members of the Arévalo administration who believed strongly in the 
transformative potential of extension work. Nevertheless, it exposed a core tension in early 
agrarian modernization work between proponents of slow reform through education and those 
who endorsed more radical solutions, including colonization and forced relocation. This second 
group favored the creation of a rationalized agrarian landscape that encouraged large, industrial-
scale farms on the coast and smaller, market-oriented farms throughout the highlands.  
In 1946, Revista Agrícola published a special issue focused on Guatemalan forests that 
included several photo essays documenting agrarian landscapes in Guatemala. The government’s 
Aerial Forest Service argued that photos taken from the air were powerful tools for education 
and they asked farmers to learn to “read the land” in order to become “our best collaborator.” 65 
This simple request was laden with ideological meaning: reading the land correctly meant 
accepting the bifurcation of Guatemala’s landscapes into the overworked highlands and the 
untapped lowland frontier. Aerial photography gave experts an unrivalled ability to observe 
peasant activity, but were often unable to see the benefits of different types of traditional 
agriculture in situ. As James Scott argued, this simplification facilitated governance by reducing 
the natural world to a handful of key variables.66 Viewing agrarian landscapes from afar enabled 
policymakers to identify agricultural practices they deemed wasteful and contemplate 
resettlement initiatives for communities that did not fit into their vision for a rationalized 
agrarian landscape. 67   
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The first collection was by the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional (IAN), a branch of the 
Ministry of Agriculture founded in 1945 that was dedicated to agricultural experimentation and 
research. These photos highlighted the agrarian potential of the South Coast—still largely 
forested—and presented examples of upland coffee and cinchona farms on the Pacific slope. The 
photos were carefully picked to support the argument that large, modern farms were able to 
balance productivity with forest conservation.68 There were several images of heavily forested 
lowland stretches of the Michatoya River which runs through the Department of Escuintla. The 
captions emphasized the Michatoya’s importance for large plantations, which had built extensive 
irrigation works to divert water to sugar plantations. Another photo of forests found in an 
undefined region “south of Retalhuleu” emphasized the vast expanses that had yet to be planted 
with cane and bananas. Only photos featuring farms close to the lowland city of Retalhuleu and 
the UFCo owned plantation of Tiquisate reversed the equation by showcasing large planted 
fields. These images of orderly and productive fields were supposed to highlight benefits of 
private initiative on the Pacific Coast, which created productive fields out of the forests that 
dominated the coast.  
The photos featured in the IAN collection also advertised the productivity benefits of 
environmentally-sensitive development in the highlands. Images of Finca El Naranjo, with its 
terraced slopes planted with thousands of new cinchona trees, demonstrated how Guatemalans 
could produce exports on more rugged lands. Similarly, the “magnificent” coffee plantation 
Buena Vista was lauded for its well-conserved forests. This set of photos ended with a vista of 
the Guatemalan border with El Salvador. On one side of this mountainous border, the forests 
were well conserved whereas on the Salvadorian side the slopes were largely deforested.69 These 
images made a strong argument for conservation as a practice that increased productivity on 
more fragile highland soils, but they routinely ignored campesino efforts to conserve soils by 
furrowing.   
The destructiveness of indigenous campesinos was reinforced in a complimentary photo 
essay sponsored by the Aerial Forest Service that featured images of deforestation from highland 
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Guatemala. Photos from the Tecpán region showed how indigenous communities cultivated 
recently cleared land, “the land that belongs to the forest,” without taking precautions against soil 
erosion. “Meagre harvests,” they wrote, “and the constant specter of desolation is the punishment 
of the man who destroys the forest, his best friend and firm ally.” Another photo of a mountain 
road in San Mateo Ixtatán, Huehuetenango emphasized the destruction wrought by the 
“thoughtless indian” who had cleared the land with fire and axes. The images collected for the 
Revista Agricola’s special issue were presented as evidence that the state had to impose 
conservation measures in the highlands, to save the forest from purportedly careless Mayan 
farmers. 70 
To convince the public about the destructive consequences of milpa cultivation, the 
Department of Forestry created an assortment of ads linking deforestation with imminent death. 
Readers were warned repeatedly that deforestation harmed agricultural productivity—inviting 
soil erosion and reducing water retention—and squandered precious lumber. Some ads 
emphasized the immediate risk of forest fires, in an attempt to dissuade indigenous farmers from 
using fire to clear land. An ad published in late 1945, showed a frantic indigenous woman, her 
son, and their livestock fleeing a fire consuming their homestead. The text explained that these 
tragedies occurred frequently during the dry period and urged Guatemalans to collaborate with 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s national forest campaign to minimize the risk of wildfires (Figure 
4).71 Another advertisement showed a lone goat in a field of stumps, littered with erosion gullies 
with the by-line: “Now there is not enough food even for a goat.” (Figure 3)72 The ad was 
followed by a short editorial that urged farmers to carefully consider how clearing forests for 
corn caused erosion and undermined the long-term viability of their communities.73  
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Figure 3: “Now there is not enough food even for a goat.”74  
 
                                                     




Figure 4: Indigenous family fleeing forest fire caused by intentional burning.75 
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This advertising campaign also encouraged Guatemalans—rich and poor—to respect 
government authority and internalize official ideas about conservation. The government 
encouraged all Guatemalans to recognize their responsibility as both citizens and stewards of 
scarce forest resources: “Every Guatemalan should be a forest ranger jealous of their forest 
wealth, which belongs to all.”76 However, ads targeted to larger landowners emphasized the 
economic value of carefully managed forests with an advertisement that showed a row of trees—
implying a managed forest—connected with an arrow to a large bag of cash. The caption stated 
simply: “All trees are money”77 Though officials frequently mentioned the economic benefits of 
forest conservation, they continued to use the specter of disaster as a rationale for regulating 
campesinos. An ad on the opposite page featured an imposing hand in the top corner of the 
image, pointing at a campesino, climbing a large tree to cut limbs for firewood. In the foreground 
there were tree stumps and in the background a field of trees being systematically limbed. The 
Department of Forestry warned that this traditional means of gathering firewood robbed the soil 
of important nutrients and eventually killed the tree, leading to soil erosion (Figure 5).78 Many of 
these ads were carefully framed to encourage campesinos to willingly cooperate with the 
Revolutionary government, which modernizers presented as a patriarchal benefactor. One ad 
made this cooperation explicit by picturing a campesino and a forest ranger shaking hands in a 
symbolic bridging of the class and cultural gap that divided rangers—and government experts—
from the communities they patrolled.79  
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Figure 5: The hand of the state observing and regulating campesinos.80 
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The Arévalo government believed that they could induce campesinos to adopt 
conservation by mixing regulation with education. For this to work, peasants had to accept expert 
tutelage as a responsibility of citizenship or the nation would face dire consequences. The special 
issue of the Revísta featured an extended editorial that highlighted the destabilizing political 
effects of soil erosion around the world. The editorial was placed beside a simple ad entitled 
“Citizens.” The sparse advertisement featured only text that urged patriotic—and presumably 
ladino—Guatemalans to help with the forest campaign by teaching others to care for the 
environment. 
Teach the Indian and make him understand the indispensable necessity of our forests. 
Compliment the tourist [that is] reforesting lands turned into wastelands. Teach children 
the value and necessity of the tree.81 
 
Though the ad stressed the need for cooperation, it also implied that like the child and the tourist, 
the indigenous person was not a full citizen. This reflected elites continuing discomfort with the 
majority indigenous population and their belief that changing agricultural practices was an 
important element in a larger project that sought to transform the Maya into appropriate citizens. 
The role of education in agrarian modernization will be explored in greater detail in the 
following chapter, but reformers frequently invoked the threat of disaster to secure their 
conservation goals.  
 The government discourse about deforestation and soil erosion continually invoked the 
threat of landslides and starvation as justifications for conservation regulations. Few areas 
attracted as much attention as the town of Panajachel, which was frequently cited in the Revista 
Agrícola as an example of deforestation run amuck threatening the town with disastrous 
landslides. Panajachel, one of the larger villages on Lake Atitlán, was also the main point of 
access to the scenic lake. Agrarian modernizers identified the Lake region as an area where 
indigenous campesinos, with some help from insects, had destroyed valuable forests of pine and 
cypress. One article concluded that, “[A] large part of these lands the Indians use to cultivate 
maize, no matter if the crop is anti-economic and that conditions are truly difficult for the 
harvest, including planting on hillsides with inclines of 85%.”82 Deforested lands were subjected 
to strong winter storms that began in May and ended in October. Throughout the winter, tropical 
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rains falling on exposed fields created rills and gullies, allowing soils to be swept quickly 
downhill and eventually into the Lake. Often the most intense storms came late in the season, 
when the ground was saturated with water and this heightened the risk of landslides and 
flooding.83  
 The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged farmers to begin remediation efforts 
immediately, advocating a mix of contour terracing, windbreaks and reforestation. The editorial 
ended with images that showcased recent landslides and deforestation in the Panajachel area, 
including a photo of a field with a 75% slope that “has been swept by the axe as it could not have 
been by a cyclone: no signs of the forest remain.”84 The caption blamed indigenous farmers who, 
lacking education and tied to tradition, preferred to “employ triple the effort in cultivating maize, 
where the natural laws are shouting their dissatisfaction…Man is cultivating his own ruin.”85 
Later in October 1945, while promoting the success of its reforestation campaign around 
Panajachel, the Ministry emphasized the continued threat posed by unruly campesinos. The axe 
and the “eagerness to harvest cobs on steep slopes” had destroyed the pine and cypress forest, 
exposing the ground to the rains that “write in the naked earth signs of death and desolation.” 86 
Throughout the 1940s, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Revista Agrícola continued to 
use Panajachel as a cautionary example of deforestation run wild. Well placed advertisements 
reminded readers of the connection between traditional agriculture, deforestation and starvation. 
One ad featured a cartoon of Death looming over a deforested landscape. A series of tree stumps 
littered the ground, with an axe buried into one stump that bordered the edge of a rapidly eroding 
bank. The headline read “Dark Prophecies for the Future” and the caption warned readers that 
deforestation led to “hunger and desolation.” To avoid catastrophe, the advertisement urged 
Guatemalans to join the Ministry of Agriculture’s conservation campaign. The following page 
featured a drawing of treeless slopes, riddled with gullies, surrounding a raging river. The 
caption read: “Don’t repeat the case of Panajachel.”87 This warning would prove prescient, as 
                                                     
83 For more on landslide dynamics, including the link between flooding and landslides caused by saturation of soils. 
United States Geological Service, “Landslide Types and Processes,” Accessed February 1, 2017. 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3072/fs-2004-3072.html  
84 “Sección de Forestación y Conservación de Suelos,” Revista Agrícola, August-September 1945, 550. 
Efforts to control soil erosion also occurred in well-settled regions like the slopes of the Agua Volcano bordering 
Antigua. “Medidas Dictadas Por la Direccion General Forestal, Para Evitar Los Deslaves Que Viene Ocasionando la 
Siembra de Cereales en las Alturas del Volcan de Agua,” Revista Agrícola, August-September 1945, 554. 
86  “Reforestacion en Panajachel” Revista Agrícola, October-December 1945, 781. 
87 “Campaña Forestal,” Revista Agrícola, October-December 1945, 805-806. 
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Panajachel was one of the main victims of devastating floods and landslides in 1949 which 
wrought tremendous damage across the South Coast (Figure 6).  
Though the Ministry of Agriculture identified deforestation around the Lake region, they 
were too focused on the potential economic consequences of soil erosion to grasp the underlying 
causes. The Ministry of Agriculture considered reforestation around Atitlán especially urgent 
because the region was a popular tourism destination. Visitors came to appreciate the beauty of 
the lake region, described by Aldous Huxley as Lake Como “with the additional embellishment 
of several immense volcanoes.”88 One of the draws for tourism was the visibility of traditional 
indigenous communities, who lived from fishing, making crafts and intensive horticulture. Yet 
the growth of tourism around the Lake slowly displaced indigenous communities, forcing them 
to cultivate land above the picturesque towns on the lake shore. This demographic shift unfolded 
over decades but the environmental changes to the Lake region began to manifest themselves 
quickly. 
 
Figure 6: A view of Panajachel, destroyed by floods caused by deforestation. 
Sol Tax, an anthropologist who worked Panajachel between 1935 and 1941, offered an 
important counterpoint to the government’s narrative of milpa as a destructive monoculture. He 
                                                     
88 Aldous Huxley, Beyond the Mexique Bay: A Traveler's Journal, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950), 139. 
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emphasized the attention indigenous farmers paid to soil fertility and their preference for diverse 
fields that balanced marketable crops like coffee and onions with corn and other crops consumed 
by the household. “One point is clear,” wrote Tax, “that while they do not always succeed, the 
Indians consciously try to get as much from the soil as possible, in a definition that includes 
long-term considerations.”89  His description of indigenous farmers revealed them to be 
inquisitive, knowledgeable about their local growing conditions, and quick to embrace new crops 
and technologies provided they made sense economically. Mayan farms were functional, even 
productive, but inequality and land shortages forced campesinos to shorten fallows and, where 
possible, open new land so that they could continue to produce food. Over time, this forced 
intensification stressed soils and campesinos had to supplement their declining milpa yields with 
waged labor. 90 Where deforestation and soil erosion existed, they were caused by poverty and 
discrimination that limited the Maya’s access to fertile land. Modernizers, however, struggled to 
escape the racial discourse that blamed Mayan milpa.  
The Cradle of Poverty 
Shortly after the Revolution, the Ministry of Agriculture began searching for new 
commodity frontiers where they could stimulate alternative exports like henequen, cotton and 
hybridized corn. Modernizers initially hoped that the perennially poor Oriente could be 
transformed into a new zone for export agriculture. They blamed endemic rural poverty on corn 
production, which returned meagre yields in the arid departments of El Progreso and Zacapa. 
The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged campesinos to adopt henequen or relocate to nearby 
departments where land was more plentiful and better suited to corn production. Even as the 
government encouraged campesinos to move, modernizers dreamed about the productive 
potential of large-scale irrigation in the Motagua Valley. They hoped that this technical 
intervention would liberate fertile soils, transforming the Valley into a hotspot for sugar and 
cotton production. However, their lofty aspirations were defeated by local environmental factors. 
Though government agents emphasized the destructiveness of corn production in the region, 
deforestation in most important agricultural zones was a by-product of export agriculture. The 
                                                     
89 Sol Tax, Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1953), 131. 
90 Ibid., 21-22. For indigenous reluctance to sell land, see Tax, Penny Capitalism, 69-70. 
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failure of modernization initiatives in the Oriente, refocused government attention on the Pacific 
Coast as a new region for development.  
In 1949, Felícito Carranza, a regional Inspector of Forest Rangers, penned a long letter 
that warned government officials about the link between rural conflict and environmental 
degradation in El Progreso, one of Guatemala’s poorest departments. El Progreso was in the arid 
interior—the region referred to by Nicanor and Juan Arrivillaga—where scant rainfall hastened 
desiccation and desertification of the already limited arable land. Carranza cited several cases 
where displaced indigenous communities were engaged in protracted land disputes with ladinos. 
91 These land disputes dated to the 19th century Liberal Reforms that enabled ladinos to 
appropriate land historically used by indigenous communities. However, the competition for 
precious soil and water resources was especially intense in El Progreso. Carranza warned that 
confrontations over limited land would continue unabated unless the state intervened with a 
definitive solution to land scarcity. 
Carranza eschewed direct legal confrontations with ladino landowners and he instead 
encouraged the government to resettle indigenous communities in El Progreso. He argued that 
campesinos were often trapped in a spiral of poverty, investing considerable time trying to make 
marginal land productive. “Farmers,” wrote Carranza, “fight with nature to obtain basic grains 
[“granos basicos”]…they risk personal efforts to obtain their daily sustenance. From there 
depends above all the poverty that is observed among them, because they barely produce for 
themselves…Thus it bears repeating the proverb that says: “LANDS WITHOUT 
PRODUCTION, CRADLE OF POOR PEOPLE.”92 Carranza advised the government to relocate 
campesinos to the border of Jalapa, a neighboring department where lumber and land was more 
abundant. He believed this would stop land conflicts—an assessment that dismissed the cultural 
importance of land—and stem the growing malnutrition crisis in El Progreso.  
Carranza invoked the threat of imminent disaster to bolster his argument for relocation. 
He estimated that 90% of the population of El Progreso was malnourished. When Carranza 
                                                     
91 In the municipality of San Agustín Acasaguastlán, the military had to intervene several times to prevent bloodshed 
between ladino landowners and displaced indigenous communities. Meanwhile, in the municipality of San Antonio 
La Paz, the indigenous community and landowners were engaged in a pitched legal battle that had lasted over 50 
years. While they had avoided confrontation and bloodshed, both sides alleged that a mysterious interloper was 
intentionally preventing legal resolution to the dispute.  
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visited local schools, he met poorly clothed and emaciated students and he encouraged the state 
to establish new Comedores Infantiles in the region, spaces where children could access 
affordable food.93 Carranza’s letter was marked by genuine concern for the well-being of 
campesinos in the region, but he focused on corn as the main cause of hunger and soil erosion. 
He called maize the “monoculture that has caused the ruin of so much land that today lies 
abandoned for lack of foresight” and encouraged the state to promote modern, market-oriented 
agriculture. Carranza wrote: 
Of what use is it to the farmer to plant in large extensions if his crops don’t give yields in 
the expected proportion. This happens in all the zone where the poor campesino exhausts 
efforts to plant the largest extension they can, but with bad production results. This error 
should be avoided while a basic [principle of] agriculture is being introduced, that is, 
plant little and produce more.94 
 
He proposed that abandoned and unproductive land throughout El Progreso should be dedicated 
to crops that balanced market potential with environmental suitability. He argued that the rugged 
land in the Department was well suited to henequen and sisal, drought tolerant and low intensity 
fiber crops that were used to make rope and twine for export.95 Carranza believed henequen 
could help this neglected region of Guatemala, opening up a “new industry with which they can 
defend themselves in the future.”96 Meanwhile, the Motagua Valley would be fully transformed 
into export zones specializing in industrial-scale cotton and sugar production.  
Carranza promised that modern and efficient plantations would transform El Progreso 
from a place of penury into one of plenty. However, he underestimated the importance of 
                                                     
93 He also encouraged the government to increase milk distribution and suggested that the United Fruit Company 
could contribute with free bananas for children. Patty Harms explores the development and spread of Comedores 
Infantiles throughout Guatemala City and more limited presence in some Departments including El Progreso (1946), 
Jalapa (1950), and Zacapa (1951). She argues that the movement, initiated by leading women in Guatemala 
including the wife of Arévalo, led to the formation of a school of social work under the auspices of IGSS. Moreover, 
the state saw the Comedores as a tool to address rural poverty and challenge the conservative Catholic Church’s 
commitment to addressing the structural basis for poverty. Patricia Harms, “Imagining a Place for Themselves: The 
Social and Political Roles of Guatemalan Women, 1871—1954," PhD Dissertation (Arizona State University, 2007), 
190-197. 
94 Carranza’s injunction closely mimicked INFOP’s development mandate “Produce more and live better” which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Carranza, “Proyecto de Obras de Positivo Progreso,” Min Ag. Leg. 421. 
AGCA. 
95 Felicito Carranza had been promoting henequen as a possible replacement for corn in Guatemala’s Oriente since 
1946. Felicito Carranza O., Inspector de Guardias Forestales, March 1946, Min Ag. Leg. 421. AGCA. Guatemala.  
96 His enthusiasm was likely inspired by the boom in the Yucatan, but the timing was not good. The henequen 
market began to decline in the 1930s because of market conditions, synthetic competition and changes in combine 
technology. Sterling Evans, Bound in Twine: The History and Ecology of the Henequen-Wheat Complex for Mexico 
and the American and Canadian Plains, 1880-1950 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), Chapter 
7; Felicito Carranza O, “Proyecto de Obras de Positivo Progreso,” Min Ag. Leg. 421. AGCA. 
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campesinos, who produced 40% of the region’s corn on a third of the arable land in El Progreso. 
These small farms were not incredibly productive, but campesinos played an important role in 
food production.97 Moreover, contemporary reports indicated that export agriculture was 
indirectly responsible for significant deforestation that gave the region its distinctive, barren 
landscape. The region he proposed to develop was known as the “forest of thorn,” because of the 
abundance of cactus, spiny trees and arbutus. This vegetation became widespread after railway 
transportation opened up the region for development and lumber extraction.  
In a report on the state of Guatemala’s forests published in 1950, ecologist Lesley 
Holdridge argued that vegetation throughout the Motagua Valley was transformed when the 
railway was built connecting Guatemala City with Puerto Barrios.98 The area was original 
covered by a mix of savannas and tropical deciduous trees. Many native trees were felled for 
their high quality, durable and resistant wood that was used as lumber and cross ties for the 
railroad. Holdridge concluded that “men completely extracted the most valuable species” from 
this now accessible forest and caused irreversible changes to the landscape.99 Though peasants 
did contribute to deforestation, Holdridge’s analysis reveals that the process was significantly 
accelerated by the construction of a railroad meant to connect Guatemalan coffee and banana 
plantations with the port of Puerto Barrios.100 Carranza praised the efficiencies of market 
                                                     
97 Simmons, et. al., “Classificación de los Suelos de Guatemala,” 83, 95-96. 
98 Holdridge, Los Bosques de Guatemala, 11-12. This report was commissioned by the Institute for Encouraging 
Production, an organization we will discuss in Chapter 4. Holdridge’s presence in Guatemala, like that of Simmons, 
Vogt, McBryde, and Tax suggested the region’s importance for the development of knowledge about the tropical 
world. He first published on Holdridge life zones in 1947 and revised this theory 1967. It continues to be used as a 
way to predict and map vegetation types based on soils and climate factors, including precipitation and 
evotranspiration. See L.R. Holdridge, “Determination of world plant formations from simple climatic data,” Science 
105 (1947) 367-368; L.R. Holdridge, Life Zone Ecology. (Tropical Science Center, San José, Costa Rica), 1967. For 
recent use of this approach to examine the links between climate change and forest cover, see Khatun K, Imbach P, 
Zamora JC, “The Implications of Climate Change Impacts on Conservation Strategies for Central America using the 
Holdridge Life Zone (HLZ) Land Classification,” iForest 6: (2013), 183-189. Accessed May 8, 2014. 
http://www.sisef.it/iforest/ contents/?id=ifor0743-006 
99 Los Bosques de Guatemala, 10. By facilitating access to formerly remote regions, railways transformed forested 
landscapes, consuming wood for ties, fuel, and stimulating production of export crops like sugar and bananas. For 
examples John Soluri, Banana Cultures: Agriculture, Consumption, and Environmental Change in Honduras and 
the United States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005) and Reinaldo Funes Monzote, From Rainforest to Cane 
Field in Cuba: An Environmental History Since 1492 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
100 A 1939 report by Agricultural Inspector Manuel Antonio Archila, emphasized the connection between poor land 
use and local market pressures. In the hills of neighboring Jalapa, Archila noted that wheat grown for sale to El 
Progreso, Zacapa, and to a lesser extent El Salvador was responsible for the destruction of forests in the mountains 
of Jalapa, Tobón, and Portero de Carillo, ranges that bordered the Motagua Valley. He accused indigenous farmers 
of clearing land and moving on after a few years. This process had “reduced to smoke and ash the natural wealth of 
these mountains” burning away stands of cedar, nogal, sapuyul and pine. M. Anto Archila to Secretario de Estado, 
Despacho de Agricultura y Caminos. January 23, 1939. Min. Ag. Leg. 1911. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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production, but the expansion of modern export agriculture was directly responsible for the 
poverty and deforestation he sought to solve. 
Holdridge recommended that agriculture should be limited to the basin of the Motagua 
Valley so that reforestation could occur naturally on the margins of the valley.  This answer was 
only partly satisfactory to Guatemalan modernizers who believed that the region had great 
economic potential which could be realized if locals followed expert advice. The government 
believed that the hills around the Valley should be seeded with henequen plants, because they 
anchored the soil and boosted campesino revenues.101 The fertile Motagua Valley was promoted 
as an ideal frontier for export agriculture and the state hoped to unleash the region’s potential 
through agricultural modernization. The valley was the object of multiple studies between the 
1930s and 1950s, which proposed irrigation to facilitate the expansion of agriculture in the dry 
region. An early report by J.G White Engineering projected that upwards of 16,000 acres 
between El Rancho and Zacapa could be irrigated fairly easily. They noted that though the soils 
were deficient in organic matter and nitrogen, after an initial application of 500 pounds of 
fertilizer per acre and the use of legumes, farmers would be able to plant lucrative cash crops like 
cotton and sugar.102 The environmental constraints including soil quality and precipitation were 
frequently overlooked or minimized by a subsequent report by the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The Ministry promoted sugar and cotton in the region, envisioning an agro-industrial 
landscape with refineries constructed close to fields. This new agrarian landscape left little room 
for corn, which was to be cultivated in the margins of irrigated land and would be displaced once 
cotton and sugar refineries were fully operational. “[A]s the capacity of these mills grows,” 
concluded the Ministry, “adjacent lands will be planted with cotton or sugar, to secure better 
economy of management and supervision.103 Growing excitement about the prospect of opening 
a new region of agrarian production through irrigation was dampened in 1953. Commissioned by 
the IAN and the Ministry of Agriculture, USDA technician Charles Simmons created a map of 
                                                     
101 The Yucatán’s experience with henequen indicated that intensive henequen production still caused deforestation 
and heightened rural inequality. Sterling Evans, “King Henequen: Order, Progress, and Ecological Change in 
Yucatán, 1850-1950,” in A Land Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico, ed. Chris Boyer 
(Tucson: University of Arizon Press, 2012), 150, 161.   
102 Though undated, references to construction of new rail lines and the use of data collected during a 1927 drought 
suggest the report was produced for the Ubico administration. J.G. White Engineering Corporation, Engineers and 
Constructors, “Reporte del Proyecto Para la Irrigación Y Suministro de Fuerza Electrica en Los Llanos de la 
Fragua,” n/d. Min Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
103 “Proyecto de Motagua,” n/d. Min Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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soil types in the Llanos de la Fragua, the region of the Valley where irrigation was proposed. 
Simmons revised earlier estimates of irrigable land downward and he found that only 13,158 
hectares were nominally viable. This region was made up of an enormous variety of soils: some 
had high salt levels that could destroy irrigated crops and other areas had such poor drainage that 
ground with standing water was completely dry just 6 inches below the soil.104 
The report concluded that despite the great hope and speculation about the agricultural 
riches of the Valley, only 30% of available the land was easily irrigated. That number rose to 
40% if one included lands that required levelling and terracing. Simmons anticipated that nearly 
27% of the lands would require several years of intensive remediation, and the rest was almost 
entirely unfit for agriculture and should be reforested.105 The state did not abandon hope that the 
Motagua Valley could be opened to agriculture but they were forced to proceed more slowly, 
establishing experimental research stations where the irrigation techniques could be tried.106 
Though plans for the rapid development of the Motagua Valley were checked by material 
realities, Guatemalan agronomists continued to tout the transformative potential of fiber crops 
like henequen, sisal and agave.107  
In 1949, the Director General of Agriculture Hector M. Sierra tried to stimulate fiber crop 
production throughout rural Guatemala. Working with U.S. authorities, he arranged for 10,000 
sisal plants to be imported from Haiti.108 Citing Haiti’s recent success with the crop, Sierra 
believed that sisal could turn practically uncultivated or marginal lands into productive farms 
that respected El Progreso’s ecological limitations. The Ministry encouraged production by 
offering plants for free and they rewarded adopters with prizes. Small farmers who planted one 
hectare of sisal were offered five quintales of maize or the equivalent in money. This was an 
effort to ease the transition to market production for subsistence-oriented campesinos.109 
                                                     
104 “Establecimiento de un Ensayo Piloto de Irrigacion en los Llanos de la Fragua,” n/d, Min. Ag. Leg 421, (AGCA).  
105 Report by Charles Simmons to Julio Morales Barrios, Sub Secretary of Agriculture, November 6, 1953, Min Ag. 
Leg. 421, (AGCA). This report confirmed the early concerns raised by Zeissig and Nuñez Aguilar who were 
concerned about the high cost of the irrigation project relative to the amount of new arable land it would create. 
Zeissig, Paraiso Perdido, 16. 
106 This research station was supported by the new United States’ new body for agrarian development in Central 
America, SCIDA. 
107 Henequen was commonly used as a shorthand for all these crops. This occurred also in Mexico’s Yucatan 
Peninsula. Evans, “King Henequen,” 153. 
108 He first approached the UFCO asking for henequen plants. The company experimented with a wide variety of 
crops on their plantations in Tiquisate.  
109 Farmers who planted 5 hectares would receive a batch of farming tools worth 50Q; those who dedicated 10 
hectares or more would receive free transportation of dry sisal fiber to the Capital for one year, or an equal amount 
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Sierra was still enthusiastic about the economic potential of fiber crops when he returned 
to the region for a three-day tour in January 1950. Sierra reported that 15 large landowners in 
Sanarate promised to plant no less than 5 manzanas, while the owner of the plantation Sabanetas 
wanted to plant up to 50-60 manzanas. He projected that within three years, the municipality 
would become the main sisal producer in Guatemala. On the basis of interest in the departments 
of El Progreso, Zacapa and even Baja Verapaz and Chiquimula, Sierra recommended that the 
Ministry obtain a further 500,000 plants from Haiti. With this infusion of new plants, Sierra 
believed that upwards of 200 manzanas of uncultivated land could be planted. Once these plants 
were established, the Ministry of Agriculture planned to promote their adoption in Guatemala’s 
arid, eastern provinces.110  
Hector Sierra and Felícito Carranza favored a carefully managed agro-ecological 
transformation, designed and implemented by experts. Their goal was to remake Guatemala’s 
agrarian landscape so that unruly cornfields were replaced with crops experts deemed 
ecologically sensible and marketable. In the 1940s, Sierra published an illustrated chart that 
demonstrated the agricultural commodities produced in Guatemala, arranged by altitude and 
labeled with the names of key communities. The image presented an orderly, idealized vision of 
Guatemalan agriculture, where every region specialized in a few crops that benefited the nation 
(Figure 7). The core conceit of this ambitious plan for rural modernization was that traditional 
agriculture stranded campesinos in poverty and destroyed the environment. In the context of a 
wise use discourse about conservation, experts saw indigenous corn cultivation as a waste of 
Guatemala’s fertility.  
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Figure 7: Regional crop specialization111 
Sierra expounded on his desire to rationalize production—for the good of the nation and 
indigenous peoples—in a 1949 essay collection celebrating the opening of the Iowa State 
College-Guatemala Tropical Research Center in Antigua. He approved of the “almost 
superhuman” tenaciousness of the Maya who originally tamed wild corn but he disparaged 
indigenous farming techniques as unchanging and unthinking. Sierra wrote that the “Guatemalan 
Indian does not even bother about where or how he plants his corn, his chief object being to have 
corn planted that he can take care of as tenderly as a father cares for his children.”112 He believed 
that this slavish adherence to tradition resulted in low productivity: Guatemala produced only 12 
bushels of corn per acre compared to high yields that U.S. farmers secured with fertilizer, 
mechanization and hybrid seeds. He argued that this situation could be changed through 
education and extension work.  
The Indian is rooted to the soil in which he lives, whether nature is kind or wild and 
unruly. To destroy or disorganize brusquely his way of life is impossible. Gradual 
changes can be made and that is precisely what is being done in Guatemala by 
                                                     
111 Hector M. Sierra, “Producción Agrícola de Guatemala” in report by Rodolfo Lambour M. “Algunas 
Consideraciones Para el Fomento de la Fruticultura en el Departamento de Jalapa,” August 4, 1951. Min. Ag. Leg. 
421. AGCA. Guatemala.  
112 H. M. Sierra, “Corn in Guatemala,” Plant Research in the Tropics: Research Bulletin 371, ed. I.E. Melhus, (Ames, 
Iowa: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College, 1949), 509, 512. 
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educational methods, in schools, army posts and by ambulatory missions. The Indian is 
happy when he grows corn, even though what he calls happiness is to us misery.113  
 
Sierra’s description accurately described government efforts to reach out to Guatemala’s large 
and largely rural indigenous population. Sierra and many of his colleagues believed strongly in 
the emancipatory power of education and they demonstrated a genuine interest in the welfare of 
the Mayan. This was a significant policy shift for the Guatemalan government, which had for 
decades ignored or actively worked to undermine indigenous communities. However, this 
renewed attention came at a cost. The government became fixated on transforming the Maya into 
sedentary, market-oriented farmers dismissing the viability of alternative agricultural knowledge. 
Conclusion 
 In June of 1949, Chilean technical advisor Manuel Elgueta was dispatched to rural 
Guatemala by the newly created Institute for Encouraging Production (INFOP). Elgueta’s task 
was to report on wheat hybridization experiments being carried out by INFOP and its 
institutional rival IAN. The latter was working closely with the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Mexican Agricultural Program, experimenting with new, rust resistant wheat varieties. After he 
had evaluated the progress of each program, he turned his attention to the crucial issue of crop 
adoption. Although Elgueta was a proponent of hybridization, he was sensitive to the geographic 
and cultural challenges that might limit the appeal of these seeds. Given the key importance of 
corn as a subsistence crop, Elgueta advised against imposing hybridized seeds on indigenous 
farmers. He argued that indigenous farmers would not accept a seed that only lasted one year, 
even if it gave high yields when first planted. Unlike his Guatemalan colleagues, Elgueta 
believed that the indigenous campesino was a “careful and meticulous farmer who has an innate 
sense of the value of conservation.”114 Indigenous farmers exercised reasonable caution before 
they adopted new crops and techniques and carefully managed their limited land and soil to 
produce reliable yields. These observations challenged the assertions of policymakers, who used 
indigenous mismanagement of the environment as leverage to modernize Guatemalan 
agriculture. 
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Guatemala,” 512. 





 Though Elgueta praised the good instincts of indigenous farmers, he also recognized that 
their results could be improved with better tools and proper techniques.  
He encouraged the state to implement an extension program that taught indigenous farmers the 
basic principles of seed selection so that they could create their own genetically stable varieties. 
This approach, he argued, would have an “enormous influence in the economic betterment of the 
Indian.” Elgueta considered extension work in indigenous communities to be of “vital 
importance,” as the state mechanized agricultural production on the South Coast and moved to 
promote hybridized corn, rice and wheat. Elgueta worried that without increasing the efficiency 
of highland maize production, indigenous farmers who depended on corn would be unable to 
compete with cheap grains produced on the coast. Extension work would also help farmers adopt 
regionally appropriate cultivation practices, minimizing the risk identified by Elgueta that 
mechanization and other farming techniques appropriate for the flat terrain of the coast would be 
inappropriately applied to inclined terrain of the highlands. 
Throughout the 1940s, state efforts to ameliorate rural poverty repeatedly characterized 
Mayan farmers as obstacles to rural modernization. By defining traditional corn cultivation in 
opposition to modern agriculture, policymakers created a caricature of indigenous farmers that 
bore little resemblance to reality. They repeatedly ignored evidence that indigenous campesinos 
were engaged and inquisitive farmers, eager to incorporate new agricultural techniques and 
technologies where they made sense. This selective incorporation of modern technologies did not 
fit well with the grandiose visions of rural reform that Sierra and his colleagues promoted. 
Modernizers predisposed to dismiss Mayan knowledge ignored the logic of traditional maize 
cultivation and instead saw a countryside gripped by chaos and confusion. They predicted that 
deforestation would lead inevitably to soil erosion, landslides and widespread hunger. 
Conservation offered state planners a viable, even progressive, reason to contemplate wholesale 
resettlement of communities. The government tried to use conservation to transform the Maya 
into citizens who rejected the traditionalism and parochialism of the peasant life and embraced 
the modern life of the market farmer.  
The grandiose aspirations of the agrarian modernizers were quickly undone by political 
and geographic realities. The case of the Motagua Valley demonstrates the environmental 
constraints that slowed down modernizing ambitions. During the Arévalo administration, the 
Ministry of Agriculture struggled to establish its presence throughout rural Guatemala. When 
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government agents, scientists and technicians visited the far flung reaches of Guatemala they 
were frequently confronted with the limits of their knowledge and the depths of their prejudices. 
The following chapter analyzes how extension work challenged accepted ideas about the Maya 






Chapter 3: The Limits of Agricultural Extension 
In February of 1945, the newly elected President Juan José Arévalo called for regional 
meetings that would bring together workers, capitalists, and the government to discuss the 
problems facing Guatemala. Arévalo told the nation, “We have to start from the beginning. And 
the beginning is to investigate.”1 The first meeting was convened in Escuintla, the largest 
Department on the Pacific Coast. Each municipality sent delegates representing large landowners 
and workers who reported independently on issues hindering economic growth and social 
equality. The Congress put forward 76 recommendations, which represented a vision of 
economic development that attempted to balance economic growth with equitable rural 
development. There was broad agreement on some issues, including the need to raise minimum 
wages, curb alcoholism and build water sanitation infrastructure. However, there was protracted 
debate about a government proposal to control the price of agricultural goods to ensure a “more 
just and equitable” economy.  
César Godoy Urrutia, a Chilean Parliamentarian and educator, intervened in the debate 
between landowners, labourers and the government and offered an extended justification for 
price controls on important crops.2 He cautioned that the decision placed the Arévalo 
government at a difficult “crossroad” between landowners who demanded absolute liberty and 
“the most defenseless sector of the nation” including campesinos and workers. The Commission 
on Economy and Labour eventually recommended that price controls be adopted, but the 
decision reflected the tensions that characterized agrarian modernization throughout the 
Revolutionary-era. Though there was broad consensus that agriculture had to be reformed, 
modernizers disagreed about the best approach with some emphasizing rural education and 
others lobbying for more radical rural interventions including financing projects and land reform.   
Moderate reformers championed agricultural extension work that educated farmers about 
new techniques and crops, because it promised to improve rural productivity without challenging 
the existing socio-economic order. President Arévalo followed this moderate path and pledged to 
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increase rural productivity by motivating campesinos who felt excluded from the nation, but his 
solution favored rhetoric over reform.3 “The problem,” state Arévalo, “is that the campesinos 
have lost their desire to till the soil because of the attitudes and politics of the past.”4 The 
President’s ambivalence on rural reform was shared by many other moderates among the 
Revolutionary government and the Guatemalan elite. The country’s governing and economic 
elite were mostly ladino and there was widespread apprehension that giving indigenous 
communities too much political freedom and economic power might lead to rural revolt and 
chaos. This tension was especially acute at the beginning of the Revolution, when the rhetoric of 
the movement spurred campesinos in the countryside to push for land and better labour 
conditions.5 
Like Mexico and other countries engaged in the Green Revolution, the Arévalo 
administration used agrarian modernization—with its promise of heightened productivity 
through new technology—to defuse rural tensions.6 This emphasis on technical fixes for 
structural problems, deferred action on social and economic issues that caused some of 
Guatemala’s pressing environmental issues including soil erosion and deforestation. The 
Ministry of Agriculture created General Agents of Agriculture as “apostles” in the government’s 
fight against soil erosion and deforestation. They travelled widely throughout Guatemala’s 
countryside, establishing new experimental farms and demonstrating the benefits of modern 
agriculture. Policymakers hoped to awe campesinos with the abundant yields that could be 
obtained with new productive technologies: fertilizers, pesticides, hybrid seeds and 
mechanization.  
Agents, and the local Committees for Agriculture they created, quickly transcended their 
initial purpose and became important instruments for the state to exercise influence in the 
countryside. Their reports offered detailed insight into the complex financial and political 
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problems restricting agricultural growth. Campesinos and small farmers circumvented local 
authorities by addressing complaints to agents, who relayed them directly to the Minister of 
Agriculture. This reinforced the perception that the Arévalo administration was acting on behalf 
of the rural population, often subverting established rural elites who controlled the Municipal and 
Departmental government. Agents worked closely with campesinos and this experience often 
forced them to question the simplistic racial stereotypes that animated the conversation around 
deforestation and soil erosion.   
As they learned to listen to the rural population, some agents began to question the limits 
of technical aid as a tool for rural development. These more progressive agents challenged the 
idea that increased productivity was the only factor necessary to secure improvements in social 
welfare for Guatemalan campesinos. Instead, they encouraged the government to undertake 
sweeping rural reforms that democratized banking, markets and land tenure. These suggestions 
provoked contentious debate in Guatemala City between proponents of technical aid and those 
who supported more aggressive development policy. This impasse eventually led to the creation 
of a new rural development organization, the Institute for Encouraging Production (INFOP), a 
semi-autonomous government agency that integrated extension work and research. The new 
government agency implemented an ambitious and progressive rural development agenda 
focused on the financial, technological and political barriers to modernization.  
“The Campesino Hears with His Eyes” 
 At the beginning of the Arévalo administration, modernizers identified two major 
problems holding back Guatemalan agriculture. First, policymakers believed milpa cultivation 
caused deforestation, soil erosion, and declining yields. The second problem was Guatemala’s 
continued dependency on coffee cultivation. The editors of Revista Agrícola disclosed their 
embarrassment that Guatemala continued to squander her agricultural potential when less fertile 
countries used modern techniques to make arid and unpromising lands productive. “[A]mong 
us,” they wrote, “apathy and abandon is the fashion. If a monoculture collapses discouragement 
spreads. We are accustomed to earning huge percentages on coffee, if this declines we are also 
ruined. This is illogical.” Though diversification had been attempted many times before, they 
argued that previous efforts failed because there was little effort to engage campesinos.7 They 
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believed that encouraging Guatemalan campesinos to participate in the market would expand the 
range of commodities produced and stimulate the domestic economy.  
The editors of the Revista Agrícola encouraged the government to establish new 
experimental farms where researchers could adapt western agricultural practices and crops to 
Guatemala’s diverse production zones. Experimental farms were excellent showcases where 
agronomists could demonstrate to campesinos the increased yields that could be secured through 
modernization. “First-hand knowledge,” they wrote, “[was] the only thing able to direct toward 
improvement the twisted campesino ideology [“la torcida ideología campesina”], tenaciously 
rooted by many decades of uncertainty.” Guatemalan modernizers believed that these farms had 
to be complemented by an aggressive expansion of agricultural extension and outreach. The 
editors insisted that campesinos would not adopt any new techniques or technologies unless they 
were certain it would work and only careful demonstration would reassure them. This entirely 
sensible position was dismissed by editors as evidence of the stubborn irrationality of peasants, 
but they nevertheless encouraged the state to invest heavily in agricultural extension. “Their ears 
will close,” wrote the editors, “to any preaching and all insinuation that is not accompanied by a 
palpable demonstration: the campesino hears with his eyes.”8   
 The Ministry of Agriculture began creating new experimental farms almost immediately 
after the Revolution. In 1946, the Department of Extension and Agrarian Development informed 
the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional (IAN) that they were working to establish outposts in 
distinct agricultural regions across the country. Given the formidable geographic variation within 
Departments, some regions had several experimental stations where seeds and growing 
techniques were adapted to local conditions.9 The local variations in soils and climates, made 
experimental research stations vital as controlled showcases of state power that inspired farmers 
with visions of abundance that were often difficult to replicate in the field.10 However, the 
expansion of experimental research stations depended heavily on extension agents, who were 
dispatched to rural Guatemala where they built relationships with large landowners and 
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campesinos. These relationships formed the basis for the establishment of agricultural research 
centers throughout the country. 
Created by the Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of Extension and Rural 
Development in 1946, General Agents of Agriculture were the embodiment of the more practical 
approach to technical advice endorsed by the Revista Agrícola. Agents were to gather 
information about the countryside, establish state oversight and promote agrarian modernization. 
Their founding document called them “apostles” and they were given an appropriately grandiose 
mandate to evangelize modern agriculture production amongst Guatemala’s farmers, large and 
small. As “peripatetic agricultural teachers,” they were expected to travel widely in their 
designated Departments. They offered farmers and campesinos advice on crop production and 
soil conservation, but this was only a small part of their mission. They also helped organize 
Committees for Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Industry, groups of influential farmers who 
were supposed to facilitate the adoption of new techniques and technologies.  
Agents were also supposed to educate farmers about rural economy, farm administration 
and encourage more efficient labour practices.11 Their charter emphasized that most farmers had 
little business acumen, and often lost money to middlemen who offered low prices for their 
crops. Agents were to remind farmers of the “economic function of the agricultural enterprise.”12 
Though extension agents focused on increasing productivity through technical and financial 
reforms, they were also conceived of as agents of moral reform. Their charter warned agents that 
farmers would rudely question and even resist new techniques, because of their misplaced 
confidence in personal observations.13 They were instructed to keep faith when confronted by 
resistant farmers, because they were “pioneers in the great work to be realized.”14 
 Their most important task was to educate campesinos about the destructiveness of 
traditional agriculture. General Agents of Agriculture were described as “apostles of this crusade 
for the defense of the soil, the water, the tree” and their charter focused on soil erosion as the 
cause and consequence of Guatemala’s agrarian malaise. 
The loss of fertility, the ruin of farm soil, the scarcity of water, changes in climate and 
modification of the seasonal regime, dust storms, floods because of water overflowing 
without restraint, and other calamities which are the fruit of carelessness and ignorance, 
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[and] the consequence of this tragedy that implies the vengeance of nature and that man 
is responsible.15 
 
To confront this danger, agents were encouraged to intervene forcefully in rural affairs. In 
essence, their charter asked a small handful of individuals to catalyze systemic changes in an 
entrenched agrarian system. Instead, agents lobbied for small, incremental changes that 
mitigated, but did not solve, falling productivity and social inequality. Like the farmers they 
sought to help, agents lacked the tools—specifically the ability to craft national laws and enforce 
national policies—to rectify the disequilibrium in land tenure that was causing underproduction, 
deforestation and soil erosion. 
Although agents ultimately proved unable to transform agrarian relations, their travels 
greatly expanded state knowledge and authority in the countryside.16 Article 21 of their charter 
instructed them to informally collect information about the countryside and assess the 
capabilities of the Departmental functionaries gathering official census data. Agents gathered 
information as they travelled through rural Guatemala, giving workshops that demonstrated the 
value of modern agricultural techniques. Their bi-monthly reports did not deviate far from the 
discourse of modernization, commenting on soil erosion, the demand for mechanization, the 
need for seed selection and a shortage of fertilizers. The prominence of fertilizers in the reports 
indicates their value as a promotional tool that visibly boosted yields and demonstrated 
modernization’s productivity to recalcitrant converts. However, farmers who experimented with 
fertilizers found that they were costly and the promised increases in yield were difficult to 
sustain without technical assistance.  
In September of 1946, the Agent for the Department of Guatemala extolled the 
“magnificent” results of fertilizers in his region, but also in Baja Verapaz, Escuintla, Antigua, 
and Chimaltenango. The agent reported that in typical fields, up to 50% of the milpa dried out 
during an unusual 28-day stretch without rain. However, fields that had been fertilized and 
plowed barely suffered any loses. “This work,” claimed the agent, “has awakened much interest 
among farmers in the region.”17 Though farmers and campesinos expressed interest in fertilizers, 
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many questioned their utility in comparison with established crop rotations and green fertilizers. 
This was certainly the case for Felipe Hernández, a vegetable farmer in Ciudad Vieja in the 
Department of Sacatepéquez who complained that his crops were badly damaged by over-
application of fertilizers. The local agent blamed Hernández for not following instructions, but 
he assured his superiors that the crop had been saved by his personal intervention.18 The 
technology that promised to emancipate farmers from physical limitations on production also 
forced them to rely on agronomists and agricultural agents who used their leverage over farmers 
to encourage them to change their cultivation habits. 
As they travelled through a very diverse landscape, extension agents tried to follow 
Hector Sierra’s suggestion that agriculture should be organized rationally. They evaluated local 
soils and topography and recommended changes in local farming practices that were almost 
always focused on replacing corn with more commercially viable crops like wheat and cotton.19 
In November of 1946, the Agent for Chimaltenango visited the Finca Las Canoas in San Martín 
Jilotepeque where he found extensive fields of corn and beans that he designated a 
“monoculture.” He insisted that the administrator should diversify and plant sugar or coffee, as 
some nearby producers had already done.20 In the same month, the Agent for Jutiapa reported his 
efforts to discourage bean production in Atescatempa, close to the border with El Salvador, 
where large surpluses of beans had accumulated. He encouraged farmers to make better use of 
their land by planting wheat and especially cotton, which was in high demand. The changes that 
Agents demanded were not always implemented, but the Extension Department did not deviate 
from its message that corn was an antiquated crop that held back small farmers and campesinos. 
                                                     
“Informe de Actividades Del Departamento de Extensión y Fomento Agrícola: Primera Quincena,” September 1946. 
Min Ag 1887. AGCA. Guatemala. 
18 “Informe de Actividades Del Departamento de Extensión y Fomento Agrícola: Segunda Quincena,” October, 
1946. Min. Ag. 1887. AGCA. Guatemala. 
19 Sometimes traditional export crops were targeted because they were identified as a cause of soil erosion. In San 
José Acatempa, Jutiapa the agent urged the “principal residents” to abandon tobacco cultivation because the soils 
were unfit. They were told to grow henequen in the rocky and barren soils around villages in the municipality. The 
Agent assured farmers that the government would help them transition to new crops with technical assistance and 
government support. Although the government was enamored of henequen as a new industrial crop, it is unclear 
how much farmers made from its cultivation and how well the government supported growers. “Informe De 
Actividades Del Departamento de Extensión y Fomento Agrícola: Primera Quincena,” November, 1946. Min. Ag. 
Leg. 1887. AGCA. Guatemala. 
20 He found 12 caballerias planted in corn and beans. “Informe De Actividades Del Departamento de Extensión y 
Fomento Agrícola: Primera Quincena,” November, 1946. Min. Ag. Leg. 1887. AGCA. Guatemala.  
100 
 
In March of 1947, the Agent for Jutiapa gave 5 conferences to some 80 attendees, where he 
explained patiently “the necessity of abandoning monoculture.”21 
Cotton, a perennial favorite among modernizers, was heavily promoted by agricultural 
agents as a natural successor to corn.22 In December of 1946, the Agent for Jutiapa Isaís B. 
Hernández met with 26 campesinos in the municipality of Zapotitlán and urged them to adopt 
cotton. He later spoke to authorities and farmers in El Adelanto and Comapa, where he “made 
them see that monoculture didn not serve them any purpose and that they should begin new 
crops, including cotton, wheat, etc.”23 To facilitate the transition to cotton, Hérnandez arranged 
for ten influential farmers from Jutiapa to visit Finca Torolita, owned by an influential member 
of the Revolutionary government, Jorge Toriello.  Unfortunately, one of the jeep’s carrying 
farmers to Torolita flipped on a bad stretch of road between Guatemala City and Escuintla. 
Several farmers were sent to the hospital and were unable to visit the Finca where Toriello was 
using modern techniques to produce cotton. Despite this setback, Hernández continued to 
evangelize cotton, and to lesser extent wheat, cultivation in Jutiapa.24 However, the incident 
demonstrated basic infrastructure challenges that slowed the diffusion of knowledge, technology 
and crops throughout rural Guatemala. Moreover, agents slowly realized that campesinos found 
modernization appealing but were hesitant to adopt new crops without financial and material 
support from the state.  
Agents were ideologically prepared for resistance from campesinos that never 
materialized, but they were often surprised by the indifference of large landowners who were 
supposed to be the vanguard of modernization. On September 30, 1946, the Agent from Jutiapa 
reported that he could not find even six farmers willing to form a Departmental Committee of 
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Agriculture. The agent concluded “the majority [of landowners] are retrograde, parochial, and 
unsociable, for the real farmers are the farm workers who do not have land and are exploited 
wickedly by the owners of land.”25 He argued that even though landowners controlled the best 
land, they had little interest in modernization because their “idle lands produce[d]” reliable crops 
of corn and beans. Although synonymous with campesinos, corn was commonly grown by large 
landowners because it produced reliable yields with minimal investment.26 Under Jorge Ubico, 
the state had encouraged large landowners to cultivate corn but they often simply rented their 
land to campesinos. Modernizers regarded this as both exploitative and a waste of land that could 
be dedicated to more lucrative crops including wheat, which the Agent believed would grow well 
in Jutiapa. 
The agent for Jutiapa finally found a Swiss landowner who was willing to support 
experimentation with grapes that were well adapted to the dry conditions prevalent throughout 
Jutiapa. His reliance on a foreign landowner indicated the depth of local resistance to 
government intervention that might disrupt established labour and land use practices. Though he 
had praised the industry of farm workers, the agent still focused his conversion efforts on large 
landowners he tried to impress with new demonstration plots. These were “the only effective 
methods to excite the skeptical.”27 There is mixed evidence regarding his success, but his 
superiors in Guatemala City were enthusiastic about his efforts to proselytize large landowners. 
Just two months after the agent for Jutiapa complained about local disinterest in new crops, the 
Head of Extension services boasted that eagerness to plant grapes had driven up land prices in 
the region. In El Jícaro, Toruño suggested that Argentinian grape cultivars were growing so well 
that Guatemala could soon become a wine growing country. He wrote:  
I consider it indispensable to continue the fight [to introduce grapes] so that tomorrow 
Guatemala will be a flowering nation, a vision which all governments of democratic drive 
should have, for which reason…we should supervise this work and develop this crop in 
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order to banish moonshine, that is not only an active venom, but also a stupefier of brains 
and scourge of Guatemala.28 
 
Toruño dreamed that Guatemala could be materially and morally transformed through 
agricultural development. Alcohol was frequently used by contractors as a tool to encourage 
indigenous labourers to work on coastal plantations, often saddling campesinos with large debts 
they could not hope to repay. Large landowners, including the UFCo, also used alcohol as a tool 
for labour control.29 For modernizers, the spread of new, more civilized crops like grapes and 
wheat symbolized the moral transformation of rural Guatemala and the end of the country’s 
dependence on exploitative exports. 
Experimental farms were transformative spaces where agents displayed the utility of new 
crops but they also inculcated labourers with modern agricultural techniques and labour habits. 
Racism defined many encounters between ladino agents and the indigenous campesinos they 
sought to reform. In Huehuetenango, the agricultural agent J. Guillermo Wellman used military 
labour to maintain grape cultivars planted on land donated by local farm owner, Jacinto Sosa. 
Wellman complained that his work on grape cultivation was “handicapped” by the need to give 
these peasant soldiers daily instructions in an effort to change their antiquated cultivation 
practices.30 However, agents were often impressed by the enthusiasm of campesinos who were 
more interested in new tools, crops and techniques than established landowners. This eagerness 
broke down racial stereotypes and formed the basis for growing relationships between agents and 
often neglected small agriculturalists. Paul Burgess of the Instituto Indígena of Quiché wrote to 
Toruño in September 1947, praising the local agent Féliz Gándara for his dedication in teaching 
local campesinos new techniques for caring for livestock and crops. “We cannot stop contrasting 
the attitude of hostility and antagonism we felt under the past dictatorship,” wrote Burgess, 
“toward our efforts in support of the indigenous race with this open and sincere cooperation.” 
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This new relationship was, Burgess wrote, markedly democratic and the strengthening of 
community relations with the state was a welcome step forward in the creation of a “new 
Guatemala.”31  
Unlike large landowners, farmers and campesinos eagerly organized themselves into 
Committees of Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Industry. These Committees were elected 
bodies made up of influential farmers and they acted as intermediaries who both represented 
local interests to agents and enforced regulations passed by the Ministry of Agriculture. In their 
basic form, Committees were re-imagined and democratized versions of the Committees for 
Agriculture and Roads that had been convened under the Ubico administration.32 The ethnicity, 
wealth and political affiliations of Committee members varied across the country, reflecting 
established political and social hierarchies. For example, across the highlands Committees had 
higher levels of indigenous participation than in the traditionally ladino regions of the country 
which included El Progreso, Zacapa and Jutiapa.33 Across the country, Committees quickly 
transcended their initial purpose and became popular vehicles for political organizing that 
enabled rural communities to communicate directly with the state. Their popularity anticipated 
the success of other community level organizations during the Revolution, including the Local 
Agrarian Committees that initiated the expropriations process during the Agrarian Reform. 
In 1947, J.A. Toruño wrote the Minister of Agriculture to inform him that his agents had 
successfully organized Committees of Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Industry in over 200 
municipalities. The Committees represented almost 20,000 campesinos and farmers and Toruño 
argued that their assistance was indispensable for agents. Committees offered detailed 
information about local issues and allowed agents to work with large groups instead of individual 
farmers, which would greatly slow down modernization.34 Committees also offered the 
government a chance to influence local affairs. In legislation passed in May of 1947, the 
government required that the heads of these Committees be approved by the President, a 
convenient way to favor sympathetic rural leaders. However, in practice the Ministry of 
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Agriculture encouraged fair elections and refused to appoint or create committees in rural areas. 
In 1948, the President of the Committee of Agriculture for San Pedro Sacatepéquez wrote to the 
Minister of Agriculture asking him for permission to create sub-committees for Agriculture in 
the municipality’s villages for the “efficient development of our agriculture.”35 The Extension 
Department denied his request. They agreed it was important to stimulate the creation of sub-
Committees in villages with the “best agricultural prospects” but they insisted that residents 
should organize their own committee via elections.36 The Arévalo administration tried to ensure 
that these Committees were formed organically and reflected local priorities, but they could not 
prevent them from becoming political instruments. Schisms eventually emerged on Committees 
that mirrored national politics and divided moderates who supported the government’s reformist 
ambitions and progressives who agitated for financial and land reforms.  
The minutes of meetings preserved in the Ministry of Agriculture records indicate that 
Committees took their role as rural advocates of agrarian modernization very seriously. In 1947, 
the Committee of Agriculture for San Rafael Las Flores, in Santa Rosa, delegated oversight 
duties to its members. Juan García Mijangos, for example, was to advertise the existence of 
vaccines for cattle and chickens to livestock owners “to avoid the development of whatever 
illness in the Municipality, closely monitoring that residents comply by vaccinating all their 
livestock.” Another member, Casimiro Pivaral was to work with Forest Rangers to monitor that 
landowners complied with their obligations to reforest land after cutting for lumber. Pivaral was 
urged to report non-compliance to the President of the Committee who would the contact 
municipal leaders. As duties were shared out, the role of the Committee in San Rafael Las Flores 
was made clear: watch the countryside, advocate modernization and act as an extension of the 
state in the most remote reaches of rural Guatemala. By creating these Committees, the Ministry 
of Agriculture was extending its influence past local levels of government and reinforcing the 
power of the state apparatus in areas that even agricultural agents rarely visited.37 
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The Committees quickly transcended their initial function, and used their privileged 
access to the Minister of Agriculture and even the President to bypass Municipal and 
Departmental administration and advocate for issues of importance to farmers. In 1946, the 
recently founded Committee for Chimaltenango tried unsuccessfully to import corn seeds from 
El Paso, Texas. The President of the Committee, Ruben Flores, appealed to the Minister of 
Agriculture to help them acquire the licenses needed to import corn seed that would help farmers 
improve crops. He also asked for an analysis of local soils to help guide seed selection, 
chemicals and equipment to help eliminate an outbreak of zompopos, winged ants, destroying 
local crops.38 Other Committees emphasized their urgent need for new agrarian technologies 
which could liberate them from penury. In a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, the Committee 
for Agriculture from Monjas, Jalapa urged the government to the send tractors to the 
municipality’s “poor farmers” so that they could cultivate their land which “are very poor 
because they are filled with weeds.” Within days, the Minister wrote to the Department of 
Mechanization telling them to investigate the practicality of sending tractors to Monjas.39 
Committees used the discourse of the state—with its emphasis on productivity and 
modernization—to frame their demands for basic tools and advanced technologies. 
 Committees wrote repeated and often insistent letters about the need for modern tractors 
but the state simply did not have the capacity to meet farmer demand. The Committee for 
Agriculture in Sanarate, El Progreso, for example, warned the Minister of Agriculture that the 
failure to mechanize threatened the future of tobacco cultivation in the region. A previous 
request for tractors made in late 1947 had not been answered, and so the Committee wrote again, 
insisting that local farmers still followed the “antiquated routine of the macana [digging stick] 
and hoe” but during winters when water was scarce this system did not allow farmers to improve 
yields. “And the Señor Minister, well understands,” they wrote, “that we need [tractors] to turn 
up soils so that they keep the humidity necessary and thereby, the crops can have life and 
develop well too.”40 They added that tractors would help them—specifically medium to small 
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farmers who had enough land to till mechanically—to minimize the cost and frustration of 
finding day labourers to work on tobacco farms. In an effort to guarantee their request, they 
contacted Keilhauer, Pagram and Co. Ltd. who confirmed that they had tractors for sale. The 
Committee urged the Minister to buy at least one, which residents of Sanarate could rent, 
considering that: “the majority of the residents here, dedicated to agricultural work, are very poor 
and for this reason it is not possible to acquire the implements we need.”41 Once again the 
request was handed off to the Department of Mechanization, who told the Minister that there 
were no tractors due to an equipment shortage.  
The Ministry of Agriculture implemented an informal triage system that prioritized 
assistance for the Pacific Coast and the region around Quetzaltenango. While touring 
Chimaltenango in 1948, the new Head of Extension Miguel Reyes was consistently told about 
the need for more tractors and basic farms tools. In Patzún, Tecpán, and Comalapa, farmers 
asked for tractors and chemical fertilizers so that they could undertake “more technical and 
modern” cultivation of wheat and corn. Farmers in Acatenango thanked the Ministry for their 
work propagating new techniques for improving yields, but they insisted on the need for basic 
tools and access to tractors to quicken the pace of development in the area. In response, Reyes 
told the Committee that all available tractors were dedicated to work on the South Coast and in 
Quetzaltenango.42 Many Committees wrote detailed justifications encouraging the state to 
purchase tractors for their municipalities and agents continued to promote the value of 
mechanization. Informally though, the state focused its limited resources on the most established 
agricultural zones including the South Coast and Quetzaltenango. 
 Even if mechanization had been widely available, it would have disproportionately 
benefited farmers who had sufficient and suitable land for tractors to till. Nearly every Agent 
reported campesino demands for basic tools, a request which indicated that rural poverty was 
deeply rooted. The Agent for Alta Verapaz concluded his September report by noting the 
“unspeakable insistence” with which the “working poor” of Quiché, Baja Verapaz, and the Petén 
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asked the agent for machetes and hoes in anticipation of the next planting season.43 The Agent in 
charge of Jutiapa wrote to Toruño in October to inform him that farm tools—hoes, plows, 
machetes—were urgently needed by poor campesinos who wanted to intensify production.44 In 
the neighboring department of Zacapa, the Agent asked Toruño for a shipment of hoes to be sent 
because he was continually receiving requests for tools from the most remote parts of the 
Department.45 
 Some agents adapted their modernization efforts to cope with the lack of tools. The 
Agent for Huehuetenango, one of the more inaccessible regions of Guatemala, shared in the 
enthusiasm for mechanization. He boasted that his experimental plantation was ripe for tractor 
tilling, with 90% of its area considered flat. However, he focused on demonstrating and 
disseminating appropriate technology that campesinos could easily use. He asked the 
government to send him a simple moldboard plow. Since oxen were plentiful in the region, he 
anticipated tilling could be done cheaply and the plow could be lent to farmers wanting to 
improve their yields. The Agent’s actions indicate that in remote areas it made more sense to buy 
basic farm tools than invest in tractors that required a costly infrastructure to maintain.46 This 
sensible approach to local agricultural problems was dismissed by the Head of Extension, who 
remained enamored of the mechanization as quick solution to underproduction.  
In a memo sent to the Ministry of Agriculture on February 12, 1947, J.A. Toruño laid out 
the three most pressing problems in Guatemalan agriculture: scarcity of labour on the coast, 
shortage of land in the highlands, and a general shortage of basic farm implements and tractors. 
Cumulatively, these problems resulted in endemic underproduction that raised the prices of food. 
This caused “discontent and anguish among the labouring classes of the countryside and these 
conditions [are] echoed in the urban population mainly among the poor and working classes.”47 
Toruño used the threat of instability in the city and countryside to justify an immediate 
investment in tractors, which would be  used to sow and harvest wheat in the Western highlands. 
Since the government lacked the disposable capital to quickly expand its fleet of tractors, Toruño 
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advised them to lease-to-own ten tractors from the firm Keilhauer, Pagram and Co, which would 
take care of maintenance.  
This approach might have temporarily prevented grain shortages, but it only masked the 
systemic issues that caused food shortages including land scarcity. Even Toruño acknowledged 
that in some departments nearly 75% of the population had no reliable access to land. They had 
to either rent land from large landowners—paying for the right to subsist—or forego agriculture 
and work on plantations where they were often paid poorly and exploited. Though Toruño was 
clearly aware of the systemic challenges that hindered Guatemalan agriculture, he remained 
firmly focused on modernization through technical improvements. After detailing the fine points 
of a mechanization program, he curtly dismissed the thorny land tenure problem as an issue that 
required further study by the Department of Rural Economy and the Ministry of Agriculture.48  
 As Head of Extension, Toruño was a vocal proponent of community engagement but he 
did not believe that systematic changes to land tenure were necessary for Guatemala to solve 
underproduction. He recommended that the government should encourage the growth of the 
Committees for Agriculture by creating a Federation under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The Federation would take charge of grain storage for its members, allowing them 
to sell when prices were high and collectively engage in limited exports, although not at the 
expense of local industry. They could also borrow against the value of their stored grain, 
allowing farmers to access capital so that they could prepare for the next harvest. From a 
technical perspective, the Federation would dispense tools, fertilizers, seeds, insecticides and 
machinery to its members at close to cost. Finally, and importantly, the Federation would attend 
to the improvement of rural housing “and everything related to the improvement of the 
conditions of life of the small farmer and campesino in the Republic.”49 The proposed 
responsibilities of the Federation almost exactly mirrored the future mandate of INFOP including 
the focus on rural housing, credits, and farm equipment. This model for rural development 
encouraged campesinos and small market farmers to engage with the state, but it was unclear if 
the proposed Federation would have the political clout to lobby for systematic changes to 
economic and labour policy that were needed for equitable rural development.  
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The democratic character of the Federation could not compensate for the possibility that 
it would turn into sphere of political contest and patronage instead of a space to make agrarian 
change. In 1947, Toruño sent the incoming Minister of Agriculture, Francisco Valdes Calderón a 
request to expand the power and authority of the Extension Department so that it had more 
independence within the Ministry. He alleged that in 1946 partisan supporters of the PAR 
pressured the Congressional Commission of Agriculture to appoint its members to positions in 
the Directorate-General for Agriculture. Toruño tendered his resignation to the embattled 
Minister of Agriculture, who refused it and rejected the candidates imposed by the Commission 
of Agriculture.50 After the conflict, Toruño alleged that PAR-sympathizers in the Directorate-
General for Agriculture punished the Extension Department with budget cuts and staffing 
reductions. The Extension Department continued organizing Committees, distributing fertilizer 
and offering technical assistance but Toruño pushed unsuccessfully for more independence. He 
asked the new Minister Francisco Valdes Calderón for financial and administrative freedom to 
collaborate with other agencies including the Department of Forestry and the Department of 
Mechanization, which he argued was key to the success of rural economic development.  
Toruño retired in frustration in 1947. He had lost his battle to keep the Extension 
Department narrowly focused on technical interventions as more progressive agents—many 
affiliated with the pro-peasant PAR—pushed the Department to embrace a more ambitious 
agenda that enabled structural change. When agents gathered in Guatemala City to fete their 
boss, he used the opportunity to remind them of the “primordial” importance of extension agents. 
As the advance guard for the Ministry of Agriculture, agents bridged the “gap between the 
peasantry and the state” and hastened agricultural modernization.51 After his retirement, agents 
were told to send reports describing the party to Ministry officials. Toruño used the opportunity 
to advocate for agricultural credit as an essential part of rural development. His new emphasis on 
credit indicated that the outgoing Head of Extension had finally begun to admit the limitations of 
technical assistance as the primary means of rural development.52 As campesinos and small 
farmers assumed a more active role in rural modernization, the Extension Department had to 
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reconsider its emphasis on technical assistance. Feedback from Committees for Agriculture and 
Agent helped shaped a more expansive definition of rural development that embraced financial 
and land reforms as tools that would create greater equality and productivity.  
Losing Faith 
Agents encountered two major problems during their fieldwork that required substantive 
and systematic reforms to correct: capital shortages and land scarcity. Though many campesinos 
found elements of modern agriculture attractive, most lacked sufficient land and the financial 
capacity to recreate the idealized experimental farms managed by extension agents. As they 
encountered rank inequality in the countryside, agents began to question the efficacy of 
modernization efforts that focused tightly on improving production but made little effort to 
address the structural causes of underproduction. Agents offered campesinos advice about crop 
rotations, seed selection and fertilizers, but without land and adequate capital the productivity 
promise of modernization could not be realized. At best, these technical fixes temporarily staved 
off rural demands for land by increasing the productivity of the small plots of land that 
campesinos tended. Too often the technical fixes were misguided and led to little or no 
improvement in production. Over the long term, this intensification on marginal land would lead 
to significant environmental and financial problems that worsened inequality. Agents and 
Committees for Agriculture sent the Ministry of Agriculture detailed letters reporting on rural 
conflicts that divided campesinos and large landowners—often along racial lines—and prevented 
the former from fully engaging in modernization. These letters made it clear that campesinos 
who supported the state were being actively persecuted by landowners. If the government took 
no action, they risked losing the faith of campesinos who supported the Arevalo administration’s 
progressive agenda.   
In December 1946, the Committee for Agriculture for Asunción Mita, Jutiapa, appealed 
to the Minister of Agriculture to intervene in a local land conflict. The Committee wanted 
landowners to rent land to campesinos at a reasonable cost and eliminate the practice of payment 
in advance of the harvest. They argued that access to good land would boost productivity and 
help campesinos deal with inflation: “life tends to get more expensive everyday mainly in these 
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areas where there are no other means of subsistence.53 They wanted the Minister to intervene to 
ensure that landowners offered them quality land, alleging that even when campesinos obtained 
land it was often marginal and could not support decent yields.54 Initially, the Section of 
Colonization and Lands warned the Ministry of Agriculture not to intercede because this was a 
dispute over private rental agreements. The government had little formal authority and at best 
could apply heavy pressure to force landowners to engage with campesinos. They also worried 
that Ministerial intervention would sanction this bypassing of administrative hierarchies, and that 
instead the Committee should look for a local powerbroker to deal with the issue privately.55 The 
Alcalde Don Maximiliano Ramírez attempted to broker a meeting to discuss land problems 
between campesinos and local landowners, but the latter refused to attend.56 
 In late January 1947, the Agent for Jutiapa, Isaías Benedicto Hernández, was sent to 
investigate the growing land conflict in the municipality of Asunción Mita. He found that over 
600 campesinos had no access to land because local landowners refused to rent to them.57 The 
Alcalde refused to convene another meeting of landowners and campesinos because landowners 
told him privately that they had already picked campesinos to rent their land.58 Over 50 landless 
peasants waiting for land met with the Committee for Agriculture and Benedicto. 
[They] declared bitterly, that for two years, since they voted for Doctor Juan José 
Arévalo, they are victims of the unjustified hatred of the landowners who before gave 
them somewhere to plant; that when they checked the stated elections all the property 
owners as [if] in agreement, asked their renters: who did you vote for? Upon telling them 
for Doctor Arévalo, they responded: “NO LONGER WILL I GIVE YOU WHERE TO 
SOW,” but to some who needed [land] they gave it, to the most notorious Arevalistas, 
they did not give any [land].59 
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After hearing their stories, Benedicto concluded campesinos and landowners hated each other 
dearly, in part because of the “little tact with which capitalist have treated the poor” which 
generated considerable resentment among the peasantry.60  
The peasants’ testimony demonstrated the considerable power large landowners 
exercised over rural politics and land tenure. By selectively denying campesinos land, they could 
discourage political organizing and maintain a profitable status quo that was detrimental to 
productivity. Benedicto argued that resettlement on private farms was the only way to avoid 
further antagonism that could lead to “fatal consequences.” 61 This suggestion was rejected by the 
national mortgage provider, Crédito Hipotecario Nacional (CHN). They cited the high cost of 
buying parcels and suggested that campesinos should be resettled on existing government land. 
The General Section of Colonization and Lands agreed and identified nearly 200 caballerias of 
land in the Colonia Montúfar that was available for campesino relocation.62 Resettlement 
avoided direct confrontation with large landowners, but it was untenable as a long term solution 
because the government did not control sufficient land to resettle all aggrieved campesinos. 
While the government struggled to find land for campesinos, food production suffered and rural 
inequality deepened.  
In 1948, the Committee of Agriculture from Santa Cruz Naranjo, Santa Rosa asked the 
government to help resolve a local corn shortage that caused artificially high grain prices in the 
region.63 The Municipality of Santa Cruz Naranjo lay Southeast of Guatemala City, between the 
Departments of Escuintla and Jutiapa. To avoid future shortages, the Committee asked the state 
to resettle them on parcels on the National Farm Cerro Redondo where better land would allow 
them to produce more and avoid “the calamities that we are now suffering with the shortages of 
corn.”64 The administrator for Cerro Redondo declined the Committee’s request for resettlement, 
citing a lack of space. The administrator noted that there were already a considerable number of 
renters from the Santa Cruz Naranjo who picked coffee in return for access to land. To accept 
more would undermine their efforts to ensure that resident campesinos, or colonos, “live[d] 
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contently and in the best way possible.” 65 Though their efforts to secure new land failed, their 
Agent tried with limited success to lobby local farmers to increase the amount of corn they were 
cultivating so that future shortages could be averted. “It is not reasonable,” he wrote, “that 
Guatemala, being a country of farmers, has to import CORN from other countries.”66 Rural 
inequality and poverty prevented small farmers and campesinos from accessing productive land. 
This also slowed efforts to diversify crops and introduce new production techniques and 
technologies. 
The government passed two pieces of legislation during the 1940s that were intended to 
ameliorate the demand for land: the Agricultural Emergency Law (1946) and the Laws of Forced 
Rental, passed in 1949 and updated in 1951. These laws enabled campesinos to rent unused land 
from large landowners in exchange for a percentage of their harvest. While municipal authorities 
were not always compliant with the law, evidence suggests that some highland peasants were 
quick to use the law to re-establish access to corn land on the coast. These pieces of legislation 
were not of immediate consequence to most Guatemalans, since they benefitted a small number 
of campesinos and did little to change corn prices. Jim Handy notes that these laws were 
“harbingers of more drastic agrarian legislation” that was passed in 1952.67 In the interim, 
attempts to redistribute land and relocate campesinos to more productive areas faced harsh 
opposition from local landowners.  
 As the largest landowner in the country, the government attempted to relocate 
campesinos to its own National Farms. Under President Arévalo the state ran nearly 130 large 
farms across the country. Most of these farms had been seized from German owners during 
World War II, but additional properties were taken from Ubico and his supporters after they were 
forced out of office. Collectively, these farms produced roughly 25% of Guatemala’s coffee and 
they employed nearly 200,000 Guatemalans. Though they were the most significant agricultural 
enterprise in Central America, they were plagued by corruption and incompetent administration. 
The Director of the National Farms was the President’s brother, Mariano Arévalo, and foreign 
observers reported that administrators knew little about farm operations. There was also frequent 
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confrontations between fieldworkers and the administrators over wages and labour conditions 
that undermined productivity.68At the end of the Arévalo period, production had declined 
significantly and the once modern coffee farms were in total disarray.69  
This ad hoc resettlement effort was a temporary solution which defused rural tension at 
government expense, but there was never enough land to satisfy demand. Arévalo also heavily 
promoted a colonization initiative that tried to establish new agricultural colonies in the remote 
Petén. Arbenz dispatched more than 400 workers, engineers, doctors and military officials to the 
lightly populated region and they established a new colony, Poptún. These “soldiers of the 
reconquest” were supposed to engineer a new, modern city from the raw jungle.70 Poptún was 
also a social laboratory, where planners tried to create a perfect, productive balance of 
indigenous and ladino settlers that would serve as the nucleus for a new Guatemala. They hoped 
that the “inferior” indigenous colonists would impart their “industry, selflessness, constancy” 
and morality to “superior” ladino settlers who showed more “mental agility [and] more 
progressive spirit.”71 Though Arévalo had grand aspirations for Poptún, the colony was an 
expensive disaster that attracted few settlers and proved expensive to supply and maintain.72 A 
journalist for the Cedar Rapids Gazette who visited the colony in 1946 reported that it took 30 
days for mules laden with supplies to make the trip from Guatemala City. The colony depended 
almost entirely on air transportation for its supplies, which artificially increased expenses and 
increased the sense of isolation.73 Though the population grew slowly, many migrants 
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unaccustomed to the humid lowlands languished in the heat and their bodies were burdened by 
malaria, parasites and venereal diseases.74 
Resettlement and colonization efforts did not successfully increase access to land for 
most Guatemalans, but even if they had worked these initiatives did not address the financial 
problems that prevented campesinos from adopting new crops. In August 1947, the Agricultural 
Agent for Jutiapa wrote an extended critique of agricultural extension that extolled the benefits 
of new crops like cotton but did not guarantee small growers fair access to markets. Isaías 
Benedicto Hernández warned his superiors that unless the Extension Department quickly 
intervened they would lose the “faith and enthusiasm of the peasantry” for whom extension had 
not resulted in the promised “economic bonanza.” Without government protection, campesinos 
were easy prey for “hoarders without scruples.” Hernández reminded his superior that past 
efforts to stimulate cotton production failed because farmers were offered absurdly low prices by 
a small clique of buyers who controlled the market. He encouraged the state to actively regulate 
large industry and proposed that General Agents of Agriculture should also help farmers market 
and sell their products. Finally, agents would help farmers organize so that they could avoid 
exploitation. This proposal implied a politicization of the Committee model that had proven to be 
an effective vehicle for campesinos and farmers to organize. His first initiative was to encourage 
cotton farmers in Jutiapa to sell collectively, which directly challenged the market monopoly of 
large landowners and industrialists who controlled cotton mills.75 
The letter sparked fierce debate in Guatemala City about the role of Agricultural Agents 
and the scope of rural development efforts. The Ministry of Economy and Labour rejected the 
Hernández proposal entirely and counselled a more moderate approach that did not alienate 
elites. Their response occurred during an unfolding political crisis during which the Arévalo 
administration—pushed by more conservative members of their governing coalition—moved to 
restrict the actions of PAR members who were actively organizing rural labour. The Arévalo 
government opposed measures that might encourage rural activism, because they worried that 
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this might antagonize conservatives and bring the Revolution to a premature conclusion.76 In this 
moment of political ferment, the Ministry of Economy and Labour favored the status quo and 
argued that Guatemala should adopt a more managed approach to the economy that encouraged 
domestic production and supported existing industries. To reinforce their point, Ministry officials 
noted that El Salvador had recently constructed a huge textile mill that would consume the better 
part of their cotton production. This would leave little for Guatemala to import and domestic 
textile producers faced a double threat of shortages of primary materials and a flood of textiles 
from El Salvador.77  
To ensure that farmers received a just price for the cotton they produced, they suggested 
revising the tariffs structure along protectionist lines to make national cotton and textiles more 
competitive with imports. A follow up to this letter in November, 1947, advised the Minister of 
Economy and Labour to focus on guaranteed minimum prices for farmers and to ignore export 
markets. Farmers’ crops would be bought at 80% of their market value at the start of the season 
and additional profits generated by the sale of crops at the end of the season would be 
redistributed. Since cotton could be stored for up to a year without fear of losses, the risk to the 
government was minimal. Ministry of Economy and Labour officials argued that this was a more 
balanced approach that encouraged small producers to take risks on new crops without unduly 
provoking industrialists.78 
The Director General of Agriculture, Hector Sierra, issued recommendations in response 
to the Hernández letter to the Minister of Agriculture in December of 1947. Sierra focused on the 
sesame industry, another example documented by Hernández alongside cotton. Cordon Horjales 
and Kon Hermanos owned most of the mills capable of turning sesame into oil. They used their 
leverage over farmers to buy sesame at rock-bottom prices. Sierra confirmed that factories 
processing sesame seed offered 6Q or 7Q per quintal, while farmers from Santa Rosa and Jutiapa 
maintained that fair compensation was between 9Q and 10Q per quintal. Sierra argued that 
factory owners were taking advantage of small producers, leveraging their access to alternative 
oil products like corozo palm to force desperate campesinos to sell at a loss. Sierra charged that 
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Horjales and Hermanos were “making war on the cultivation of sesame” by offering small 
farmers and campesinos unjustly low prices. He confirmed that refined sesame oil was being 
sold to Venezuela at a significant premium of 17Q per quintal. To ensure that small farmers 
continued to plant sesame, Sierra advised the government to fix the price of sesame. If 
industrialists refused to buy, the government could export seeds without fear of losses. He 
encouraged the government to convene a meeting of farmers, industrialists and the Government 
where price issues could be addressed.79 In the opening months of 1948, the government passed 
legislation addressing cotton and sesame prices. 
 Campesinos who wanted to engage in commodity production had to overcome 
considerable barriers. They first had to secure land with good soils and accessible water. Then 
they had to compete as small producers in volatile markets that were dominated by large 
landowners who often controlled the means of refining grains and seeds into flour and oil 
derivatives that fetched higher prices on the market. The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged 
farmers to modernize, but even campesinos who had access to land lacked the financial capacity 
to buy the new tools, hybrid seeds and fertilizers needed to compete with industrial farms. Price 
controls opened a small space for campesinos to re-orient their farms toward market production, 
but they did not enable capital-starved small producers to compete effectively. Without this 
incentive, there was little indication that campesinos would commit wholly to the market and 
abandon intercropping and subsistence activities. The government tried to facilitate rural access 
to capital by opening state-funded credit agencies in rural communities. This initiative excited 
unexpected hostility from landowners and conservative politicians who viewed the move as an 
attack on established financial and social hierarchies.  
Tensions between local landowners and more progressive modernizers and local 
landowners were exacerbated by the fractious party politics which hindered legislative work 
throughout the Arevalo period (1945-51). After Ubico left office, young professionals and 
students organized into two political parties, the National Renovation (RN) and the Popular 
Liberation Front (FPL). Shortly after Arévalo’s election, the two most important parties of the 
revolution united to form the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR). This union was short lived and 
the RN split from the PAR in 1946, although they pledged to support the cause of the revolution. 
                                                     




The PAR split again later that year, when most of the members left the party to form the FPL 
because they were concerned the party was drifting too far to the left. FPL and RN members 
were concerned that progressive elements in the PAR—influenced by organized labour and 
communists—were pushing for radical changes to Guatemala’s agricultural landscape that might 
lead to rural violence. Despite these setbacks, the PAR continued to grow in strength and its 
members were among the most committed, active and effective in government. Nevertheless, 
these new parties were hardly stable, and internecine conflict dogged the RN, FPL and PAR into 
the 1950 Presidential elections. Though Arévalo skillfully balanced the competing interests of 
rival parties, these protracted political conflicts limited his ability to pass new legislation.80  
National political conflicts also divided politicians and government agents throughout the 
countryside. In 1948, the pro-peasant PAR took a third of the municipal seats in the country, 
which made it the second largest political party behind the FPL. Their rising political influence, 
especially among workers and campesinos, exacerbated agitation between conservative and 
radical elements of the revolution. Early in 1948, the Governor and the municipal leaders from 
Chimaltenango urged the Ministry to immediately dismiss the Department’s General Agent for 
Agriculture, Eduardo Guerrero. The Municipal Alcalde for Tecpán argued that Guerrrero was a 
political leader, not a qualified technician and a complaint from Yepocapa cautioned that 
Guerrero’s activism would drive a wedge between the Extension Department and rural farmers.81 
The allegations led to an investigation by the new Head of Extension, Miguel Ángel Reyes 
which concluded that Guerrero failed to visit all the municipalities under his charge.82  
Guerrero defended his record, noting that he was only appointed in October and he was 
unable to work in January because the Governor seized his office. He claimed the Governor of 
Chimaltenango, Colonel Rubén Matta, was trying to force himself and two other active members 
of the PAR to leave the Department. Matta and his co-conspirator the Alcalde of Patzicía, were 
allegedly following directions from the FPL leadership to strengthen the party’s position in 
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Chimaltenango. Guerrero’s story was corroborated by a judge, who confirmed that the Agent 
was twice accused and then briefly imprisoned on charges ranging from resistance, disobedience 
and fraud. Guerrero was eventually exonerated and he retained his position, although his 
opponents continued to oppose his presence and undertook increasingly desperate attacks on his 
character.83  
The intense opposition to Guerrero’s presence in Chimaltenango was driven by his 
progressive position on rural development. He was a vocal proponent of financial and land 
reforms that challenged large landowners and their allies. On a trip through the municipality of 
Tecpán, Guerrero observed that the main problem facing small wheat growers was financial, not 
technical. He estimated that nearly 90% of wheat farmers didn’t have enough money to plant or 
maintain their crops. The local mill, ‘Helvetia’, lent farmers money when they were short on 
food and funds, and the loans were paid back in wheat. The mill processed this artificially cheap 
wheat into flour that it sold at a huge mark-up. 84 To avoid crippling major debts, farmers hoped 
for a good harvest so that they could pay off their loans. However, intemperate weather could 
easily strand small producers in perpetual poverty and many farmers were still paying off debts 
from 1946, when wheat crops failed across the country.  
Guerrero told several Committees that poverty was the biggest obstacle to agricultural 
development in the region. His efforts to transform local financial affairs subverted the pillars of 
local power and authority made him a target of the established elites in Chimaltenango. He 
encouraged farmers across Chimaltenango to borrow from newly established Offices for Rural 
Credit, which offered loans up to Q300 at 4% annual interest and made no claims on farmer 
crops.85 This government sponsored solution allowed campesinos to avoid borrowing from the 
“rich hoarders” who offered exploitative loans.86 However, administrative delays and financial 
constraints limited the reach of these affordable loans. Without substantive land reforms and 
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sweeping financial changes, many farmers still had to depend on the largesse of local landowners 
for life saving loans. 
 Rural credit was seen as a vital need by campesinos throughout Guatemala. A meeting of 
Alcaldes, Committees for Agriculture, and farmers in Quetzaltenango urged the Ministry of 
Agriculture to rapidly open new Offices for Rural Credit throughout Guatemala. The Minister, 
Valdes Calderón, responded positively to these recommendations and he encouraged the Bank of 
Guatemala to open new offices across Western Guatemala because the development of small 
farmers and businesses was being hindered by the lack of capital. The Minister wrote that 
campesinos currently had to submit themselves to the “extortion of a few wealthy people, 
without scruples, who levy growing interest and [place] drastic exigencies [on loans].” He 
argued that new credit offices would favor the development of a cadre of honest, hardworking 
farmers who represented the future of the country.87 His lobbying indicated the importance of 
agricultural agents and Committees as sources of information about the countryside and their 
influence over the Ministry’s policies. The Bank, however, was non-committal. The President of 
the Bank, Manuel Noriega Morales, acknowledged there was a credit shortage in rural 
Guatemala but he redirected the Minister’s requests to the national mortgage provider CHN 
(Crédito Hipotecario Nacional) because the bank had no legal authority to establish credit 
agencies according to the “Regulations for Rural Credit Agencies” passed in January 1946.88 The 
head of the Bank of Guatemala acknowledged the shortcomings in the current strategy for rural 
development and advised the Minister of Agriculture to consult new reports on the creation of a 
Banco Agrícola and the Instituto de Fomento de la Producción (INFOP), emphasizing their 
potential for realizing the Government’s agenda for rural change.89 
 For its part, the CHN was anxious to assuage concerns that they were too slow to open 
new offices for rural credit. In 1947, they penned an extensive report on their rural credit 
program to the Ministry of Agriculture, which contacted the CHN after fielding several requests 
for a Credit Agency from the Committee for Agriculture in Santa Rosa de Lima in Santa Rosa.90 
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The CHN claimed that they had already established 11 credit cooperatives and multiple credit 
agencies across Guatemala, which had collectively loaned Q230, 700 in credits to farmers and 
extended a further Q74, 710 to cooperatives and collectives.91 The rising demand for credit 
indicated that rural credit agencies were still too scattered to service farmers across Guatemala. 
The scarcity of rural capital—or at least capital borrowed at fair rates—was perceived by many 
small growers and the government as a barrier to development. Without capital, campesinos 
struggled to buy tools, fertilizers and seeds that were increasingly required to compete against 
large, heavily capitalized farms.  
Conclusion 
By 1948, it was clear that the Arévalo administration’s failure to implement a clear and 
comprehensive rural reform policy had hindered agrarian modernization efforts. The Ministry of 
Agriculture had successfully established a network of agricultural agents that greatly expanded 
the presence and authority of the Arévalo administration across rural Guatemala. The 
government had some success expanding its rural credit program and controlling the prices of 
new exports, but the ad hoc nature of these efforts indicates that the state lacked a clear policy on 
rural economic issues. As Urrutia remarked in 1945, the Guatemalan government had to decide if 
it was going to regulate the economy or let large landowners and industrialists dictate economic 
affairs. The compromises worked out by the Sierra and the Ministry of Economy and Labour 
around price controls indicated a clear hesitancy to stringently regulate Guatemala’s financial 
and landowning elite. The Arévalo administration lacked the political power to openly challenge 
Guatemalan elites and moderates were also worried that structural reforms—credit programs, 
price controls, and land reform—would empower the country’s indigenous majority.     
Cindy Forster has argued that during the Arévalo administration the “state stood aloof 
from the demands of its poorest citizens.” She argues that colonization schemes avoided the 
question of land reform and labour inspectors only gingerly regulated large landowners. The 
Labour Code was widely criticized by labour organizers and progressives who believed that 
Arévalo had actively courted the good favor of Guatemalan elites by preventing rural unions that 
had less than 500 members. Forster argues that labour inspectors were largely powerless because 
they needed landowner permission to make a ruling. Yet they remained highly visible, travelling 
                                                     




through rural Guatemala “like missionaries armed with the Labour Code and little else.”92 This 
description of is reminiscent of the General Agents of Agriculture whom the Ministry of 
Agriculture dubbed apostles on a crusade to stop soil erosion. However, the similarities are not 
complete. Unlike labour inspectors, when General Agents of Agriculture were rebuffed by large 
landowners many began working closely with smaller farmers and campesinos. As they laboured 
to propagate new agricultural techniques and technologies throughout the countryside, agents 
were often surprised by campesinos who eagerly engaged with state-led modernization efforts. 
Importantly, campesinos adopted new crops and tools when they fit with local priorities. 
Though the Arévalo administration was divided on the best approach to rural 
development, technicians who worked closely with the peasantry came to appreciate the 
limitations of technical aid and they pushed for financial and land reforms that empowered small 
growers and undermined the power of rural elites. Though agricultural agents often shared closer 
class and cultural ties with large landowners than campesinos, but as they travelled through the 
countryside many came to appreciate the industry and resolve of small producers.93 The rapid 
spread of Committees for Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Industry also helped defined the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s knowledge about the countryside, since they allowed local 
communities to bypass sometimes hostile municipal and departmental authorities and present 
their requests directly to the Arévalo administration. Although they did not always fulfill the 
requests made by Committees, the Ministry of Agriculture responded quickly and 
sympathetically to questions and requests from the countryside. They even lobbied other 
government agencies to secure rapid results for communities that petitioned the Ministry for 
assistance. These Committees and the agents whom they worked alongside, succeeded when they 
framed their demands to the state in the language of productivity and progress. 
Agents had successfully established the state’s presence throughout rural Guatemala by 
introducing new productive technologies, reporting on local conflicts and encouraging the 
development of Committees for Agriculture. However, they often confronted thorny political, 
social and environmental problems that defied simple technical fixes. Some progressive agents 
began to push for more expansive power, but policymakers worried that turning agents into 
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economists and local power brokers would undermine their efficacy on productivity issues. This 
might also further fracture the countryside by creating ad-hoc economic policy where the success 
of small farmers was dictated by the efficacy of their Agricultural Agent. On behalf of the 
Department of Rural Economy, Leopoldo Zeissig encouraged the government to instead create a 
new rural development institution with a broader mandate and more powers than the Department 
for Extension and Agricultural Development. “We have to consider,” wrote Zeissig, “that the 
services of agricultural extension are new in Guatemala and they have ahead a field so wide as to 
be virgin and…it would be useless to shift the energies and time of the General Agents in the 
area of rural economy, which is a different phase.”94 He believed that agents needed to focus on 
technical aid while another, more powerful agency addressed the systemic problems of 
inequality, speculation and hoarding agents identified as barriers to rural development.95 
Despite the evident shortcomings of agrarian policy prior in the 1940s, it is clear that 
policy makers understood the need for further diversification of Guatemala’s anemic agrarian 
economy. Yet, stimulating the adoption of new export crops and modern agricultural techniques 
required a nuanced understanding of both landscape and people that the Arévalo administration 
initially lacked. General Agents of Agriculture evangelized modernization throughout rural 
Guatemala, but they also gave officials in the Ministry of Agriculture unprecedented insight into 
the local environmental and political constraints on production. They also fostered the growth 
Committees for Agriculture, which became new vehicles for rural organizing.  
Without sustained pressure from indigenous campesinos agricultural extension would 
likely have remained trapped in the search for efficiency: higher yielding crops, mechanization 
and more effective distribution of credits, tools and inputs. Although some of the new rural 
development experts acknowledged the necessity for land and financial reform, they focused 
initially on increasing yields and encouraging new crops. Committees for Agriculture used their 
privileged access to the state to request tools, seeds and credit, but they also asked the Ministry 
of Agriculture to address systemic problems like credit and land shortages. Although Ministry 
officials tried to quickly deal with technical problems, they lacked the tools and political clout to 
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implement a more expansive rural development agenda. Their outreach efforts did demonstrate 
that there was significant enthusiasm for change amongst campesinos. The government had to 
find a vehicle for creating substantive social-economic change that cut through party politics. 
Their answer was INFOP, a semi-autonomous government agency that had a broad mandate to 
rapidly develop Guatemala by challenging the financial, technological and political barriers to 
modernization. INFOP’s mandate was a reaction to the limitations of agriculture extension as a 













Chapter 4: “Produce More to Live Better” 
 In late August of 1949, officials from Latin American and Caribbean countries met with 
representatives of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) and the 
Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (IICA) in Costa Rica to discuss the challenges 
of extension work and share successful approaches.1 Guatemalans were active participants in the 
conference, which reiterated the importance of extension work in rural countries “where the 
majority of the national income is derived from the soil, where a majority of the people are 
dedicated to agriculture as means to life and source of subsistence.”2 Though Guatemalan 
reformers had encountered serious political and economic challenges to modernization, their 
extension efforts pushed the boundaries of rural development. They had engaged communities as 
technicians, but many became advocates pushing for economic and political reforms. They also 
helped organize Committees for Agriculture, which became vehicles for remote communities to 
engage the state directly. 
These new responsibilities fit the expansive definition of rural extension advanced at the 
Conference, where participants identified increased agricultural productivity as the precursor to 
improvements in rural nutrition, health and education. A collected volume on the conference 
encouraged rural development experts to “work with the people at the community level, not by 
distributing relief, [but] by promoting self-help and the development of rural organizations.”3 
Experts, however, still had an important role to play in the development of the countryside 
because they offered the state detailed insight into social, economic and environmental 
challenges to development. Moreover, technicians and extension agents could quicken the pace 
of modernization by disseminating discoveries made in agricultural research stations. The goal of 
rural development and extension, concluded conference participants, was to enable rural 
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communities to secure “improvements in individuals and communities, through their own 
efforts.”4 
The Conference encouraged developing countries to expand the state’s presence in the 
countryside with new government offices and state agents so that citizens began to trust the 
government. This ideal, however, was problematic in Guatemala where the state was relatively 
weak and the countryside was wracked by political factionalism. Committees for Agriculture and 
extension agents could not always count on local or even national political support for their 
efforts to improve rural wellbeing. The Conference criticized poorly planned rural development 
initiatives which were often scuttled by the conflicting goals of different ministries and 
international organizations working for the wellbeing of the rural population. To avoid confusion 
and waste, participating countries were encouraged to found a coordinating body for rural affairs: 
“because the needs of rural inhabitants are urgent and the resources available to confront those 
needs are limited.”5 Guatemalan reformers anticipated this suggestion and had begun planning 
for their own, semi-autonomous development agency in 1947. 
This chapter examines the creation and early years of the Institute for Encouraging 
Production, a powerful government organization that was dedicated to rural development. The 
institute stimulated modernization with targeted loans and a strong focus on technical assistance 
for famers, large and small. INFOP has not played an important role in historical accounts about 
the Revolution, but it greatly facilitated the spread of new agrarian technologies, encouraged new 
exports like cotton and transformed the financial landscape. INFOP laid the groundwork for the 
1952 agrarian reform by demonstrating the viability of the Pacific Coast as a new agricultural 
frontier. The institute funded agricultural research that defined and quantified a poorly 
understood agrarian region that was dominated by large, undercapitalized plantations. INFOP 
technicians experimented with new crops and forms of land tenure on their large, experimental 
farms. These controlled spaces were utilized to demonstrate the productive potential of 
modernization on the Pacific Coast and the viability of a mixed farming landscape. The institute 
also used loans to stimulate crop diversification on large farms, an initiative which led to the 
emergence of new modernization advocates including the future President, Jacobo Arbenz.  
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In October 1949, large swathes of Guatemala were devastated by tropical rainstorms 
which unleashed landslides and unprecedented flooding. INFOP reacted quickly to the disaster, 
distributing new, hybridized corn and cotton seeds as part of its emergency response effort. The 
storms drew national attention to the dangers of soil erosion and deforestation, where previously 
inundations and landslides had been episodic and localized. INFOP and the Ministry of 
Agriculture pushed for coastal colonization and resettlement initiatives, which promised to 
transform large extents of forest and pastures into productive farmland. The Guatemalan 
government received robust support for this agenda from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. INFOP continued to promote the viability of industrial 
agriculture on the Pacific Coast, but they also emphasized the importance of a diversified 
agrarian landscape throughout the country.  
To prevent further disasters, INFOP encouraged the Guatemalans to rethink land tenure 
and replace private property with a more sustainable alternative called usufruct. They argued that 
usufruct was a flexible form of land tenure that promoted conservation. Under this model, the 
state retained the rights to the land but campesinos were given lifelong rights to farm the land. 
Upon their death, the land would revert to the state. INFOP experts argued that the usufruct 
model would encourage campesinos to recognize their responsibilities as stewards who should 
sustain soil fertility for future generations. Usufruct also reinforced the power of the 
Revolutionary state in the countryside, because it required campesinos to consult experts about 
the best strategies for increasing production while conserving natural resources. Notably, most of 
the land given out to campesinos under the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law was offered in lifelong 
usufruct. Conservative opponents of INFOP and the Revolution attacked usufruct as a 
fundamentally inefficient form of land use that also demonstrated the government’s ‘communist’ 
tendencies. INFOP, thus, demonstrated the viability of coastal resettlement and modernization 
and they actively experimented with new models of land tenure that were intended to balance 
productivity with the wellbeing of farmers and the land they farmed. 
The institute’s role has been neglected because it was overshadowed by the agrarian 
reform and it left few distinctive archival records. It was also maligned by Guatemalan elites 
after the coup who believed it favored Arbenz and other influential progressives with loans. 
There were minor incidents of political favoritism during the revolution, but overall INFOP 
effectively carried out its mandate to diversify exports, facilitate agricultural credits and improve 
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food production. The Institute managed to retain its reputation for independence, effectiveness 
and impartiality until the 1954 coup. American economists John H. Alder, Eugene R. 
Schlesinger and Ernest C. Olson concluded that the “absence of direct government intervention” 
in INFOP indicated that the government “has managed to translate into reality the legal concept 
of administrative autonomy.”6 
  This analysis comes with an important caveat. Over the long-term, the chemical 
dependent model of cotton cultivation that INFOP promoted on the Pacific Coast had devastating 
consequences for ecosystems and labourers. During the Revolution, INFOP agronomist tried to 
limit the need for costly pesticides by promoting conservation measures, including crop 
rotations.7 However, their end goal was to foster the development of a new, productive annual 
that would rapidly create a new class of small farmers. To this end, INFOP and other government 
agencies helped campesinos access the seeds, fertilizers and pesticides they needed. The 
government also moved to regulate the cotton industry, to control the risk of pests. After the 
Revolution, the government continued to fund cotton growers through INFOP but they stopped 
measures that helped campesinos farm cotton and reduced efforts to control pesticide use. 
Reflecting on INFOP’s role in cotton production during the 1950s and 1960s, American 
anthropologist Richard Adams criticized government support for cotton because it empowered a 
wealthy minority and caused significant environmental damages. “[W]hat superficially may 
appear to be a healthy sign of growth,” warned Adams, “is also a manifestation of a continuing 
tendency to lay waste to the environment for the profit of a very small segment of society.”8 In 
their enthusiasm for modern crops and techniques, INFOP promoted the spread of a model of 
agriculture that prioritized productivity as a means of achieving equality. They neglected, 
however, to consider the long-term implications of a system of agriculture that dependent heavily 
on external inputs of chemicals. 
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“Produce More to Live Better” 
As the limitations of agricultural extension work became evident, the Guatemalan 
government began planning for a powerful development institution that could cut through 
politics and rapidly modernize rural Guatemala. The Bank of Guatemala began designing a new 
development organization in 1947. The future Institute for Encouraging Production, or INFOP, 
was initially divided into two sections: one focused on banking “to widen and democratize 
productive credit” and the other on agricultural development.9 Although housing was 
subsequently added to INFOP’s responsibilities, throughout the revolution the institute focused 
most of its efforts on credits and technical assistance for farmers. To avoid the political divisions 
which had hindered agricultural extension efforts, the institute was given financial and 
administrative autonomy. It was also led by experienced technicians who could leverage their 
scientific and financial expertise to justify rural interventions.10 
 In 1948, Congress passed Decree No. 553 and officially created INFOP. To ensure its 
independence, INFOP was given an initial capital allotment of 6.5 million Quetzales and the 
government pledged to fund the Institute with annual budget appropriations that ranged from 2 to 
6 percent of the national budget. This arrangement quickly proved to be a point of contention and 
after 1950 the government consistently neglected to set aside the proper allocations for INFOP. 
Nevertheless, the organization was able to maintain its capital with savings and credit programs 
that encouraged agricultural production.11 INFOP’s robust administrative structure was also 
designed to protect its autonomy, while sharing information with other government departments. 
There were three executive layers, including a Superior Directive Council that guided and 
approved INFOP policy, an Executive Directorate which supervised and directed the institute’s 
policies and a Managerial branch, with Directors who administered Credits, Agricultural 
Development and Housing Initiatives. Finally, there was a Technical Council which offered 
expert advice on INFOP’s development schemes.12 As the Arévalo and Arbenz government tried 
to cope with frenetic political activity, INFOP’s financial and administrative structure enabled it 
to remain remarkably focused throughout the revolution. 
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The Superior Directive Council was the least stable aspect of INFOP. There were 
permanent members from key government ministries, including Agriculture and Economy, the 
Bank of Guatemala and the National Mortgage Credit (CHN). The Council also included 
representatives from industry, agriculture and two labour members, the latter were chosen by the 
President. Although membership in this group changed over the course of the Revolution, 
several moderates remained throughout including Dr. Manuel Noriega Morales, who served as 
the representative for the Bank of Guatemala and then Minister of Economy. Influential 
progressive Augusto Charnaud McDonald and labour leaders Amor Velasco and Manuel Pinto 
Usaga also served on this oversight committee until 1952.13 
Their departure from INFOP was closely tied to emergent political conflicts in the PAR, 
which coalesced around Charnaud McDonald’s support for the new National Peasant 
Confederation of Guatemala (CNCG). Critics worried that this peasant league would enable 
Charnaud and his supporters, including Amor Velasco, to consolidate political power. Charnaud 
resigned from the PAR in 1951 and formed a new Socialist Party. The President replaced the 
outgoing labour representatives with José Luis Caceros and José Luis Ramos, both influential 
members of the new communist party, the Guatemalan Labour Party (PGT).14 However, this 
1952 shift also saw the inclusion of Roberto Berger—a leading cotton grower after the 
Revolution—as the agricultural representative to the Superior Directive Council.15 The moderate 
Nicolás Brol also continued to represent the Ministry of Agriculture.16 The effect of these 
transitions was a turn toward the centre and a retreat from the overtly revolutionary language of 
the early INFOP years. During this period, the Institute continued to be respected nationally and 
internationally for its effective credit and agricultural development activities.17  
One of the key factors ensuring INFOP’s institutional focus was the Executive 
Directorate that was led by Ángel Nuñez Aguilar until early 1954. He was an Argentinian 
                                                     
13 Handy, Revolution, 42.  
14 José Luis Ramos was an active in the CGTG and the CNCG. He was the head of the PGT’s Peasant Commission 
(1952-54) and CGTG representative on the National Agrarian Council. Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in 
Guatemala: 1944-1954 (New York: Octagon Books, 1979), 96. Handy, Revolution, 42. 
15 He served as President of AGUAPA. See Chapter 6 for more details. “Letter to Junta General,” Informativo 
Algodonero no. 4 (March 1956): 2. 
16 For more on Brol see Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 235. Handy, Revolution, 87. Glejesis, Shattered 
Hope, 73, 209-210. 
17 Adler et. al., Public Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala, 266. 
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engineer who had collaborated with Leopold Zeissig on Paraíso Perdido in 1945.18 Ángel Nuñez 
Aguilar met Arévalo in Argentina, where he also cultivated contacts with the FAO. After 
President Arévalo was elected, Nuñez Aguilar came to Guatemala and became the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s main technical advisor. He was instrumental in the planning of INFOP and courted 
international agencies including the FAO for technical assistance. He told FAO liaison W.G. 
Casseres in confidence that Guatemala wanted to recruit Latin American technicians “already 
familiar with tropical agriculture, and not recent graduates from U.S. colleges who come to win 
their spurs [and] learn agriculture [and] then leave.” Casseres supported this “novel and 
refreshing point of view” because it gave Guatemala more freedom to implement economic 
changes without American intervention.19 He warned his superiors that other Central American 
organizations which accepted US technical assistance were beholden to their US funders and 
burdened by a surplus of US agronomists.20 INFOP tried to forge a distinctive path, which 
recognized the transformative power of technical and financial assistance but defended the 
institution’s political autonomy.  
The organization’s commitment to modernization as a means of increasing rural 
productivity and wellbeing was clearly communicated by its motto: “Produce More to Live 
Better.” Shortly after it was created, INFOP officials created a strategic plan that identified areas 
where the institute could make significant changes. First, officials sought to increase yields of 
corn and other essential foods so that they could control the rising cost of living threatening to 
destabilize the government. This initiative was complemented by efforts to make it easier for 
small borrowers to obtain credit so that they could enter the market as small farmers (Figure 8). 
Second, INFOP tried to diversify export crops and reduce the government’s dependency on 
coffee. This was accompanied by an initiative to encourage domestic crops including cotton, 
reducing the need for imports and stopping the outflow of capital. Finally, the institute invested 
                                                     
18 He was actually Honduran, but had lived most of his life in Argentina. Casseres also reported that the government 
was receiving advice from Juan Pablo Duque, a Colombian coffee expert.  
19 Personal Letter from W.G. Casseres to Fortescue, Decembre 8, 1947, Gran Hotel Continental, Guatemala, LA 
Record Group 15 LAT [Latin American Regional Office] Box 28, “Reports to HQ.” UN FAO-Rome.  
20 He focused on the Inter American Institute for Agricultural Sciences (IIAS) in Turrialba, Costa Rica. The IIAS 
was created by the Pan American Union as “a child of all the American republics,” but its dependency on US staff 
and funding meant it was known as a “predominately United States organization.” Casseres noted that the IIAS was 
frequently confused with the American-dominated Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of Foreign 
Agricultural relations. Casseres encouraged Guatemalans to work with the IIAS on an informal basis, guided by 
shared interests. “Report on Field Trip, August 10-29, 1947”, 4 September 1947, 11. LA Record Group 15 LAT 
[Latin American Regional Office] Box 28, “Reports to HQ” UN FAO-Rome. 
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heavily in research so that they could better understand the problems facing the country before 
they made interventions to improve the living standards for Guatemalans.21 
The Monitor Del INFOP was the organization’s official organ and was organized and 
edited by Leopold Zeissig. The Monitor’s editorials and information pieces conveyed the 
organization’s vision for rural development, which focused on improving rural wellbeing 
through agricultural modernization and financial reforms. The editors claimed that the 
organization was the counterpart to the democratic Revolution initiated in 1944, which would 
create substantive material improvements in the lives of Guatemalans. 
By freely elected powers, through the press, the parties and the unions, the people of 
Guatemala exercise their right to live free. Through INFOP they exercise their right to 
live better. Or to say it in one of their concise slogans: “Better Bread, Better Clothes, 
Better Homes.22 
 
The Monitor argued that a revolution confined to political reforms would create a formal 
democracy where people might have the right to vote but, quoting French writer Anatole France, 
they also had to die of hunger beneath the bridges. They warned that this apparent democracy 
would also be “held prisoner by the forces of privilege” while “the popular majority remain 
debased by backwardness and poverty.” To secure lasting change, Guatemalans had to reject 
monoculture and embrace crop diversification and new production techniques. “Or said another 
way,” concluded the editorial, “create wealth, emancipate her from monoculture and organize 
her [agriculture] methodically and scientifically.” 23 
INFOP officials immediately focused on gathering information about the countryside 
they were supposed to transform. The institute co-funded a wide ranging soil classification and 
mapping project by US specialist Charles Simmons, which is still used as basic reference 
material at the Universidad de San Carlos. Though the final edition was only published in 1964, 
information was available from study in the late 1940s and informed decisions about 
development initiatives in the Motagua Valley and the Pacific Coast. Another cornerstone study 
was Lesley Holdridge’s 1950 study of the economic potential of Guatemala’s diverse forests that 
                                                     
21 Alder et. al., Public Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala, 264; “Razones y Propositos de Este 
Publicación,” Monitor Del INFOP, No 1-2, (1950): 1. 
22 The original translation for the adage was “Mejor pan, mejor vestido y mejor techo.” “Mision y Sentido de 
INFOP,” Monitor del INFOP Vol 2: No. 7 (1951): 1. 
23 Ibid.  
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focused especially on the untapped potential of the Petén.24 Studies and reports were an attempt 
to make Guatemala’s varied landscape legible to the state as it planned and implement sweeping 
social and agrarian reforms.  
Prior to 1950s, reports from rural governors, state agents and foreigners had produced a 
partial and fractured vision of Guatemala’s agrarian landscape, shaped by ethnic prejudice and 
political interests. Agricultural agents began to feed the state more detailed information about 
soil composition, forest cover and crop yields, but their reports lacked scientific rigor and the 
utility of the reports depended greatly on the capability of agents. These anecdotal reports 
produced a fractured vision of the country that inhibited the state’s ability to govern. This 
situation changed considerably with the advent of the modern census, aerial photography and 
scientific assessments of land and land use. Though these forms of knowing were also partial and 
biased, they gave Guatemalan experts the ability to plan for sweeping agrarian change and a 
perceived moral authority derived from their use of science to inform planning.25 
                                                     
24 Both studies thanked INFOP for funding and facilitating fieldwork. 




Figure 8: Maize as commodity, “Plant Today to Harvest Tomorrow: Save in INFOP”26 
INFOP’s emphasis on gathering information before making changes to the countryside 
was inspired by José Cecilio del Valle. The 19th century Central American thinker and politician 
advocated for statistics as a cornerstone for good rule. “A government that does not know the 
                                                     
26 Back cover, Monitor del INFOP, Vol 2: No. 7 (1951). 
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lands of the Nation it governs,” wrote del Valle, “nor the fruits it produces, nor the men who 
populate her, is a blind man that does not see the house where he lives, an administrator who in 
order not to risk action without knowledge, must be idle out of prudence.”27 Del Valle believed 
that the Guatemalan government could not rule effectively until it had a working knowledge of 
the population, crop production, and landscape. The Guatemalan government finally answered 
this call in the late 1940s, when the government coordinated with the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization to create rigorous, standardized surveys of agriculture and population.  
Though department level surveys of agrarian holdings had begun as early as 1883, no 
systemic agricultural census had been undertaken prior to 1950. Before the census could even 
begin, the Directorate-General of Statistics had to update and refine existing maps of 
Guatemala’s political boundaries and land holdings. Even so, 10% of the Republic was left 
effectively unmapped and the government depended on local authorities to quickly outline urban 
boundaries and create sketches of these remaining municipalities.28 Over a century after 
independence and the formation of the Guatemalan state, many corners of the country remained 
relatively unknown to government agents. The 1950 agricultural census and other INFOP-funded 
studies attempted to rectify the lack of rigor in previous data-collection efforts that depended on 
local authorities and landowners to submit their information to the state. Landowners could 
easily omit or misrepresent information about crops, yields and land cover which the government 
used for taxation and governance purposes. 29 
The census and INFOP-funded studies generated new information about the countryside 
that enabled the Guatemalan government to deploy a coherent national agrarian policy. At the 
same time, a cadre of technicians were trained and dispatched to survey and measure lands 
across Guatemala. In 1949, the UN FAO pledged to train and assist Guatemalan technicians so 
that they could ensure the “conservation of forests, soil, and water” resources necessary for the 
                                                     
27 Manuel Rubio Sanchez, “Desenvolvimiento de las Estadísticas Agropecuarias en la República de Guatemala,” 
Monitor del INFOP Vol 4: No. 16 (1953). 
28 In the introduction to the agrarian census, readers were directed to consult the “Censo cafetalero de 1940” 
“Presentacion,” Censo Agropecuario, Vol. 1 (1950): 4. 
29 Government officials could also manipulate data to serve their interests. The introduction to Guatemala’s 6th 
population census, published in 1954, emphasized the inconsistency of previous population surveys due to data 
manipulation. In the 4th census of population of 1921, a carefully designed census form was undermined by faulty 
tabulations that inflated the population by 15% to account for citizens they could not count. In 1940, the President 
forced government officials to inflate the population and the 1950 population census found that there were 




country to attain “higher levels of economic and social welfare for its people.”30 The government 
also established a Faculty of Agronomy at the Universidad de San Carlos in 1950, which was 
partly a response to devastating floods in 1949.31 This greatly expanded an ongoing effort to train 
agronomists by the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional (IAN) and the Ministry of Agriculture. 32 
New experts and a profusion of studies were the necessary foundation for effective rural reform. 
These same agronomists, technicians and planners would be called on to judge the merits of 
campesino land claims made during the agrarian reform. Though INFOP did not itself transform 
Guatemalan politics, it established the basis for surveillance, planning, and financial initiatives 
that made the agrarian reform of 1952 plausible. 
Defining the countryside through scientific study and quantitative measurement was 
INFOP’s first step toward realizing their motto: “Produce more to live better.” Information about 
the countryside—crop yields, rotations, and labour practices—was subsumed into their larger 
political agenda which sought to increase agrarian productivity and rapidly industrialize 
Guatemala. Yet INFOP, like the Ministry of Agriculture, still struggled to convince Guatemala’s 
landed elite about the necessity of modernization. Most wealthy landowners preferred to plant 
well known exports like coffee, eschewing the financial risk inherent in rapid diversification. 
Less established landowners—those not of the landed elite or new immigrants—were more 
likely to gamble on new exports, and benefited more from the financial incentives and technical 
assistance offered by INFOP. This was the case with the future President Jacobo Arbenz, who 
bought the El Cajón plantation with his wife in the 1940s and moved quickly to diversify crops 
and modernize labour relations. 
 “Magnificent machinery” 
 The modernization of coastal agriculture depended initially on adventurous landowners, 
willing to experiment with different crop varieties, land use strategies and labour regimes. El 
Cajón, the Arbenz family farm, was a key example of agrarian modernization led by large 
                                                     
30 “Agreement on Technical Assistance Between the Food and Agriculture Organization and Government of 
Guatemala,” Min Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
31 H.M. Dressler, “Cartas de Antigua: ¿Por qué no Tenemos Facultad de Agronomía?” El Imparcial, October 26, 
1949. 
32 IAN was more conservative than INFOP, focused on experimentation with agricultural crops, and had a good 
relationship with the US throughout the Revolutionary period. In 1945, the United States Department of Agriculture 
signed a convention with the Instituto Agropecuario Nacional (IAN), supporting investigation of key exports crops 
including rubber and cattle. Between 1946 and 1953, twenty-three students received scholarships allowing them to 
study agriculture in the United States. Yurrita Elgueta, “Agricultura”, 392-393. 
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landowners and it demonstrated the challenges that modernizers faced when trying to reshape 
labour relations and crop regimes. Modernization was not universally perceived as a benefit. 
Campesinos who had longstanding labour relations with coastal planters sometimes rejected a 
straightforward wage-labour relationship because it supplanted important customary entitlements 
like access to land and food rations.33 The disconnection between the plan for rural 
modernization and the messy reality was evident at El Cajón, The administrator Pablo Rohr 
managed daily affairs on the plantation and he struggled to explain crop failures, machine 
breakdowns and worker resistance to the idealistic Arbenz family who did not live on the 
plantation. Correspondence between the administrator of El Cajón and the Arbenz family that 
runs from 1948 and 1950, highlights the struggle of ‘progressive farmers’ to balance financial 
solvency, equitable labour relations, and modernization. Loans and technical assistance from 
INFOP facilitated diversification across Guatemala and especially the Pacific Coast, but they did 
not remove the financial and labour costs of diversification. Though Arbenz advocated an end to 
‘feudal’ farms, the limited capacity of the Guatemalan state and poor rural infrastructure slowed 
modernization efforts and perpetuated a dependency on migrant labour.  
El Cajón was bought by Arbenz in the 1940s and the family began experimenting with 
modern crops immediately. Inspired by the success of cotton in El Salvador, the Arbenz family 
planted an experimental plot of 10 manzanas in their new farm. The first planting failed rather 
spectacularly. Arbenz’s wife Maria Vilanova—who penned the majority of the letters to the 
plantation under the pseudonym La Secretaría—claimed this was due to lack of close 
supervision by an increasingly busy Arbenz and the failure to control pests. When Vilanova and 
Arbenz visited the plantation, what appeared at first to be a thriving stand of cotton field was 
infested with caterpillars. In her memoir, Maria Vilanova wrote, “we heard a very strong rustling 
[murmullo] coming from the plantation, which was beginning to wither.” Close examination of 
the cotton revealed thousands of caterpillars, “who chewed the plants giving themselves a great 
feast. We had to burn it all.” Though the plantation had been fumigated, Maria Vilanova’s 
                                                     
33 Though campesinos were inspired to action by the Arbenz administation, modernization also frightened peasants 
who were poor and worried about changes that might further undermine their fiscal and bodily security. Though 
‘feudal’ relations between landowner and campesinos were highly exploitative, peasants carved out small spaces of 
autonomy or privilege based on their work ethic and labor value to the plantation. Jacobo Arbenz, “La Politica 
Economica en el Informe Presidencial,” Vol. 5: No. 20 (1954). For further discussion of community, labor and 
ethnic conflicts engendered by the Agrarian Reform process see Handy, Gift of the Devil, 130 and Handy, 
Revolution in the Countryside, 120-127. 
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Brother Antonio—an experienced cotton planter in El Salvador—believed that the Arbenz’s had 
sprayed too little and at the wrong time.34  
Cotton is very sensitive to changes in precipitation and farmers often gambled that good 
weather would ensure high returns from sales to international buyers. Speculation was 
exacerbated because cotton was an annual, unlike coffee which required 5 to 7 years before a 
plant would produce for market. Price controls mitigated speculation, but the threat of disease 
remained and farmers applied pesticides generously in an attempt to prevent crop losses. 
Careless application of pesticides had a negative long-term impact on farm finances because it 
hastened pest resistance and inflated crop maintenance costs. Arbenz briefly experimented with 
alternative growing strategies that increased the resiliency of cotton plants, including inter-
planting which was common in Indigenous communities.35 In September 1949, cropland was 
divided evenly between cotton, corn and inter-planted fields. Inter-planting and more mainstream 
options like fallowing were not widely adopted because they limited the number of plants that 
could be planted per year in a given area, lowering possible returns.36 
Despite the upsetting failure of their first cotton field, the Arbenz family resolved once 
again to plant cotton. Between 1947 and 1949, Arbenz began planning for a dramatic expansion 
of El Cajón’s productive capacity. Cotton was to be the centerpiece of the farm. An early 
memorandum estimated that they would clear 1000 manzanas in the coming year where they 
would plant 400 manzanas of cotton, 300 manzanas of rice, 200 manzanas for corn, and 100 
manzanas for sesame.37 Compared to other crops, cotton was prohibitively expensive to plant 
and care for since it required a heavy investment in pesticides and hybridized seeds. Of the 51.34 
Quetzales invested in a manzana of cotton, 5 Quetzales were spent on special seed stock—an 
                                                     
34 Pacific Coast cotton plantations required fumigation for the first 10 days after sprouting (“de nacido”) and 
frequent fumigation thereafter. María Vilanova de Arbenz, “El Soldado del Pueblo,” p. 98. Archivo de Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán, Serie Borradores de Libros. Archivo Inedito. CIRMA. Antigua, Guatemala. 
35 In 1948, an outbreak of caterpillars in one of El Cajón’s cotton fields required urgent application of pesticides. 
Nearby corn fields were flourishing with minimal inputs and normal management. “Letter to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz 
from Pablo Rohr, Jr.,” August 2, 1949; “Letter to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz from Rafael Lot,” November 26, 1948. 
Archivo de Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, Finca El Cajón. Archivo Inedito. CIRMA. Antigua, Guatemala. (Hereafter 
Arbenz Papers) 
36 The plantation planted 18 Manzanas of cotton, 16 manzanas of corn, and 13 manzanas of corn and cotton. “Letter 
to María Jerez R. from Pablo Rohr Jr., Finca ‘El Cajón’, September 30, 1949, Archivo de Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, 
Finca El Cajón. Archivo Inedito. CIRMA. Antigua, Guatemala; “Report” 5 September, 1949. Finca El Cajón. 
Arbenz Papers. 
37 Arbenz imported 1400 kilograms of Delta Pine 14 cotton seed from El Salvador, disinfected to prevent the spread 
of plagues. “Memorandum” n/d Archivo de Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, Finca El Cajón. Archivo Inedito. CIRMA. 
Antigua, Guatemala; “Certificado de Origen,” n/d. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
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important consideration because poor quality cotton fibers ruined potential returns—20Q was 
spent on insecticides and 22Q on collecting the harvest. Unlike other crops, cotton was seeded by 
tractors but bolls were picked by hand to preserve value. Whereas tractors had to be repaired 
seasonal labourers were paid little and if they fell ill they could be readily replaced. These labour 
practices allowed farm operators to combine modern mechanization with more traditional forms 
of exploitation, ensuring high margins.38 
Though chemicals represented cotton growers’ largest and most volatile investment, 
labour costs could also escalate when crops were afflicted by disease. Fellow planter Minor 
Keilhauer, the owner of the nearby farm El Cerritos and the agricultural advisor on INFOP’s 
Executive Directorate, informed Arbenz in early 1949 that average labour costs were determined 
on a piecemeal rate. On a normal plantation, labourers earned roughly 0.60Q per day but on a 
very productive plantation workers earned closer to 1Q a day because they could harvest five to 
six quintales of cotton a day. He warned that on a bad plantation, labour costs rose by up to 50% 
because workers needed to be paid more per pound to ensure they stayed to collect the remaining 
cotton bolls. “Naturally,” wrote Keilhauer, “you have to consider that in a bad cotton field the 
workers have no desire to work in it, they do not make their daily work time and there are 
endless difficulties to harvest it.”39 
By 1949, 200 manzanas of cotton were registered at El Cajón and Arbenz—confident in 
cotton’s potential—planned to plant another 800 manzanas with cotton.40 Arbenz guessed the 
new crop would be five to ten times larger than his 1948 harvest.41 INFOP recognized Arbenz as 
“one of the farmers dedicated to the cultivation of this important textile fiber,” and contacted him 
for advice about the seed varieties and growing practices that would guarantee the best yield and 
highest quality fibers. Although Arbenz was enthused about cotton, he expressed frustration 
                                                     
38 After cotton, the next most expensive crop was sesame, which cost Q26.34 per manzana, followed by rice, maize, 
and bananas. “Memorandum” n/d. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
39 Piece rates on a good plantation were 0.01Q per pound and 0.03Q per pound on a bad plantation. Good yields 
were estimated at 5 to 6 quintales of cotton per manzana. “Letter from Minor R. Keilhauer to Jacobo Arbenz,” 
January 7, 1949. Noviembre 26, 1948. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
40 Registering and measuring cotton yields allowed the state to set import tariffs that wouldn’t undercut factories that 
produced clothing with cotton. “Letter to Administator of El Cajón from Ramiro Aragón C., Director General de la 
Economía Nacional,” 18 January, 1949. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
41 The yield for the 1948 crop was 5 quintales oro per manzana, with a total yield of 120 quintales. He estimated 500 
to 1000 quintales for 1949. “Registro de Productores de Algodon” January 20, 1949, Archivo de Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán, Finca El Cajón. Archivo Inedito. CIRMA. Antigua, Guatemala. For complaints about pests and humidity 
affecting 1948 crop and a request for more pesticides, see “Letter to Jacobo Arbenz from Rafael Lot,” November 26, 
1948. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
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about the scarcity of capital available to farmers growing alternative crops. Planting new crops 
required heavy initial investment in new production technologies and farmers often had to wait 
several years before they harvested a successful crop. This delay between the receipt of funds 
and the return on investment was perilous for farms financed with loans bearing high interest 
rates or with short loan repayment windows.42   
In the “Observations” section of the official registration form INFOP required cotton 
farmers to fill out, Arbenz criticized the terms on which he had borrowed from the Crédito 
Hipotecario Nacional. He borrowed from the CHN for a one year term, but in retrospect he 
recommended a longer term for potential lenders and borrowers because of high start-up cost and 
the risks associated with cotton planting.43 In a letter to the head of INFOP, Arbenz asked for 
75,000 Quetzales over 3 years which would allow him to pay off his CHN loan and plant 1,000 
manzanas of cotton, rice, corn and sesame in El Cajón. As justification for the loan, he cited his 
dedication to clearing and planting new land. Using expensive new machinery, Arbenz had 
cleared 10 caballerias of land and 7 more were in the process of being cleared and readied for 
planting.44  
The desire to efficiently cultivate new crops drove migration and labour recruitment 
throughout Guatemala. Highland communities often specialized in certain crops or acquired a 
reputation for hard work that encouraged landowners to pay a small premium for their services, 
in wages, rations, or housing. As the farm expanded in 1949, Pablo Rohr, El Cajón’s full-time 
administrator, urged Arbenz to recruit labourers from the highland region of Santa Cruz el 
Quiché, “because the indigenous [worker] is the best worker.”45 Though workers from the 
                                                     
42 Arbenz and another notable cotton farmer, Minor Keilhauer, established an association for cotton growers to raise 
capital to build a ginning plant and fund further planting. Keilhauer sought to turn INFOP, the principle lender, into 
an active investor into the newly incorporated Industrial Algodonera de Guatemala, S.A. (INDALSA) by paying 
back the loan through shares. “Letter to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz from Eduardo Motealegre C., Gerente, INFOP,” 
April 25, 1949; “Letter to Jacobo Arbenz from p.p. Minor R. Keilhauer, signed by Frank Townson,” Feb 21, 1949. 
Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
43 “Registro de Productores de Algodon,” January 20, 1949. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers.  For complaints about 
pests and humidity affecting 1948 crop and a request for more pesticides, see “Letter to Jacobo Arbenz from Rafael 
Lot,” Noviembre 26, 1948. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
44 Arbenz estimated that the value of the farm rose from 125,000 to 200,000 Quetzales. (610) “Letter to Gerente del 
INFOP from Jacobo Arbenz,” March 11, 1949. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
45 Despite this assertion, the expectations of laborers differed throughout the highlands. When Arbenz was petitioned 
by a labor contractor from Rabinal, Rohr encouraged him to ignore that offer. He believed that Rabinaleros were 
hardworking but they expected high wages because they often worked on United Fruit Company plantations in 




highlands had substantially less power and authority than Arbenz, the Minister of Defence and 
future President, they used their knowledge of crops, dedication to field work and reputation to 
negotiate terms of employment.46 Their value to the farm lay in labour skill and their intimate 
knowledge of new cultivars: insight gained through training and thousands of hours of work time 
that created a pool of communal knowledge about best practices.  
Rohr actively discouraged Arbenz from employing locals—plentiful and willing to work 
without rations—because they were not “good workers.” He warned that temporary savings 
would be offset by productivity losses.47 Facing labour shortages in the fall, Rohr relented lest 
the crop be lost and used workers from Siquinalá and Santa Lucía Cotzulmalguapa. He 
maintained that this was a “necessary evil” and emphasized his preference for workers from 
Quiché and even El Salvador.48 He praised those from Quiché because they allegedly worked 
harder and were more obedient.49 Eventually skilled workers from Quiché, Santo Tomas 
Chichicastenango and even Rabinal arrived on the farm looking to work, though they bargained 
for rations as a supplement to their wages.50 The Arbenz family’s preference for indigenous or 
Salvadorian labourers fostered ethnic tensions between El Cajón and surrounding 
municipalities.51 
The apparent docility of highland workers vis-à-vis their coastal counterparts was a by-
product of endemic highland poverty. Organized communities that migrated collectively to 
labour on farms could press for limited concessions, but more often migrants were anonymized 
and atomized by exploitative landowners. Their apparent cooperation was often an indication of 
                                                     
46 As Cindy Forster notes, the Revolution opened up political space for plantation workers to protest the terms of 
their employment including the length of the workday. Forster, Time of Freedom, 150. 
47 “Letter to María Jerez R. from Pablor Rohr. Jr., Finca ‘El Cajón,” August 6, 1949 Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
48 References to workers from El Salvador were sporadic but positive and an early reference indicated a connection 
to María’s brother Tonio. “Letter to María Jerez R. from Rafael Lot, Finca El Cajón,” n/d Finca El Cajón. Arbenz 
Papers; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 144-145. 
49 “Informe que la Señoría Secretaría Solicita para Rendirle al Coronel; al mismo tiempo lleva todos los datos del 
informe quincenal.” Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
50 Workers from Rabinal even came with their own “moldendera”, a woman dedicated to making tortillas for 
workers. “Letter to María Jerez R. from Pablo Rohr Jr., Finca El Cajón” September 4, 1949, Finca El Cajón. Arbenz 
Papers. 
51 When local laborers began pressing for wage increases and complaining about work conditions, El Cajón’s 
administrator Pablo Rohr encouraged Arbenz to dispense with lowland laborers offer highland workers housing and 
rations instead. Though Rohr was not eager to employ local labor, he was by all accounts an exemplary 
administrator. When he had to leave because of the illness of his son, workers urged Arbenz to keep him on. “Letter 
to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz from Benjamin López, Finca El Cajón,” April 24, 1950; “Letter to Maria Jerez from 
Pablo Rohr, Finca El Cajón,” July 8, 1950; “Letter to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz from Workers from Sanarate at Finca 
El Cajón,” December 7, 1949; “Letter to Coronel Jacobo Arbenz from Workers of Finca El Cajón,” April 19, 1950. 
Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
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their isolation and their need for wages to pay off debts incurred with contractors. Local 
labourers, not tied to land and family in a far off location, had more incentive to organize and 
pressure employers and were often regarded as less pliable than their highland counterparts. 
Though highlanders were sought out, generalized labour shortages and the lack of a safety net 
encouraged lowland workers to organize for better terms of employment in a way that 
indigenous campesinos generally did not.52 
The struggle to secure labour slowed agrarian diversification, farm expansion, and 
modernization. To regularize labour relations, the Arbenz family pushed for waged labour so that 
they could abolish customary-obligations like rations and housing. They maintained that paying 
high wages justified the denial of rations, but they had difficulty enforcing their rules on their 
own farm. In September 1949, corn prices rose and supplies grew scarce spurring workers from 
Sanarate to petition Rohr for corn to eat or rations they could buy. Rohr struggled to respect the 
Arbenz family’s wishes but he urged them to consider the proposal lest they lose valuable 
labourers.53 Rohr also asked Jacobo Arbenz to quickly improve housing on the plantation. 
During the heavy rains of 1949, Rohr reported that workers huddled in the corners of their 
galeras avoiding leaks. The Arbenz family responded sympathetically, asking Rohr to halt 
construction on open-style galeras that lasted only 8 to 10 years because they were saving for 
high quality housing.54 Like many modernization and development initiatives, the Arbenz 
family’s well-intentioned focus on the future left workers stuck waiting for the future to arrive.55 
                                                     
52 Forster, The Time of Freedom, 117-135.  
53 “Letter to Pablo Rohr Jr. from La Secretaria,” Sept 28, 1949; “Letter to Maria Jerez R. from Pablo Rohr Jr, Finca 
‘El Cajón,’ Octubre 28, 1949; “Letter to Pablo Rohr Jr. from La Secretaría,”Octubre, 11, 1949. Finca El Cajón. 
Arbenz Papers. 
54 Maria Vilanova asked that campesinos maintain their land in their spare time instead of dedicated laborers to the 
task. “Letter to María Jerez R. from Pablo Rohr Jr., Finca El Cajón,” September 17, 1949; “Letter to Pablo Rohr Jr. 
from La Secretaría,” September 12, 1949. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
55 The Arbenz’s were generally concerned about the health and well-being of their workers, but they stalled on 
needed improvements citing the costs associated with modernizing El Cajón. In June 1949, the Mayor Abel Ochoa 
of Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa urged Arbenz to address housing issues.  He argued that the health and security of 
workers was often sacrificed by farmers who invested instead in “stables, kennels, and pens and forget to protect 
workers with more or less decent houses no matter that they are the source of production for this farm and knowing 
that your life runs parallel with misery.” “Letter to Pablo Rohr from La Secretaria,” June 3, 1950; “Letter to 
Propietario de la Finca El Cajón from J. Abel Ochoa, Alcalde Municipal, Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa,” June 8, 
1949. Finca El Cajón. Arbenz Papers. 
143 
 
The costs of maintaining labourers coupled with chronic shortages was an economic 
burden on farm finances and prevented long-term planning.56 Mechanization was increasingly 
sought out by farmers as a way to minimize landowner dependency on labourers, whose 
availability, pliancy, and skill level was in constant flux. Rohr and the Arbenz family struggled 
to identify the right balance, with the latter emphasizing the ability of farm machinery and better 
administration to control labour costs. Maria Vilanova admonished Rohr for employing too 
many labourers and urged him to use the “magnificent machinery” which was “more efficient, 
quick and [used] less personnel.” Rohr objected that the machinery was in disrepair and that 
machines could not perform delicate tasks like planting lemongrass and doubling corn, a routine 
practice meant to allow the cob to season and protect it from rains. When Rohr offered to resign, 
citing differences of opinion, María Vilanova reassured him that disagreements over farm 
management were normal, produced by the mismatch between reality and the Arbenz family’s 
modernizing vision.57  
Despite making a heavy investment in cotton production, by 1950 Arbenz abandoned the 
crop and ordered the plants destroyed after several bad harvests. After a brief experiment with 
sesame, El Cajón transitioned to new crops including citronella and lemongrass. Arbenz ordered 
Rohr to clear land and plant citronella through the winter, with the lofty goal of planting nearly 
300 manzanas by the end of 1950.58 The jarring transition from cotton to citronella surprised 
lenders like INFOP, who sent Arbenz a carefully phrased letter reminding him that his loan was 
only to be used for cotton.59 INFOP’s official policy was to promote crop diversification, but 
they quickly focused on cotton because it could be used by domestic textile producers and 
surplus could be sold for a high price on international markets. The future President’s decision to 
abandon cotton was potentially embarrassing for the organization, but they did not want to 
publicly rebuke him because Arbenz was a powerful proponent of modernization.  
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The expansion of El Cajón and other coastal farms came at the expense of thousands of 
acres of forested land. A 1929 map of El Cajón and the adjoining farm of Tehuantepeque 
indicates that the plantations were dominated by woodlands and pastures with only small 
amounts of land planted with corn.60 The Arbenz family modernized El Cajón to capitalize on 
new crops like cotton, citronella and lemongrass. Their drive to modernize irrevocably 
transformed the landscape. The Pacific Coast’s transformation from lazy hinterland into modern, 
mechanized agrarian frontier occurred rapidly but the discourse around deforestation exposed a 
key tension in the modernization agenda. State officials attacked highland deforestation as proof 
of the peasantry’s rejection of modernity, but clearing trees on the coast was celebrated as an act 
of colonization that opened up Guatemala’s fertile frontier. In the eyes of the government, a tree 
felled in the highlands destroyed the fabric of the nation, a tree felled on the coast was the 
precursor to national development.  
Nature’s Fury 
In October 1949, Guatemala was subjected to a month of intense rainstorms which 
caused destructive floods and landslides throughout the countryside. An estimated 30 inches of 
rain fell in the capital during the first fifteen days of October. The final deluge came in a 
rainstorm that raged for 72 hours, inundating communities around Lake Atitlán and Amatitlán. 
Surging rivers destroyed over 50 bridges, wrecked an estimated 1,200 miles of highways. The 
Guatemalan government reported that at least 50 villages had been swept away by water or 
buried under landslides triggered by the storm. Reports from affected regions suggested that the 
flooding and landslides had destroyed crops and homesteads throughout the Motagua Valley and 
in the Departments of Escuintla, Quetzaltenango, San Marcos, Santa Rosa, Jutiapa, Jalapa and 
Sacatepéquez.61 “As each additional report arrives,” President Juan José Arevalo explained to 
international media on October 19, “the disaster assumes greater proportions.”62  
The floods wrought significant damage across the South Coast, destroying communities 
and covering productive lands with mud and rock. At the port of San José, most of the town had 
been summarily swept into the ocean. The port of Ocós meanwhile disappeared under the mud, 
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caught between the rapidly rising rivers and the lashing sea.63 Flyovers by American pilots 
revealed that the very contours of Guatemala’s coastline had changed, with “yellow mud deltas” 
forming at the mouth of rivers that fed into the sea.64 The Madre Vieja river, fed by runoff from 
the Atitlán Volcano, buried 3 kilometers of the highway through the coastal town of Patulul 
under 5 meters of rock. Elsewhere the rushing water gouged a ravine 10 meters deep as it rushed 
toward the ocean. 
In the days after the disaster, estimated death tolls fluctuated between official estimates of 
4,000 to more conservative estimates by the Red Cross of 500. Upwards of 70,000 people were 
estimated to be homeless.65 In the departmental capital of Escuintla, population 26,000, flooding 
left at least a 1000 children homeless and presumed orphaned. Campesinos were 
disproportionately affected by the storms, which obliterated their homes, their fields, and their 
livestock. Over 55,000 families were displaced and struggled to obtain food.66 People in the 
Motagua Valley were reportedly eating two meals a day, trying to conserve food because the 
region was cut-off from the rest of the country.67 On the Pacific Coast, people in Patulul urged 
the government to quickly send more food by rail because airdropped emergency rations had 
split open and spoiled.   
As October came to a close, damages from the storm were estimated to be more than 
$23,000,000. The storm decimated agricultural production in some of Guatemala’s most fertile 
regions. The United Fruit Company reportedly lost 1,500,000 pounds of rice and millions of 
banana stems. Meanwhile, coffee producers initially estimated that coffee crop destruction 
hovered around 30 percent although these estimates were subsequent lowered.68 More than 
20,000 labourers who lived or worked seasonally on large plantations were laid off in the wake 
of the disaster by landowners who cited a lack of work due to the destruction of roads and 
crops.69 Tensions quickly escalated after workers were laid off and in Pochuta, Chimaltenango 
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authorities threatened to send troublemakers to the Departmental capital to be punished. In the 
interim, local authorities distributed rations of corn and beans to defuse the situation.70 To avert 
potential conflict and minimize suffering, the Guatemalan government tried to resettle displaced 
campesinos on national farms and private land. They also tried to control destabilizing food 
shortages and inflation that was caused by the destruction of crops on the verge of being 
harvested by repealing import duties on corn, beans, rice and eggs.71 These measures had some 
success, but speculation continued and the state gave local authorities emergency powers to 
punish speculators and hoarders.72 
 Though large swathes of the Guatemalan countryside had been affected by the storms, 
two regions received special attention in early reports: the Motagua Valley and Panajachel. On 
October 14th, after 5 days of hurricane-like rain, the Motagua River burst its banks in the middle 
of the night and swept through towns and villages carrying away homes, people, and livestock. 
Valley residents estimated that the river rose 28 feet, and when the waters receded fertile fields 
were destroyed, and often buried by mud and debris. One elder remarked that he had never seen 
the like after 80 years living in the area.73 Meanwhile, the small river that passed by the lake-side 
town of Panajachel became a rushing torrent that dragged huge boulders and ancient trees down 
from the mountains. The rushing water swept aside the houses of the humble and flooded luxury 
hotels. Locals attempted to cope with the devastation by remembering how the city had rebuilt 
after previous catastrophes. Elders cited an epic flood on the 4th of October 1881 that matched 
the ferocity of the recent disaster, though in the wake of that event most of the population left 
Panajachel for the South Coast. Braulio Mayén, a long-time resident, sought meaning in the 
disaster by suggesting it was punishment for human misuse of nature: “The same Nature 
repentant for the gift given to us, jealous, unleashed her implacable fury against human works, to 
highlight more her own charms.”74  
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El Imparcial largely dispensed with metaphysical explanations and placed the blame 
squarely on human actions.  In an editorial titled “Neglect, Ignorance, and Ruin,” they cited 
“incessant deforestation” and poor cultivation practices of highland farmers as the aggravating 
factor that allowed a destructive storm to become a catastrophe. Like others, El Imparcial’s 
writers sought to contextualize the storm by reminding readers of devastating storms in 1924, 
1926 and 1931. They did so not to minimize its importance, but rather to emphasize that this 
storm was exponentially more destructive. Guatemala’s best agrarian lands had been buried by 
landslides and scrubbed clean by floods. The damage was measurably worse, noted El Imparcial, 
where tree cover had been removed by deforestation. They reminded readers that though national 
defense was often thought of in terms of military arms alone, Guatemalans needed to initiate a 
new campaign to prevent the destruction of the nation’s soils. This “national imperative” had to 
check the daily attacks on soils by Guatemalans who “only think about today and not tomorrow, 
in their immediate gain and in the least effort.” The editorial strongly implied that traditional 
maize cultivation by indigenous campesinos caused highland deforestation. As an alternative, 
they promoted rational, disciplined cultivation practices that planned for a productive tomorrow. 
Failure to conserve soils now, risked a future where Guatemala became an “immense desert 
whose fruit will be dust storms, floods in the winter, desolation and poverty forever.”75 
In early November, representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture toured affected areas 
around the watershed of the river Los Esclavos in Santa Rosa. The oldest residents told officials 
that they had never seen a flood of this scale. The river had carried away half the town of 
Cerritos, and left local pastures buried under 2 to 4 meters of sand littered with tree trunks.76  
Campesinos lost cattle, pigs, chickens and even dogs during the flood. The report cited 
significant losses of corn, and other crops found in the region. Of these, sesame plantations were 
deemed the most affected. Ministry of Agriculture officials reported that over 80% of the crop 
was considered completely lost. High winds during the rainstorms had snapped the stalks of the 
tall plants and unrelenting humidity had resulted in outbreaks of fungus that contaminated the 
rest of the plants, causing record losses. The only beneficiaries, representatives reported 
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cynically, were local sawmill owners who were processing the cedar and other fine wood 
dragged downstream by the raging river.77  
Agriculture officials, however, interpreted disaster as an opportunity to re-imagine the 
Santa Rosa region as an active participant in the Guatemalan economy. Representatives noted 
that sesame plants being grown at the nearby agricultural station in Guazacapán, Santa Rosa 
demonstrated resistance to the fungus sweeping through plantations. These sesame plants were 
being bred so that they could be distributed to farmers. Officials observed that they had seen 
other high yielding varietals of sesame and rice that promised to transform regional cultivation in 
the coming years. The Ministry-funded research station helped campesinos increase production; 
facilitating access to equipment to destroy plant diseases, distributing mango and citrus seedlings 
and selected seeds. With these special strains, campesinos were able to boost production over 
that achieved with traditional seed stock. Leveraging this disaster, government intervention 
capitalized on the scientific research undertaken at agricultural stations. Relief efforts distributed 
hybridized corn and sesame seeds in a bid to speed up their adoption and hasten the 
transformation of Santa Rosa into a new grain and export producing region.78   
 In the area around Cerritos, Santa Rosa, the Ministry of Agriculture discussed an 
ambitious plan for regenerating local agriculture by relocating the capital. Instead of dredging the 
nearly blocked river, they believed that Cerritos should be rebuilt further north so that the city 
could be rationally reorganized. The land would be parceled with the goal of turning Cerritos 
into a prosperous and modern city located near rich, but relatively untapped agricultural land. 
They endorsed a series of changes intended to bring the town into more rapid communication 
with the state and market. Building roads between Cerritos and Chiquimulilla, in conjunction 
with a state funded irrigation project, would open up the area to farming. These roads would also 
quicken the transport of fish between the coast and the capital and increase the scope of salt 
exploitation, already a key industry in Santa Rosa. The physical health of the region would be 
secured by a more intensive DDT campaign, even as the economic well-being of Cerritos was 
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being ensured by funds disbursed by INFOP.79 The planners called on the organization to 
establish a credit union from which campesinos could take out small loans.80 Officials promised, 
in short, that the combination of improved transportation, irrigation and credit would open up 
land and transform the region between Cerritos and Chiquimulilla into the “most prosperous 
granary of the South Coast.”81  
The storms destroyed many plantations and grain stores across the South Coast. INFOP 
responded quickly with a generous line of credit, which allowed the Arévalo administration to 
borrow Q200,000 to purchase food “[t]o stave off the scarcity of subsistence goods that 
threatened inhabitants.”82 INFOP also used the disaster as an opportunity to encourage farmers to 
use new, more productive corn varietals. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture observed that 
during their visit, 30 quintales of a special yellow corn varietal, Tiquisate Dorado, had been 
given out to lowland campesinos just in time for a late sowing.83 The disaster relief and 
mitigation effort dovetailed with INFOP’s research on modern, more productive and nutrient 
dense maize varietals that were designed to combat endemically low corn yields.84  
INFOP later reflected on their role in disaster relief, focusing on their successful 
distribution of modern, hybridized seeds to farmers in crisis. The institute spent roughly 
Q10,0000 on 335 quintales of Tiquisate Dorado corn and 302 quintales of Cocker Wilt cotton 
that they distributed to planters. After the disaster, INFOP continued to distribute hybridized 
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corn and cotton to farmers which they claimed produced higher quality crops. They even began 
expanding the range of imported hybrids, exploring possible wheat varieties and they imported 
potatoes from Holland for experimentation.85 The rains of 1949 created an opportunity for 
INFOP to push its reform agenda onto skeptical farmers, with the hope that the high yields from 
hybrids would convince farmers to fully modernize their fields. INFOP emphasized the 
importance of modernization as the guarantor of well-being by distributing seeds and 
demonstrating the productive capacity of new agricultural frontiers, including the Pacific Coast, 
Quetzaltenango and the Motagua Valley. As the country struggled with the displacement and 
rural impoverishment caused by the disaster, INFOP redoubled its efforts to convince farmers 
that modernization would help them produce more and live better. 
“Progressive Agriculture” 
The disastrous rains of 1949 reinforced the government’s commitment to soil and forest 
conservation in Guatemala’s highlands. For modernizers, the disaster vividly demonstrated the 
continuing threat that campesinos posed to the country’s productive regions and they called for a 
reorganization of Guatemalan agriculture. The research work that INFOP commissioned gave 
them the scientific legitimacy to argue for development schemes that balanced increased 
productivity in designated agrarian zones with soil and forest conservation in the highlands. The 
lightly populated Pacific Coast became a focal point for modernization and resettlement 
schemes. Experts argued that large landowners could intensify production on rich, coastal soils 
and there would still be ample land for small farmers from the highlands to clear and colonize. 
Arbenz and handful of progressive farmers had demonstrated that the Pacific Coast was ripe for 
modernization, with large tracts of forested land that could be quickly cleared and planted with 
new machines. The realization that mechanization could partially replace labourers encouraged 
reformers to dream of a new agrarian landscape, where large-scale industrial farms co-existed 
with smaller producers. INFOP built upon these efforts, using its experimental farms to 
demonstrate the productive potential of industrial agriculture and test new land tenure 
arrangements that emphasized the importance of conservation.   
Modernizers received strong support for their efforts to reorganize Guatemalan 
agriculture from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The first 
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IBRD mission to Guatemala toured the country in 1950, guided by experts from the INFOP. The 
IBRD report, released in 1951, warned the government that overpopulation was leading to 
widespread soil erosion and falling yields throughout the highlands. They advised the Arbenz 
administration to relocate campesinos to new villages in “regions better adapted to progressive 
agriculture” like the Pacific Coast. In these managed spaces, the state could quickly treat tropical 
diseases and manage the transformation of indigenous campesinos into industrious market 
farmers. These new, more prosperous, small farmers could produce for internal markets and 
support a burgeoning domestic industry through consumption.86  
The government’s long-term goal was to replace the large cattle ranches and poorly 
capitalized plantations that dominated the Pacific Coast with a more productive network of farms 
operating at multiple scales. Geographer Edward Higbee argued that many coastal plantations 
imported “thousands of emaciated cattle” from Southeastern Guatemala and Honduras and 
fattened them on “lush guinea-grass pastures.”87 This approach to cattle ranching was lucrative, 
but food production suffered because prime agricultural land was monopolized by ranchers who 
invested little and produced low grade meat, milk and leather. 88 The extractive mentality of 
coastal ranchers and landowners reflected the widespread belief that coastal soils were 
inexhaustible and could sustain high yields without maintenance. George Britnell, head of the 
                                                     
86 Concentrating new migrants in planned communities was supposed to prevent “episodes of social maladjustment 
which have arisen in the past,” an oblique reference to alcoholism, gambling and prostitution which was supposedly 
more common on the Pacific Coast. The IRBD drew on prevalent stereotypes that characterized the coastal 
population as less hard working and more prone to immoral acts, including drinking and prostitution. Guatemalan 
ideas of race were not static, tied to physiology alone, but rather race was a product of self-ascription, climate, 
perceived heritage and location. The Pacific Coast, with its long heritage of migration, was often a place of racial 
mixing and blended and shifting identities. These concerns about cultural deterioration echoed the sentiments El 
Cajón administrator Pablo Rohr who associated coastal living with indolence. Economic Survey Mission to 
Guatemala, The Economic Development of Guatemala, (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1951), 26-27, 82-84; For a more nuanced analysis of coastal life see David Carey, “Empowered 
through Labor and Buttressing their Communities: Mayan Women and Coastal Migration, 1875-1965,” Hispanic 
American Historical Review, Vol. 86 No. 3 (2006): 501-534; For discussions of race and mestizaje in Guatemala 
and Central America see Charles Hale, Darío Euraque, and Jeffrey L. Gould, Memorias del Mestizaje, (Guatemala: 
CIRMA, 2004). 
87 Edward C. Higbee, “The Agricultural Regions of Guatemala,” Geographical Review, Vol. 37. No 2 (1947): 189. 
For geography of cattle, sheep, and pig production and flow of meat products see Felix McBryde, Cultural and 
Historical Geography of Southwest Guatemala (Washington: U.S. Government Printing office: Smithsonian 
Institute of Social Anthropology Publication No. 4, 1945), 37 and Map 13. 
88 Dirección General de Ganadería, “Plan de Fomento Pecuario: Importacion y Compra en el Pais, de sementales y 
lotes de hembras de pura raza, para el majoramiento de nuestro Ganado criollo, que se distribuye de la siguiente 
manera,” n/d. Min Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
152 
 
IBRD mission, characterized coastal landowners as “absentee landlords…interested only in the 
total amount of immediate cash however ruinous the production methods used.”89 
Resettlement was only part of a larger effort to slow highland deforestation and improve 
food production. The IBRD encouraged the government to also invest heavily in more modern, 
industrial scale corn production on the coast. This would lower the price of corn and encourage 
highland farmers to experiment with new, more appropriate food and market crops. This advice 
dovetailed with efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture and INFOP to discourage corn cultivation. 
They promoted promote livestock and fruit trees as viable market crops, which would also 
contribute to highland reforestation and slow erosion.90 The government recognized that the 
transition to new crops on the Pacific Coast and throughout the highlands might take several 
years, so in the interim they supported coffee production on the Pacific Slope. The revenues from 
coffee were supposed to nurture new crops like cotton, sesame, and lemongrass and fund 
resettlement initiatives on the coast.91  
The IBRD’s final report praised INFOP especially and encouraged the government to 
entrust all agrarian development initiatives to the organization. The notable synergy between 
IBRD recommendations and INFOP’s mandate, was a by-product of the mission’s close 
cooperation with the institute’s technical advisers.92  Like the IBRD, INFOP focused on the 
South Coast as an untapped agricultural frontier. They established several model farms on the 
Pacific Coast where they experimented with mechanization and new crops, including El 
Progreso, La Blanca, and Cuyuta. The most important of these was Cuyuta, located in the 
municipality of Masagua, Escuintla. Cuyuta was 46 metres above sea level—below the coffee 
belt and the ideal sugar production zone—and encompassed 6, 100 hectares of land. Cuyuta was 
INFOP’s flagship initiative: a controlled location where they demonstrated the tangible 
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production benefits of mechanization, selected seeds and new agricultural techniques to 
maximize productivity. INFOP used Cuyuta to evangelize the productive potential of 
Guatemala’s Pacific Coast.  
The Monitor del INFOP showcased the rapid expansion of agriculture with photospreads 
featuring tractors knocking down trees and brush: “conquering” land for cotton cultivation at 
another INFOP plantation, La Blanca. A series of photos documenting mechanization in Cuyuta 
emphasized the transformation of a disorderly forest into an orderly and clean cotton field 
(Figure 9). “The straightness of the furrows,” read the caption of one photo, “is characteristic of 
an economic crop” (Figure 10).93 The scale and speed of land change on the coast was almost 
without precedent in Guatemala. At Cuyuta, INFOP estimated that in 6 months, more than 962 
manzanas had been cleared of forests and prepared for planting. By June of 1950, the farm had 
been seeded with 574 manzanas of corn and INFOP had planted 107 manzanas of a projected 
350 manzanas of cotton.94 Mechanization was integral to INFOP’s development mandate, since 
it enabled increased production and opened up new land for cotton and corn. 
Though INFOP encouraged farmers to clear coastal land, they criticized highland 
deforestation because it potentially caused landslides, floods and river desiccation that threatened 
coastal plantations. Though geographically distinct, these two regions were connected by rivers 
that brought important freshwater from the mountains to the coast. Cuyuta straddled Escuintla’s 
major river, the Achiguate, which descended from the mountains and flowed through the 
Department to the Pacific Coast. Seasonal flooding by the river over millennial had deposited 
rich alluvial soils in the region, contributing to its fertility. Yet like rivers which flowed past 
Cerritos and Panajachel, the Achiguate also threatened downstream communities with disastrous 
floods. INFOP planners worried that overpopulation and correlated deforestation had increased 
the intensity and frequency of flooding in recent years. The Monitor del INFOP focused on 
strategies that farmers could use to maintain high yields and counteract the effects of upstream 
deforestation. They encouraged landowners to plant resilient African palm and coconut trees 
along riverbanks, both to slow erosion and prevent the inundation of fields with soil and debris. 
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INFOP also experimented with irrigation at Cuyuta, which was seen as a possible avenue to 
allow year-round cotton cultivation.95 
 
Figure 9: Clearing land for INFOP’s Cuyuta plantation 
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Figure 10: New cotton field, straight rows were evidence of an “economic crop” 
INFOP also encouraged coastal colonization and they were vocal advocates of a mixed 
agrarian landscape comprised of large, medium and small farmers. They argued that varied land 
tenure encouraged crop diversity and increased the resiliency of the agrarian system. Large farms 
could focus on exports while smaller farms served domestic needs, although these lines could be 
blurred as cotton and corn were grown across multiple scales. INFOP agronomists cautioned 
farmers that soil fertility had to be closely managed on intensive operations, because exports like 
cotton could irrevocably deplete soil fertility without careful management. To minimize the loss 
of soil fertility and mitigate the risk of pests and pathogens, they encouraged landowners to 
practice crop rotations and add organic matter to the soil frequently.96 This approach sacrificed 
immediate profits for the guarantee of long-term productivity. 
The institute articulated a new “conservationist doctrine,” which encouraged farmers to 
adopt modern techniques so that they could achieve and sustain higher yields without destroying 
the environment. INFOP claimed that farmers who focused on conservation produced “more and 
better food” for the “continuous well-being of Man, last usufructuary of natural resources.” To 
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demonstrate the viability of usufruct, INFOP rented a portion of Cuyuta to farmers, arguing that 
long-term land lease arrangements encouraged conservation. This argument formed the basis for 
a transformation in land tenure arrangements which reconceptualised the farmer as a steward of 
natural resources instead of an owner. Stewardship benefited the majority of Guatemalans over 
time, instead of a select few who benefited immediately and shared little of their wealth: 
The possession of the land must be interpreted [as] modifying the old concept of absolute 
owner and arbiter for the indiscriminate use of the same, to the new concept of possessing 
it as a guardian using it rationally according to its capacity to produce in order to leave it 
not impoverished and if possible with a more elevated index of fertility. 
 
This vision of agriculture cast farmers in the role of guardians who could increase yields 
sustainably if they collaborated with scientists who would “not only increase the production of 
the earth but also maintain its fertility.”97 Campesinos who adopted this stewardship model 
surrendered a measure of control to technicians, who became the arbiters of crop schedules, soil 
management, and best practices regarding land use.  
INFOP justified this loss of local autonomy by emphasizing the benefits that they could 
offer campesinos including higher yields and better access to domestic markets. In a lengthy 
memorandum written in 1951, Juan Fernández Mendía of INFOP’s Cotton Division proposed a 
new plan to distribute cotton seeds to campesinos on Guatemala’s Pacific Coast. He promised 
that this initiative would allow Guatemala’s “huge, unproductive masses” to create “new 
communities of wealth” in a hitherto abandoned and unproductive region. Fernández Mendía 
estimated that upwards of 6, 000 manzanas could be put into production if roughly ten thousand 
indigenous campesinos planted 10 cuerdas each. This would create a large supply of inexpensive 
cotton for Guatemala’s textile industry and would offer small farmers a new revenue stream that 
would improve their quality of life. 98 In 1951, the lead editorial for Monitor del INFOP 
reiterated the importance of campesinos to sustainable economic diversification of the 
countryside. “[We] must mark,” they wrote, “the path of progress in the productive labour of the 
campesino from New Guatemala.” To encourage more organized production of corn and 
especially cotton, they rented land from Cuyuta and other INFOP properties to campesinos in 
modestly-sized plots.99 
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For INFOP, cotton was more than a means for economic development and 
diversification, it was also an opportunity to transform indigenous campesinos into market-
oriented farmers. Fernández Mendía argued that campesinos would adopt modernization once 
they saw its potential: “our Indians will derive slowly but positively the benefits of modern 
agriculture and voluntarily” trade their oxen and “antiquated” agricultural techniques for modern 
tools and tractors.100 To ensure that campesinos did not neglect corn fields for commercial crops, 
Fernández Mendía suggested that they receive cotton seeds in direct proportion to the amount of 
corn they planted. INFOP sought to balance important increases in commercial crops with a 
steady output of basic grains. This plan also fostered the growth of small, diversified farms, and 
INFOP projected this sector would increase cotton production by 67%. Working together small 
and industrial-scale farms could potentially satisfy 50% of domestic demand by 1951, sharply 
reducing the textile industry’s reliance on expensive imports.101   
The rise of small producers was a source of anxiety for Guatemala’s large landowners. 
They feared that new opportunities would create labour and food shortages that undermined the 
profitability of coffee and other exports.102 Fernández Mendía defended INFOP’s efforts to 
encourage cotton, noting that there would be no food shortages because the Maya were driven by 
instinct to produce corn. “[S]uppose,” he wrote, “we subtract in their entirety the 10, 000 that can 
be dedicated to cotton, what is this to the millions [of campesinos] that are left?”103 This attempt 
to assuage large landowners that their labour supply would be unaffected reinforced stereotypes 
about indigenous farmers that excluded them from participating as equals in agrarian 
modernization. The expectation that campesinos would rely on expert guidance and advice 
implied erroneously that they were passive recipients of modernization. As we saw earlier, 
campesinos eagerly engaged in modernization and it was often the state that struggled to respond 
effectively to their demands. This was especially true during the agrarian reform, when 
thousands of campesinos received land in usufruct on the coast and were encouraged to plant 
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commodities like cotton but state agencies, including INFOP, failed to distribute loans, seeds, 
and fertilizers in the quantities needed by small farmers.   
INFOP encouraged campesinos to adopt measures that prioritized long-term 
sustainability over raw productivity. Though cotton can produce high yields on virgin soils, 
maintaining productivity requires farmers to carefully manage soil fertility and pests.104 
Agronomist Narcisco Castillo wrote an in-depth analysis of best practices for cotton farmers in 
1951, based on extensive work undertaken on the plantation Chapán in Champerico, a 
municipality in the Department of Retalhuleu. Castillo criticized farmers in Retalhuleu—and by 
extension the rest of the country—for ignoring the importance of soils. After two or three years 
of relentlessly cropping, eager cotton farmers exhausted key soil nutrients and rendered once 
fertile soil incapable of producing good harvests. Castillo encouraged farmers to replenish 
nutrients by using cattle manure and fallowing land. He was adamant that cotton should not be 
grown in the same location year-after-year and advised rotating cotton with corn and legumes on 
a four year rotation. Farmer’s using this method would still harvest cotton annually, but in 
smaller amounts than producers who dedicated all their land to cotton. By carefully maintaining 
soil fertility and practicing rotations, campesinos could sharply decrease their need for fertilizers 
and lower their overall production costs.105  
Though campesinos could reduce their use of fertilizers through careful crop rotations, 
pesticides remained an absolute necessity for cotton farmers. Rotations helped slow the spread of 
pathogens, but Castillo also advised farmers to burn cotton plants after the harvest so that 
possible pests or plant diseases would be destroyed before the next harvest.106 INFOP also 
facilitated the distribution of pesticides to cotton farmers across the Pacific Coast. In 1950 alone, 
INFOP imported 700 quintales of cotton seeds and over 20,000 Quetzales worth of pesticides, 
including lethal organophosphates Toxaphene and Gamexan.107 A 1951 proposal to give cotton 
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seeds to campesinos—expanding earlier seed distribution efforts—tried to reduce costs by using 
INFOP produced seeds but they still stipulated that cotton growers had to apply at least 120 lbs 
of insecticide per manzana   to secure a good cotton harvest.108 This reliance on pesticides was 
subsequently legislated in a 1953 law that required cotton growers to use only certified, 
disinfected seeds and forced them to obtain pesticides before planting.109 
Cotton thrived on the Pacific Coast but the humid climate also favored the growth of 
pests and plant diseases that could destroy cotton plants. Indeed, a 1952 report from the 
Department of Mechanization concluded that the Pacific Coast was “almost inadequate” for 
cotton production because of high precipitation and less than ideal soils. The report argued that 
the Motagua Valley was one of the most important regions for the future of cotton production in 
Guatemala because it was easily mechanized with ideal soils. They encouraged the state to build 
an experimental farm to promote cotton production it would help fight against the “apathy 
characteristic” of this region.110 The Pacific Coast was not a natural home for cotton production, 
but INFOP heavily promoted its cultivation because it grew well under controlled conditions and 
there was an abundance of undeveloped land that campesinos could potentially use. Unlike the 
Motagua Valley, this land would produce immediately but the long-term prospects for 
agricultural production on the Pacific Coast were less unclear.  
The Pacific Coast presented visitors with a vision of unending abundance, but experts 
like Castillo warned that fertility had to be carefully managed to prevent soil exhaustion, erosion, 
and pests. With expert consultation, modern agricultural methods could help cotton growers and 
other exporters avoid crop diseases and prevent falling yields. The only requirement to ensure 
success—barring catastrophic rainfall or market collapse—was adopting conservation measures 
that respected the limitations of coastal agriculture. Failing to take protective measures would, 
Castillo cautioned, guarantee the rapid collapse of a potentially lucrative industry after just a few 
years of good harvests.111  By transforming cropping practices and shaking-up land tenure, 
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INFOP hoped to minimize disease risk and maximize production cotton production on the 
Pacific Coast but this system was heavily dependent on pesticides to control disease. As cotton 
production increased during the 1950s and 1960s, cotton growers abandoned crop rotations and 
they sustained high yields by clearing new land and using fertilizers and pesticides to keep older 
land productive.112 
INFOP’s ambitious rural development project involved thousands of campesinos and 
widespread technical interventions to rural productivity. Cotton was the focus of their 
development efforts, but they also took interest in other non-traditional crops including sesame 
and burgeoning industries like salt production. INFOP’s agronomists frequently struggled to 
resolve the human benefits of development—improvements in rural wellbeing—with the 
environmental costs of development which often led to deforestation and habitat destruction. 
This was evident in the discussion around salt production, which flourished in the biodiverse 
region bordering the Pacific Ocean. Between Guatemala’s Pacific plain and the ocean there is a 
rich ecosystem dominated by swamps, lagoons and mangroves. This area supports a wide variety 
of migratory birds and is a vital breeding ground for sea turtles and fish. 113  
For centuries, salt producers in Santa Rosa, Escuintla, Suchitepéquez, and Retalhuleu 
used natural and manmade lagoons to trap water which evaporated under the hot sun and coastal 
wind. Salt brine was also collected and cooked to create pure salt, a process that consumed large 
quantities of lumber. 114 Like corn, cotton and cattle by-products, salt was part of the basic diet 
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and the state wanted to improve domestic production so that it could reduce imports. In 1951, an 
INFOP survey of the salt industry determined that domestic production had peaked in 1946 and 
declined year after year, despite increasing domestic demand. Imports were used to satisfy 
demand but INFOP was concerned that importers were manipulating the market. Import records 
indicated that Guatemala imported far more salt than it needed to meet domestic demand and by 
1950, importers had stockpiled over 90, 000 quintales of salt. Although salt should have been 
readily available, the cost per unit remained very high and INFOP was concerned that importers 
were artificially inflating prices and limiting accessibility.  
 Officials struggled to determine the correct course of action: should the state encourage 
production to meet domestic demand or curtail production to conserve local forests? The INFOP 
report cited Franklin D. Roosevelt’s injunction that a better distribution of wealth was the only 
way to solve problems between capital and labour. Yet INFOP officials worried about allowing 
more small salt producers, cautioning that the unfettered growth of the salt industry would lead 
to the “exhaustive and disorganized” exploitation of coastal forests for firewood. Salt producers 
around Champerico, Itzapa and San José had already exhausted local lumber supplies and were 
forced to travel far afield for wood which increased their costs considerably. Instead of 
popularizing production to meet demand, INFOP limited existing small producers to roughly 
1,000 quintales of salt per “harvest.” Officials believed that if these small producers were also 
encouraged to work small scale farms they would experience a “one hundred percent 
improvement in their standard of life.” Moreover, by creating a robust network of small salt 
producers who used forest resources sustainably, the industry would be able to produce salt 
reliably and at a reasonable cost.115 Unlike the highlands, there was no discussion of forced 
relocation or any concerted attempt to reorganize production systems to minimize their impact 
on local ecosystems. In this case, conservation was invoked to maintain a socio-economic order 
that dovetailed with government policy but had questionable implications for delicate coastal 
ecosystems vital for migratory birds and aquatic life.  
The example of salt production demonstrates the political and geographical limits of the 
conservation discourse in Guatemala. Agronomists and policymakers believed that if farmers 
followed a conservation ethos, the nation would derive long-term economic benefits and 
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immediate improvements in food security. However, this conservationist discourse made clear 
political and social judgements about what constituted sustainable land use. For example, cattle 
ranching which had historically dominated the Pacific Coast was heavily discouraged by 
modernizers. They argued that it was environmentally destructive—requiring large amounts of 
land to produce little meat—but it also was the power base of the traditional landed elite. On the 
other hand, salt production that clearly caused coastal deforestation was allowed to continue with 
only light regulation to restrain cutting because it employed campesinos and helped redistribute 
income. The Arbenz administration believed that the Pacific Coast was a frontier awaiting 
development: an ideal location to foster crop diversity and democratize land tenure. 
Conservation was an important idea that informed government discussion about the best types of 
land use, but it was often utilized as a political tool to discredit large landowners and encourage a 
dependency on experts. 
  INFOP was most effective when it had financial and technical leverage over the 
landowners and campesinos who worked with the organization. In these cases, it could 
encourage compliance with its conservation ethos and the technical advice offered by its experts. 
Although INFOP was widely recognized as an effective organization, as political tensions 
mounted its close association with the Revolution proved to be a significant liability and 
hindered the institute’s efforts to promote sustainable land use. In 1953, the Ministry of 
Agriculture received several reports that over 150 manzanas around INFOP’s Cuyuta plantation 
had been left unattended by farmers after the cotton harvest. Cotton farmers were required by a 
1952 law to burn and bury cotton plants after harvest so that pests and diseases would not 
spread.116 The most notorious offender was Colonel Elfego Monzón, who rented nearly 170 
mananzas in Cuyuta from INFOP.117 Colonel Elfego Monzón was an important political figure 
during the Revolution who rose to prominence because of his military connections and his 
political opportunism. To quell political conflict between conservatives and progressives, 
Arévalo reached out to Monzón on the anniversary of Major Francisco Arana’s death in 1950. 
Monzón negotiated to become the Minister of the Interior, but he was forced to resign months 
after his appointment, because of congressional opposition to his closure of the radical 
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newspaper Octubre and the Marxist school Jacobo Sanchéz. Monzón returned to power in a 
minor way under Arbenz as Minister without a Portfolio, though he left this position and 
eventually joined other disaffected but ambitious officers in covert efforts to overthrow Arbenz 
with US backing. 118 
INFOP urged the Ministry of Agriculture to intervene because they could not compel 
Monzón to comply with the destruction order.119 The Ministry of Agriculture sent an inspector 
from the Division of Plant Health who found that Elfego Monzón lived in Guatemala City and 
had not visited his land recently. According to locals, Monzón had lost interest in the property 
because he anticipated that the land would be redistributed to campesinos as part of the agrarian 
reform.120 Once Monzón had been found delinquent, the state assumed responsibility for the 
property, but the destruction was not carried out until June of 1953 due to a shortage of 
tractors.121 Although the Ministry quickly remedied the situation, this example indicates the 
practical limitations of INFOP’s efforts to promote sustainable land use.122  
The vilification of INFOP after the 1954 coup was also a by-product of this conflict 
between Monzón and other conservatives who resisted the institute’s efforts to transform the 
countryside and empower campesinos. After the 1954 coup, Monzón was part of the junta of 
officers that served until a new President was installed. He was forced to leave Guatemala, 
however, when he tried to stand up to Castillo Armas, the dominant member of the junta and the 
American choice for President.123 As a cotton grower, Monzón’s singular focus on profits and 
disinterest in soil and pest management foreshadowed the agrarian landscape after the coup. 
Cotton cultivation after 1954 was driven by speculation encouraged by easy and plentiful 
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government loans. The financial assistance for cotton cultivation was a legacy of the 
revolutionary period, but it was divorced from the technical assistance and lacked the emphasis 
on conservation that characterized early cotton promotion efforts. INFOP was divested of its 
technical responsibilities after 1954, and it became another avenue for landowners to access 
cheap capital. The modern perception that cotton was an inherently destructive crop has to be 
qualified by examining the political and environmental context in which it was cultivated. 
During the Revolution, the government believed cotton cultivation would help campesinos make 
the ideological transition from campesino to farmer and the geographic migration from highlands 
to the coast. 
Conclusion 
 INFOP’s mandate, “Produce more to live better,” focused on modernization as a means 
of rural development that could rapidly improve rural wellbeing. The institute worked to 
diversify the Guatemalan economy by promoting new exports like cotton among large 
landowners. Established elites remained focused on coffee production, but a few enterprising 
landowners experimented with new crops and cultivation techniques. INFOP and the Ministry of 
Agriculture also advocated multiple scales of production as the means to achieve the economic 
and ecological resiliency that eluded coffee dependent Guatemala. This modernization agenda 
did not seek to efface export agriculture but rather balance it with domestic production so that 
Guatemala could move toward self-sufficiency and greater equality. Although they believed 
fervently in the power of rural modernization, INFOP’s officials struggled to convince farmers to 
abandon coffee and corn for new modern crops. 
 The disastrous rains of 1949 offered INFOP a unique opportunity to overcome rural 
resistance by freely distributing new high-yielding corn and cotton seeds to large landowners and 
campesino who had lost their crops. They calculated that farmers would naturally adopt new 
seed varieties once they realized their productive potential, although these crops often carried 
hidden costs. To obtain the best yields, farmers had to follow expert advice and expend often 
scarce capital on fertilizers and pesticides needed to sustain high yields. This watershed moment 
also encouraged widespread government action on the pressing problem of highland 
deforestation, which contributed the soil erosion and possibly aggravated landslides and flooding 
on the Pacific Coast. New agricultural frontiers like Santa Rosa and, more generally, the Pacific 
165 
 
Coast became the focus of rural development efforts and INFOP envisaged a new, diversified 
landscape of large and small farmers.  
 The colonization of the Pacific Coast was part of a larger effort to diversify production, 
reduce population pressure on highland resources, and transform campesinos into market 
farmers. INFOP used this moment of demographic and agricultural change to experiment with 
alternative land tenure arrangements that emphasized the concept of people as stewards of 
natural resources. The institute successfully established cotton as a new and compelling crop for 
large and small farmers. Though cotton offered potentially large returns for individual farmers, 
INFOP counselled moderation and encouraged farmers to implement crop rotations and fallow 
periods which would ensure the long-term viability of their fields. The usufruct relationship was 
supposed to break old notions of individual ownership, and encourage conservation by 
emphasizing the common resources Guatemalans shared. INFOP’s role in this arrangement was 
as a guarantor of environmental protections, which elevated the institute’s expertise over local 
authority and knowledge.  
Industrial cotton varieties could produce huge crops with careful management and 
technical oversight. Their susceptibility to disease made them, counterintuitively, ideal crops for 
the expansion of the state into new agricultural frontiers. Landowners and campesinos had to 
work with agronomists and policymakers to coordinate loans and technical assistance. This 
expanded the reach of government authority but also undermined local autonomy by creating a 
farming system whose productivity depended on external inputs that farmers had to obtain 
through the state. Campesinos depended on the goodwill of technicians to access credits and 
farm equipment and this limited their ability to openly criticize the state. Middle and upper class 
farmers had more leeway to choose their crops and ignore conservation regulations that were 
designed to improve productivity for all farmers. The case of Colonel Monzón proved that elites 
could ignore INFOP’s technical advice without fear of serious sanctions. The organization’s 
mandate to transform rural development through modernization was an aspirational goal, which 
functioned only when farmers agreed to work under the direction of technicians.  
El Cajón and Cuyuta were powerful symbols of the transformative power of agrarian 
modernization, which many experts and government officials thought could boost productivity 
by reorganizing labour and land tenure arrangements. These farms were also at the forefront of a 
radical re-imagining of coastal agriculture that tried to extend the agrarian frontier by clearing 
166 
 
new land and planting multiple crops in the same year. Examined more closely, each 
demonstrates how efforts to rapidly transform rural Guatemala were inhibited by social and 
environmental constraints. Efforts to transform land and labour use at El Cajón, Jacobo Arbenz’s 
farm, showed that there was often a disjuncture between the aspirations of modernizers and the 
rural reality: machines broke down more quickly than anticipated, new crops failed 
unexpectedly, and campesinos sometimes refused to surrender customary rights to land and food 
in exchange for fair wages. Rural life was messy and complicated in a way that sometimes defied 
expert planning.  
Similarly, INFOP’s efforts to promote a diversified and sustainable landscape at Cuyuta 
ignored the environmental problems that plagued cotton production on the Pacific Coast. 
Agronomists tried to mitigate these risks by urging campesinos to follow expert advice including 
adopting crop rotations and using new seeds and pesticides distributed by the state. These were 
temporary solutions that only slowed the environmental problems associated with cotton, and 
they only worked as long as the Guatemalan government was willing to regulate landowners. 
Even if INFOP had successfully diversified landownership on the Pacific Coast, the model of 
cotton production they promoted could only sustain high productivity by using chemicals that 
threatened the health of ecosystems and labourers. Moreover, the example of Coronel Monzón 
highlights how uncooperative farm operators could undermine conservation measures that were 








Chapter 5: The Coastal Laboratory 
The apex of the Revolution was the 1952 agrarian reform that distributed thousands of 
acres of land to campesinos. President Jacobo Arbenz called the reform that he helped 
implement, “the most precious fruit of the revolution.”1 The ambitious effort to transform 
Guatemalan agriculture successfully redistributed 17% of the country’s farmland and benefitted 
over 100,000 families. The state helped beneficiaries develop their new land, offering them 
technical advice, new seeds and capital. The agrarian reform was cut short in 1954 by a US-
backed coup that was supported by the military and large landowners. Since Guatemala’s 
agrarian reform lasted just two years and most of the expropriated land was returned to large 
landowners, scholars have treated it as an isolated political event that created impressive but 
short-lived improvements in the lives of campesinos.2 This chapter argues that the agrarian 
reform was a transformative moment in Guatemalan politics and agriculture that encouraged 
cooperation between bureaucrats, technicians and campesinos. Working together, these parties 
helped solve Guatemala’s chronic food production problem and began to diversify crop 
production. 
At the end of President Arévalo’s term, large landowners remained powerful and export 
agriculture was largely regulated by the good intentions of individual landowners. Guatemala’s 
economic growth continued to depend on export crops like coffee, sugar and bananas. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and INFOP had successfully introduced new techniques and avenues to 
obtain credit, but without substantive land reforms campesinos did not have enough land to 
participate in the agrarian modernization project. Although campesinos were interested in crop 
diversification, most focused on cultivating milpa because it produced food reliably without 
external inputs. Since most campesinos did not have sufficient land to fully support themselves, 
they travelled to the Pacific Coast to work on coffee, sugar, and banana plantations. The 
precariousness of this arrangement was exposed after the floods of 1949 destroyed plantations 
where campesinos laboured and their subsistence farms. After the disaster, food prices began 
spiraling out of control and the Arévalo government struggled unsuccessfully to control inflation 
and prevent scarcity that threatened Guatemala’s poorest residents.  
                                                     
1 Jim Handy, “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution’: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, 68, No. 4 (Nov., 1988): 675. 
2 Timothy J. Smith and Abigail E. Adams. After the Coup An Ethnographic Reframing of Guatemala, 1954 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2011), 3. 
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In 1952, the Agrarian Reform Law, also known as Decree 900, was passed in an effort to 
stabilize food prices, diversify agricultural production and democratize land tenure. Beneficiaries 
of Decree 900 had a short window to work the land before the Arbenz government was 
overthrown—two years or less—but they rapidly cleared land and planted their allotments with 
corn and other modern crops including rice and cotton. The state offered robust technical and 
financial support to encourage campesinos to plant a balance of crops for domestic consumption 
and exports. By removing the obstacles that hampered previous development efforts—land and 
capital—the state facilitated a dizzying transformation of expropriated land. This was most 
noticeable on the Pacific Coast, where campesinos turned forests into fields and transformed 
overgrazed pastureland into gardens. By 1953, Guatemalan agriculture was thriving and there 
was an 11.8% increase in corn production compared to 1950. Coffee producers collected record 
harvests and Guatemala reversed its corn deficit and began exporting surplus corn to neighboring 
countries.3 Though it was controversial and imperfect, Decree 900 demonstrated that an active 
government could create the material and financial conditions necessary for peasants to improve 
their lives and escape generations of exploitation. Few campesinos were able reap the fruit of 
their labours as the coup gave landowners the power to drive them from expropriated lands under 
the guise of eliminating communists.  
Reflecting on the agrarian reform, María Vilanova de Arbenz emphasized its importance 
as a “type of experimental laboratory, of crops and technical innovations that gave a great push 
to the modernization of agriculture.” 4 Her evaluation of the agrarian reform highlights both the 
popularity of agrarian modernization initiatives introduced during the Revolution and their 
unexpected durability. The agrarian reform—and the modernization efforts that preceded it—
transformed Guatemala for generations. The socio-ecological changes caused by this experiment 
were especially evident on the Pacific Coast, where large landowners rapidly cleared land and 
planted it with cotton to prevent expropriation. Throughout the agrarian reform, landowners 
denigrated small farmers as wasteful and emphasized the productivity of large, industrial scale 
farms as the key to Guatemala’s economic prosperity.5  
                                                     
3 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 95. Handy, Gift of the Devil, 129. 
4 Though she evidently had some personal bias, Vilanova was well qualified to comment on agrarian issues: her 
family in El Salvador were successful cotton growers and she carefully managed El Cajón. María Vilanova de 
Arbenz, “El Soldado del Pueblo,” p. 97. Serie Borradores de Libros. Arbenz Papers. For more on Vilanova see Piero 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 134-136. 
5 For this counter narrative and the role it played in agrarian development after 1954 see Chapter 5. 
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Large landowners benefited tremendously from the agrarian reform and its rapid reversal. 
To avoid expropriation, they rapidly cleared and planted their land with new crops including 
cotton. After the coup, they reclaimed large swathes of land cleared and planted by campesinos 
and inherited robust new structures of agrarian development staffed by well trained technicians. 
Records from the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Agrarian Department that oversaw 
Decree 900, indicate that conservative Guatemalan elites retook their land after the coup by 
focusing on the supposedly wastefulness of campesinos. The success of this discursive strategy 
relied on the entrenched perception that indigenous campesinos were unable to innovate or 
engage with modernization efforts. The coup not only ended the agrarian reform, but it also 
concluded a transformative moment when the state and indigenous communities worked toward 
a common goal. 
Hunger 
The assassination of Francisco Arana in the summer of 1949 and the devastating flooding 
that occurred a few months later threatened to destabilize Guatemala and bring a premature 
conclusion to the Revolution. During President Arévalo’s term in office, the government was 
decidedly moderate and the state was hesitant to engage in systemic reforms. The conservative 
army officer Arana nominally supported Arévalo and kept him in office, but in return he forced 
the President to limit campesino and labour activism. When Arana’s death was announced, a 
large revolt broke out among his supporters in the army, but Jacobo Arbenz helped Arévalo repel 
the revolt by distributing arms to workers and political allies. Arbenz’s actions during this 
moment of crisis established his reputation as a leading Revolutionary and helped him win the 
Presidency in November, 1950. The death of Arana and the subsequent purging of nearly one 
quarter of army officers created an opening for more serious reform efforts.6 Though the 
Revolution had not lived up to its emancipatory rhetoric, there were still many ardent supporters 
in the countryside. Surveying the conflict between conservatives and supporters of the 
Revolution in San Marcos during this period. Cindy Forster argues that campesinos “took 
personal responsibility for protecting the revolutionary state as their own.”7 
Through the Arévalo administration, the government’s inability to control food costs was 
a major source of discontent and anxiety in the country. The 1949 disaster destroyed fields as 
                                                     
6 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 182-183. 
7 Forster, The Time of Freedom, 168. 
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they were about to be harvested, causing food scarcity and speculation in a system that was 
already unstable. These problems were especially acute in Guatemala City, and urban activists 
urged the government to implement reforms that would curb rural poverty, stabilize food prices, 
and stem indigenous migration to the Capital.8 In May of 1951, the Guatemalan government 
reported that the price of food in the capital was 21.5% higher than the year before. To mitigate 
public concern, President Jacobo Arbenz took to the radio on May 1st to announce that he had 
submitted a study on Guatemala’s food problem to the National Economic Council. Two days 
later, the President told the press that food shortages and inflation would continue to plague rural 
Guatemala without sweeping reforms. Arbenz blamed the food crisis on antiquated farming 
practices employed by the rural elite and highland campesinos. He argued that shortages were 
the outward manifestations of a dysfunctional economic system that wasted Guatemala’s natural 
wealth. The President argued for social and economic reforms that encouraged farmers to 
modernize, diversify, and engage with the market.9  
During the election, Arbenz pledged to pass a sweeping agrarian reform that would 
“liquidate latifundia and make fundamental changes in primitive methods of work…to effect a 
better distribution of uncultivated land or that land in which feudal customs continue.”10 After he 
was elected, Arbenz did something that Arévalo had been unwilling to do: he confronted the 
large landowners who controlled most of the country’s best land. Arbenz justified an agrarian 
reform as a tool that could induce landowners to modernize and “treat agricultural farms as 
capitalist enterprises in both production methods and worker relationships.” 11 His commitment 
to fostering capitalism inspired support from even upper class members of his government like 
the Minister of Agriculture, Nicolás Brol, and the Minister of Economy, Roberto Franjul.12 As 
we will see, Brol’s commitment to providing campesinos with access to the resources they 
needed to prosper was evident in the numerous letters he answered from Decree 900 
                                                     
8  Inflation and food scarcity disproportionately affected the city’s indigenous population, many of whom came to 
Guatemala City after 1944 seeking opportunities denied to them under the Ubico dictatorship. They settled in 
unplanned communities that straddled the city’s ravines, many of which were devastated by the rains of 1949. After 
the floods, many people were forced to settle in new colonias on the edges of the city which were chronically 
underserviced. John T. Way, The Mayan in the Mall: Globalization, Development, and the Making of Modern 
Guatemala (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012), 44-46, 56-58. 
9 “Síntesis Económica – Financiera de 1951 en Guatemala,” Monitor del INFOP, Vol 2: No. 7 (1951): 28. For 
similar sentiments expressed in April 1951, see Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 150. 
10 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 85. 
11 Handy, Gift of the Devil, 127-128. 
12 Gleijesis, Shattered Hope, 209-210. 
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beneficiaries. The goal of liberating the countryside from a feudal agrarian structure briefly 
united workers, campesinos, scientists and politicians in common cause and discourse.  
The call for an agrarian reform was also supported by progressives who were concerned 
about the social consequences of poverty and the escalation in food prices. In August of 1951, 
the Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca voiced their concern about the rising cost of living. They 
argued that since 1946 the price of basic goods had risen almost 300%, while wages had 
remained relatively stagnant. Food production had also not kept up with surging population 
growth. As a result, urban workers, small business owners and campesinos struggled to feed their 
families.13 In emotional language, the Alianza implored Guatemalans to take notice of the 
growing misery besetting the poor: “The picture becomes bleaker when we face hunger and the 
cries of our malnourished children.” The Alianza argued that as citizens and mothers driven by 
“the infinite heart of motherhood,” they had to fight against the rising cost of living. They called 
on mothers to join with rural communities in protest against rising costs and support Arbenz’s 
push for agrarian modernization and reform.14 Their call was supported by the Federation of 
Unions of Guatemala, who also called for the government to protect Guatemalans by intervening 
in the market and imposing price controls on basic goods.15   
Arbenz used price controls and wage increases to alleviate rural instability and urban 
poverty while he worked with leading members of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) and 
Leonardo Castillo Flores, the leader of the National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala 
(CNCG) to draft agrarian reform legislation.16 By preventing speculation and ruinous price 
fluctuations, price controls encouraged farmers to plant basic grains and raise cattle for milk and 
meat that would be consumed domestically. In 1950, the government increased the minimum 
wage to 80 centavos on national farms but workers had to press landowners and even state-run 
farms to comply with the law.17 The increase in the minimum wage was a significant victory for 
workers, who had earned less than 40 centavos per day. This was not enough to buy basic 
staples, let alone proper clothing, medicine and education. Landowners often supplemented 
                                                     
13 It is difficult to quantify how urban gardens and milpa plots affected urban food security.  Way notes that the city 
discouraged crop cultivation and livestock in the city. In the 1930s, Public Works campaigned against corn 
cultivation although illicit cultivation continues to occur in ravines on the edges of the city where government 
authority is weakest. Way, The Mayan in the Mall, 51. 
14 “¡Contra la Carestia de la Vida!: Declaracion de Alianza Femenina Guatemalteca,” Octubre, August 17, 1951.  
15 “Resoluciónes del 3er Congreso de la Federacion Sindical de Guatemala,” Octubre, September 6, 1951. 
16 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 145. 
17 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 70; Forster, Time of Freedom, 175. 
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meagre wages with food rations and land, but these were not guaranteed privileges and could be 
taken away from troublesome workers.18 Forster notes that when workers protested for better 
wages and basic labour rights “planters almost instinctively declared war on customary rights. 
They attacked where they thought it would hurt the most.”19 The Communist Party and the 
Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Guatemala (PROG) also criticized the new minimum wage 
because it fell short of the “the minimum necessary to live half-decently.” They encouraged 
further wage increases as a means to improve worker welfare and create new consumers whose 
purchases would support Guatemala’s small industrial sector.20  
 Arbenz and other progressives believed that an agrarian reform was the first step in a 
larger economic transformation that would turn Guatemala into a modern nation with a strong 
industrial sector. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, an influential labour organizer, argued that “[w]ithout 
an agrarian reform we cannot speak about industrialization in Guatemala.” Pellecer argued that 
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform would establish small farms which would increase food 
production and rapidly lower food costs. This would enable the majority of Guatemala’s 
campesinos to abandon subsistence agriculture and become wage-labourers on plantations or 
factories.21 The freedom to become wage-labourers or establish lowland farms came with the 
implied cost of abandoning subsistence agriculture and the aspects of indigenous culture 
perceived as antithetical to modernity. As Marx observed, losing control of the mean of 
production was capitalism’s way of ensuring that workers were “free and unfree”: free to sell 
their labour or crops, but wholly dependent on the market for their social reproduction.22 
Some modernizers wanted to create a socially conscious form of industrial agriculture 
that paid workers well but achieved high productivity by emulating the organizational structure 
of the United Fruit Company. In April 1951, agronomist Benjamin Motta contacted the Ministry 
                                                     
18 “‘Editorial: ¡Conquistar el Salario Mínimo de 80 Centavos!’” Octubre, August 1951. For discussion of low wages 
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Time of Freedom, 173. 
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intrinsic value of the Agrarian Reform as a tool of poverty eradication but also the extrinsic value for the nation and 
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21 Carlos Manuel Pellecer, “Por la Prosperidad de Nuestra Patria,” Octubre, October 18, 1951. 
22 Karl Marx, Capital Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 272-273. 
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of Agriculture with a plan to re-organize national farms on Guatemala’s South Coast into a new 
organization called the Union of National Farms. His plan, supported by the Association of 
Agronomists, would have divided national farms in the South Coast Departments of Retalhuleu 
and lowland Quetzaltenango into 3 groups determined by climate, altitude and region. Citing a 
40% drop in yields since expropriation of farms from German citizens during World War II, 
Motta suggested the Arbenz government needed to emulate the administrative and agricultural 
initiatives undertaken by the United Fruit Company. Motta encouraged transforming antiquated 
working conditions predominant on the South Coast by creating modern and hygienic housing 
for workers and a sanitary institution to look after workers when they fell ill or suffered 
accidents. “Introducing modern methods to agricultural holdings in the UFN,” wrote Motta, “will 
be undertaken...to socialize labour, to raise the standard of living of Guatemalan campesinos.”23   
Under Arbenz, the state wielded agrarian modernization as a tool to increase agricultural 
productivity and improve rural wellbeing. Motta attacked previous agrarian models as extracting 
earnings for the benefit of foreign banks: 
this old tendency caused much ruin among our campesino families, redounding to the 
detriment of national life. In my proposal, the state is not going to make a profit, the state 
will protect. We have to consider that the wealth of the state depends on the wellbeing of 
its citizens.24   
 
The centralized administrative structure of the UFN was, Motta argued, the perfect way to drive 
agrarian modernization and improve the lives of campesinos who had been “relegated to 
oblivion.” Motta argued the state had to think about “their housing, the water they drink, the food 
they consume, their right to adapt to the culture.” He concluded that a fair wage—facilitated by 
increased productivity under the UFN—would allow campesinos to secure all of their basic 
needs.25 
The UFN never came to be because most of the National Farms were redistributed to 
campesinos and workers during the agrarian reform. Yet the report offers an interesting insight 
into the importance of wellbeing as part of agrarian modernization initiatives. Motta’s belief that 
improving productivity would encourage campesinos to become modern workers exposed the 
racism that permeated well-intentioned rural development efforts. Arbenz and fellow 
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progressives continued to encourage indigenous assimilation as part of a broader campaign to 
improve rural welfare.26 The final part of Motta’s list of rights included “their right to adapt to 
the culture,” a stipulation that indicated his belief that agrarian modernization would facilitate the 
assimilation of the Maya and the creation of a new, national consciousness.  
Throughout the Revolution, the government tried to guide the transformation of unruly 
indigenous subjects into modern citizens that engaged with the market as labourers or producers. 
Manuel Pinto Usaga, formerly a member of INFOP’s Superior Directive Council, identified 
hunger and poverty as the cause of growing peasant discontent and agitation. “For a country that 
lives ill, poorly fed, and in the most absolute abandon,” wrote Pinto Usaga, “there is no other 
choice but to fight for rights within the possibilities offered by law and democratic 
institutions.”27 His emphasis on poverty as the principal cause of rural conflict was a rebuttal of 
right-wing critics who accused labour organizers of misleading naïve campesinos with 
communist ideals.28 However, Pinto Usaga’s argument also subtly undermined the political 
agency of the peasantry because he worried that uncontrolled population growth would 
destabilize Guatemala. “Statistics,” argued Usaga, “prove that we are poorly fed, have an 
inadequate diet, live in unhealthy housing and with an insane promiscuity.”29 His analysis 
reduced campesinos to ignorant and teeming masses that had to be led out of poverty by 
educated reformers. 
Although they had good intentions, in the early years of the Revolution Guatemalan 
modernizers—moderate and progressive—dismissed the transformative potential of cooperation. 
Organizations like INFOP, agronomists like Motta and labour activists like Usaga insisted on 
bringing development to campesinos as a means of incorporating them into the nation-state, 
rather than enabling them to forge their own path. This attitude was reinforced by demographics 
                                                     
26 For assimilation focus of state policy, see Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 48-52. 
27 Manuel Pinto Usaga, “Unidos Podremos Conquistar Nuestras Reivindicacciones y las de Todo el Pueblo,” 
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which divided reformers from the peasantry. Most Guatemalans lived in the countryside where 
they had little access to education, whereas experts were part of a small but growing middle class 
that was concentrated in the Capital. However, growing political tensions following the election 
of Arbenz opened up the space for a new relationship between experts and campesinos that 
transcended cultural and geographic barriers. The new President relied on the political support of 
campesinos and his administration was responsive to their demands. The 1952 Agrarian Reform 
Law extended the state into the countryside and brought campesinos, technicians, and 
progressives into close and frequent contact. The experience fostered increased respect between 
state officials and the communities they sought to aid. Though this moment was all too brief and 
never free of conflict or disagreement, it signaled the possibility that cooperation between the 
state and its citizens could create lasting rural change. 
Agrarian Reform  
After years of negotiation and planning, the Arbenz administration finally passed an 
Agrarian Reform Law in June of 1952. The law was moderate and it was implemented 
efficiently, notwithstanding opposition from large landowners and frustration from campesinos 
who wanted it to move faster. In two years, the government expropriated and redistributed an 
estimated 917,659 acres of land to 87,589 people who received roughly 10 acres each although 
this varied depending on the quality of land.30 Campesinos who received previously worked land 
were given between 8.5 and 17, whereas beneficiaries who received undeveloped land were 
given between 26 and 33 acres.31 The reform process was directed by the National Agrarian 
Department (DAN), which reported directly to President Arbenz. The organization also had 
Departmental Agrarian Committee’s (CAD) for each region and Local Agrarian Committees 
(CAL), the latter was formed when there was a case for expropriation to be judged. The five 
member CAL’s was appointed with one member selected by the Governor, one by the 
municipality, and three by the local peasant or worker union.32 Though the government oversaw 
the expropriation process, the denunciations were initiated by groups of campesinos. The 
agrarian reform transformed Guatemalan society and the economy, by distributing land and 
credit to long marginalized campesinos. 
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32 Ley de Reforma Agraría. Decreto 900. 1952. Chapter 2. 
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The Agrarian Reform Law opened new land for development and empowered peasants, 
but it also dramatically increased pressure on forests, soils and watersheds. Decree 900 stipulated 
that farms under two caballerias were exempt from expropriation and plantations under six 
caballerias were exempt if they could demonstrate that at least two thirds of the land was being 
actively cultivated or used to maintain livestock. Plantations over six caballerias were liable to 
expropriation, though the amount redistributed varied on how that land was being used. The 
government offered special exemptions for property owners who could demonstrated that their 
land was being used rationally to grow crops considered important to national development like 
coffee, cotton, sugar, rubber and cereal crops. This also included protections for cattle ranchers, 
provided they meet the stipulated carrying capacity for their designated region. These clauses 
incentivized landowners to intensify production and rapidly modernize so that they could avoid 
expropriation.33  
The expropriation process was largely driven from below, but the government attempted 
to protect key resources from expropriation by embedding conservation in the spirit and the letter 
of the Agrarian Reform Law. Decree 900 had special clauses that protected land on slopes over 
30% and bordering watersheds from expropriation.34 These regulations were sometimes ignored 
in the rush to distribute land to campesinos, but their presence indicates that the government saw 
conservation as a means of sustaining the productivity of Guatemala’s best farmland.35 The 
government also offered beneficiaries the option of receiving land in property or usufruct, this 
depended on the method of expropriation and in practice most of the land was awarded in life 
long usufruct. The government required that land redistributed to campesinos from National 
Farms had to be given out in usufruct. Decree 900 stipulated that usufruct could be revoked if 
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campesinos did not plant the crops mandated by the government. This was justified as a means to 
maintain the production of crops that were important to the national economy—including 
coffee—but it also indicated the government’s preference for state-led economic development. 
The usufruct model advocated by INFOP and instituted during the agrarian reform gave the state 
extra-leverage to guide campesino production.36 Throughout the agrarian reform, experts 
struggled to balance conservation with efforts to diversify crops and increase food production.  
The Agrarian Reform Law guaranteed that beneficiaries would receive the technical 
support needed to create a “capitalist campesino economy” including credits and access to new 
crops and fertilizers.37 The implementation of Decree 900 was technically overseen by the 
National Agrarian Department (DAN), but the Arbenz administration directed all government 
departments to support the process with technical and financial assistance. This had an 
immediate political benefit for the Arbenz administration: campesinos who received prompt and 
effective assistance from the state expressed fervent political support for Decree 900 and 
President Arbenz. Letters addressed to the Minister of Agriculture were responded to quickly, 
even though technically they fell under the jurisdiction of the DAN. The Ministry of Agriculture 
publicly stated its commitment to helping Decree 900 beneficiaries diversify production so that 
Guatemala could raise food production and improve the nutrition and wellbeing of workers and 
campesinos.38 
In April of 1953, the CAL of Puerto San José wrote to the Minister of Agriculture 
directly, requesting rice seeds of the blue bonnet variety that had recently been featured in the 
newspaper, Nuestro Diario. The Ministry of Agriculture approved the Local Agrarian 
Committee of Puerto San José’s request for seeds in just two weeks, a very rapid response 
considering the provision of seeds was technically the responsibility of the DAN. In lieu of 
payment, they asked the Committee to return an equal amount of seeds to the Ministry so that 
they could continue propagating seed stock.39 Another letter sent by the Local Agrarian 
Committee of Pueblo Nuevo Viñas in April 1953 reported on the success of education efforts 
and urged the Ministry to quickly send more pamphlets about modern agriculture. They ended 
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their letter with a pledge of support for Decree 900, “whatever it costs, so that we have a new 
Guatemala” under the government of Jacobo Arbenz.40 Their language evoked the rhetoric of the 
administration, but these letters also indicate that Decree 900 beneficiaries were eager to adopt 
new techniques and tools. 
The Ministry of Agriculture viewed Decree 900 as an extension of their conservation 
work. The Ministry’s Soil Conservation Division warned Guatemalan officials in 1953 that 
production still lagged behind population growth and they supported efforts to move campesinos 
out of the highlands. The Division concluded that 12.4 quintales of corn per manzana was just 
enough to feed the population in 1949-1950, but they anticipated that rapid population growth 
and diminishing yields would result in serious shortages by 1956. The Division argued that with 
technical assistance campesinos could double their yields in less than a year without expanding 
the amount of land under cultivation. “If we make good use of our natural resources,” wrote the 
Division head, “we will get more crops to live better.”41  
By distributing land to campesinos, the Arbenz administration hoped to solve food 
production problems and transform campesinos into small yeoman farmers. Promotional material 
produced by the Ministry of Agriculture idealized the family farm that Decree 900 recipients 
would inhabit, portraying mixed-land use on rationalized and nucleated settlements. This 
advertisement featured an indigenous family and cultivated the notion that the reform integrated 
the nation by helping small families engage in market farming (Figure 11). However, no mention 
was made of the larger community that supported campesinos during the difficult process of 
clearing and planting new land. Instead, the advertisement implied that the conditions for the 
family’s happiness and productivity were created by the state. Though campesinos experimented 
with new farming techniques and new crops, the farms they created did not wholly correspond to 
the neat, idealized models promoted by the state. 
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Figure 11: Ideal Farm under Decree 90042 
The mundane process of measuring and distributing land created an opportunity for 
technicians and campesinos to interact and share ideas about conservation, farm management 
and land use. In these moments, campesinos subtly shaped the division of land to strengthen their 
communities. For example, when Union Campesina members from Santa Maria Cauqué received 
land in Santiago Sacatepéquez the local CAL worked with Soil Conservation officer Virgilio 
Recinos to parcel out land. He used an oxen-drawn plow to divide 36 manzanas of land into 50 
parcels. Campesinos were awarded land through a raffle system, but they successfully kept six 
parcels free which they planned to farm together for the benefit of the community. After land 
was distributed, the Soil Conservation Division began levelling land to minimize soil erosion and 
campesinos agreed to follow technical advice when planting and cultivating crops. This 
distribution of land struck a balance between conservation and community needs. By protecting 
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their control of land, the community re-established the basic structures that historically enabled 
them to retain corporate control over land and resources under colonialism.43  
Beneficiaries of Decree 900 welcomed state assistance, but their gratitude did not prevent 
them from lobbying for faster assistance. The National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala 
(CNCG) was an important intermediary and advocate for new communities.44 Beneficiaries of 
the Agrarian Reform Law sent complaints, petitions and requests to the Secretary General of the 
CNCG, Leonard Castillo Flores, which he presented to the pertinent Ministry.45 In March of 
1953, the CAL of Limones in Ocós, San Marcos wrote to the Secretary General of the CNCG 
Leonard Castillo Flores looking for a tractor to work their new land on the Santa Clara Ranch. 
They promised to collectively pay the fee for mechanization services but urged Castillo Flores, 
“our right arm”, to help them locate equipment.46 Castillo Flores quickly forwarded the letter to 
the Minister of Agriculture.47 The Sub-secretary of Agriculture marked the request urgent and it 
was immediately approved by the Department of Agricultural Mechanization. When Agronomist 
José Antonio Vega visited the ranch in April, he concluded that only five community members 
could pay for services but he encouraged the Department to extend loans to campesinos because 
the area was very fertile. Antonio Vega estimated that on fertile coastal land each campesino 
could produce roughly three quintales of corn per cuerda—roughly 48 quintales per manzana—
on a 40 cuerda parcel of land.48 The Department of Mechanization approved the compromise and 
within two months the CAL of Limones had the financial means to mechanize their farms. Their 
success demonstrated that campesinos who framed their demands in the language of 
modernization and productivity had more success when lobbying the government.  
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This scenario was repeated throughout Guatemala as beneficiaries of Decree 900 used 
their membership in the CNCG to request seeds, tractors, pesticides and more from the state. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and INFOP had largely succeeded in establishing scientific intervention 
as a necessity for modern farms and agronomists became crucial intermediaries between the state 
and the peasantry. As they laboured alongside campesino communities, technicians gained their 
trust and respect and they were regarded as regional assets. In June of 1953, Castillo Flores asked 
the Ministry of Agriculture to immediately cancel the transfer of Alfonso Castañeda, an 
agronomist in the Soil Conservation Department, Secretary General of the CNCG for Jalapa and 
member of the CAD. Castillo warned that transferring Castañeda would cripple Jalapa’s efforts 
to combat erosion.49 The Ministry wrote back the following day assuring Castillo Flores that 
Castañeda would not be transferred to a major pest control initiative.50 The Ministry’s 
willingness to cancel the transfer of a talented agronomist, indicated both the growing political 
power of Castillo Flores and the sway that the campesinos could exert if they spoke the language 
of conservation.  
Campesinos who received land during the agrarian reform sometimes found that 
conservation was used against them by agronomists. Landowners often complained that 
campesinos invaded their property without permission or settled on land that was not eligible for 
expropriation. The Arbenz administration tried to balance the growing opposition of landowners 
with the concerns of campesinos, who were anxious that land was not being expropriated fast 
enough.51 As these property conflicts unfolded, landowners tried to use the government’s evident 
concern about conservation to force the government to intervene in their favor. For example, in 
February of 1953 the United Fruit Company complained to the Forest Inspector for Eastern 
Department of Izabal that campesinos were illicitly occupying their land. The UFCO framed its 
concerns in the language of conservation, warning that campesinos were clearing valuable 
forests close to the water source used by the town of Morales and their plantation, Bananera.52  
The Forest Inspector launched an investigation and concluded that the local CAL had 
subdivided 5 caballerias of UFCO land, which contained precious lumber that was protected 
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under Decree 900. Though he sympathized with their desire for access to the lumber, he claimed 
that their settlement threatened an important watershed and encouraged resettlement on nearby 
land. The Inspector argued that the law protected campesinos and landowners by conserving land 
that might otherwise be destroyed by short-sighted speculation. “It is our obligation,” he wrote, 
“to avoid by all means a destruction which will cause in time irreparable damages for the same 
campesinos who forget precaution for tomorrow.”53 His even-handed approach to the case did 
little to quell campesino grievances because it appeared to favor the United Fruit Company. The 
local CAL accused the inspector of collusion with the UFCO and asked for his immediate 
dismissal.54 The Ministry of Agriculture investigated and exonerated the Inspector who was 
surprised by the allegations.55 Campesinos who did not demonstrate their devotion to 
conservation—as defined by the state—lost valuable political capital which harmed their efforts 
to obtain the financial and technical assistance necessary to develop their new land.56  
The Arbenz administration worked diligently to support Decree 900, but the speed and 
the scale of the reform stretched the state to its financial and administrative breaking point. The 
promised financial and technical assistance often did not materialize in a timely fashion. In 
August of 1953, the CNCG held an assembly where beneficiaries of Decree 900 and workers on 
National Farms discussed their problems. They asked the President and INFOP to abolish the 
debts of Decree 900 recipients. Many of these debts had been incurred on plantations and 
campesinos who received land were often extorted by their former employers. They also 
encouraged the state to provide campesinos with more credit—on par with the wages of national 
farm workers—and to ensure that loans were fulfilled more quickly.57 The CNCG planned to 
release its recommendations for technical reforms at the end of August, but they reached out to 
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the Minister of Agriculture to solicit feedback beforehand. The Ministry urged the CNCG not to 
release its report. They invited the CNCG leadership to privately advise the Ministry by 
reviewing a report that would shortly be sent to the President.58 The Ministry of Agriculture tried 
to control the political message so that they could avoid unanticipated demands that might be 
made by beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform Law. 
The Ministry had ample reason to be concerned about public criticism of the agrarian 
reform and their rural development strategy. By late 1953, Arbenz’s agrarian modernization 
initiative was threatened by growing political opposition and budgetary constraints. The Agrarian 
Reform Law excited intense opposition from domestic elites and international actors, especially 
the United States, which also prevented the government from accessing international capital.59 
The Arbenz government promoted its efforts to redistribute land, but the resolutions drawn up by 
the CNCG and the General Confederation of Workers of Guatemala (CGTG) pushed the state to 
invest even more in rural reform. 60 Though letters sent to the Ministry of Agriculture remained, 
on balance, positive there was a growing number of frustrated missives sent by CAL’s eager to 
access fertilizers, seeds, tractors and technicians promised by the Arbenz administration.61 These 
requests were often urgent since beneficiaries of the agrarian reform wanted pesticides to control 
disease and pests that threatened their new crops.62  
The case of Las Trojes, a campesino community in the interior Department of Amatitlán, 
highlights the difficulty of managing a sprawling bureaucratic machine that tried to aid new 
farmers settling new land. In April 1953 the CAL of Las Trojes, a community in the interior 
Department of Amatitlán, asked the Minister to send 25 quintales of the pesticide Gamexan as 
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soon as possible so that farmers could plant: “if we do not have poison, we will be victims of the 
plagues.”63 After a second request was made by Las Trojes, an agent was dispatched by the 
Division of Plant Health. He reported that campesinos had planted their 15 manzana parcels with 
a diverse array of crops including beans, chickpeas, corn and yucca. He suggested that 25 
quintales of Gamexan was far too much and advised the Ministry to use a less expensive 
admixture of sulfur and arsenic with just five quintales of Gamexan as a supplement. The advice 
was never acted upon, however, due to a disagreement about jurisdiction. A month later the CAL 
wrote back to the Ministry for the third time, requesting immediate intervention because 
“zompopos,” a type of flying ant, were ravaging their fields.64 Though Las Trojes eventually 
received state assistance, it was only their admirable persistence that forced the Ministry to take 
notice of their case. Given that they had acquired their land in August 1952, just months after the 
Agrarian Reform Law was passed, it is likely that they were well organized and adeptly 
navigated the necessary bureaucratic roadblocks.65 Their communication issues presaged 
troubling problems as the government struggled to allot limited supplies to agrarian reform 
beneficiaries.  
Although technical services were important for farmers, the availability of credit also 
determined the success of Decree 900 beneficiaries. New and more flexible sources for rural 
credit were available through INFOP, the National Mortgage Bank of Guatemala (CHN), and the 
National Agrarian Bank (BNA).66 Almost one sixth of government spending in 1953-54 was 
committed to loans. The state hoped this generous credit and loan policy would reverse 
Guatemala’s chronic shortage of liquid capital and jump-start domestic productivity.67 In a 
radically unequal country, most campesinos had never had access to capital which they could 
invest in their own land. Speaking generally about the importance of new credit initiatives, in 
1951 INFOP’s Director claimed that they had broken with convention by giving credits to “small 
farmers who arrive at the doors of the Institution with calloused hands and faces blackened by 
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the sun.”68 In April 1954, INFOP’s Director Carlos Leonidas Acevedo told the Interamerican 
Conference of the Organization of American States that their credit program opened the way for 
a “new mentality and a new economic policy” in Guatemala.69  
Though INFOP was eager to pronounce the credit program a success, many campesinos 
struggled to acquire the promised funds. Financial assistance was disproportionately focused on 
the area around Guatemala City and the Pacific Coast. The Department of Guatemala (Q 633 
923.22) and Escuintla (Q 511 092.25) received the largest number of loans in 1953, several times 
more than the next largest recipient Retalhuleu (Q 117 993). The imbalance was created by the 
state’s inability to effectively administer credits in remote areas and the political emphasis placed 
on coastal development.70 Financial shortfalls and administrative issues often caused panic and 
crisis among farmers, who sought to improve their land but lacked the means to buy tools, seeds 
and inputs. 
Consider the following letters sent by campesinos from the highland town of Panimaquip, 
Totonicapán. They were searching for funds to help them secure their corn harvest on newly 
acquired land. In June 1954, just weeks before the US-backed coup, campesinos wrote to 
Castillo Flores to help them secure loans from the National Agrarian Bank: “friend we are letting 
you know that our parcels are now cultivated[,] under our poverty we did struggle to make these 
land that were granted to us, to plant them with beans and corn.” June in Guatemala is a difficult 
time because campesinos have exhausted their food reserves and are waiting for the harvest that 
happens as early as September and as late as November, depending on weather and altitude. The 
campesinos from Panimaquip were eager to secure funds from the Bank to help ensure a 
successful harvest. They wrote that “now is the time of our poverty, because we buy corn at 5.50 
quetzales a quintal and for many reasons we are very poor now.” They travelled to visit the Bank 
manager in the coastal city of Mazatanengo and he assured them that an inspector would come to 
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see their lands. After 15 days passed without any visit, they pleaded with Castillo Flores of the 
CNCG for a rapid intervention: 
[Y]ou have to consider that time passes and the crops need to be cleaned and what do we 
do without money to sustain ourselves while we clean these crops, and here there is no 
one to lend us a cent with which to buy corn and sustain us until help from the Bank 
comes.71 
 
While they awaited the Bank’s response they were forced to leave their new lands and work for 
others. “[T]oday,” They wrote, “we are going with other compañeros to earn corn to sustain the 
family; because here we suffer with[out] maize because our harvest is yearly.” Their harvest 
depended on receiving timely financial aid from the Bank so they could hire help to clean the 
fields and guarantee a good crop. “[W]ithout cleaning in our land,” they concluded somberly, 
“the crop will be ruined and we will lose everything.”72  
The story of Panimaquip indicated that after two years, the agrarian reform had only 
partially accomplished its goals. Land had been redistributed and food prices had been stabilized, 
but many Decree 900 beneficiaries still lived in poverty. Campesinos working newly cleared 
land often lacked the financial means to buy the proper tools and seeds needed to plant and 
harvest their crops. When the state failed to fulfill its commitments, they often turned to 
plantation labour. To ensure the success of their crops, some sold the only possession they had: 
their labour. This vignette illustrates the paradox created by the rapid implementation of the 
agrarian reform: the government did not have the resources to match their rhetoric. These issues 
were magnified in the final months of the agrarian reform, when the growing hostility of large 
landowners and the shrinking financial means of the state prevented campesinos from developing 
their land.  
“Sword of Damocles”  
 Though it was flawed, the agrarian reform successfully redistributed land to roughly 
100,000 families. By 1954, the agrarian landscape was far more productive than it had been in 
1952. Export production was growing quickly and food production was much more robust as 
Decree 900 beneficiaries established new households on their new land. Beneficiaries often 
experimented with new exports, but their first priority was to establish their new households by 
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cultivating milpa, planting garden crops and raising small animals like chickens. The result was a 
more diversified agrarian landscape that realized, imperfectly, the dream of substantive reform 
that Arbenz promised in 1951. The success of the agrarian reform demonstrates the effectiveness 
of cooperation between campesinos and the Revolutionary government. Where previous efforts 
to transform the countryside tried to impose new crops and technologies on campesinos, Decree 
900 created a political space where campesinos, technicians and bureaucrats could together to 
build a more diverse and equitable agrarian landscape. This promising moment was ended 
suddenly by the 1954 coup, but the memory of the agrarian reform as a time of social 
transformation where ethnic barriers were eroded shaped political activism throughout the 20th 
century.  
The agrarian reform catalyzed sweeping environmental changes in Guatemala, especially 
on the Pacific Coast where it led to rapid deforestation and a surge in export crops. Decree 900 
had clear rules that protected forests and watersheds, but the Pacific Coast was seen as a new 
frontier that had to be rapidly developed for the good of the nation. Large landowners tried to 
prevent expropriation by rapidly clearing their land and planting it with crops like cotton so that 
they could claim it was being rationally utilized. This was compounded by the influx of settlers 
who arrived eager to open new land, using tractors to clear the forest and employing pesticides to 
protect crops from pests.73  
The Arbenz government heavily favored modern agricultural crops and actively 
discouraged cattle ranching, which had historically dominated the Pacific Coast. The Arbenz 
administration believed cattle ranching was inherently wasteful, because it monopolized land that 
could be used to produce crops that could be exported or used domestically, like cotton and corn. 
To discourage the seasonal cattle trade and force intensification, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the DAN established strict carrying capacities for pastures in Guatemala’s different ecoregions.74 
These figures were used during the agrarian reform to judge if Guatemalan ranchers were using 
their land effectively. 
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Facing regulatory pressure from the state and declining revenues, Guatemalan Rancher’s 
Cooperative commissioned a report on the state of the cattle industry in 1953.75 The report 
criticized ranchers for relying on extensive grazing to minimize their costs. Though Guatemala 
was a “paradise” with a climate capable of producing a wide variety of pastureland the report 
argued that extensive ranching wasted this natural advantage, raising the costs of production over 
time. The Cooperative found that ranchers on the Pacific Coast rotated grazing land infrequently 
and instead burned over 50% of their pastures to quickly rejuvenate grasses and suppress weeds. 
As overgrazed pastures grew less productive ranchers turned to the “heroic and completely 
prejudicial” use of fire “which every time impoverishes the land more.”76 Ranchers who invested 
little in their herds and pastures often struggled financially, burdened by sick and emaciated 
cattle that produced low quality meat, milk and leather. An addendum warned the industry that 
their own “anti-economic, antiquated and impractical” approach to cattle ranching had caused 
their economic malaise.77 
By savaging their own members for their lack of foresight, the Rancher’s Cooperative 
tried to reclaim the moral authority needed to guide state policy. Guillermo Gomar, the report’s 
author, encouraged the government to lift price controls and export restrictions on meat. Gomar 
appealed to the Directorate-General for Livestock using the rhetoric of the day, economic 
stability, modernization and national well-being. He assured the Directorate that if they were 
able to modernize, ranchers could increase productivity and produce enough meat and milk—
goods “vital for health”—to satisfy domestic demands. Gomar insisted that any surplus could be 
exported, which benefitted ranchers and the state because it brought in needed foreign exchange. 
The Directorate-General for Livestock rejected the Guatemalan Rancher’s Cooperative proposal 
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expose them to expropriation. “Cooperativa de Ganaderos de Guatemala to Min Ag., Economía y Trabajo y Jefe del 
DAN,” April 15, 1953. Min Ag. Leg. 1940. AGCA. 
76 Guillermo Gomar M, “Estudio del Desarrollo de la Industria Pecuária en la Zona Sur de Guatemala,” April 1953. 
Min Ag. Leg 421. Guatemala. AGCA. 
77 Guillermo Gomar argued that herds had low birth rates (below 60%) and high levels of mortality (30%). His 
personal testimony was that a 100 cows would birth 60 calves but only 42 would survive. Higbee 1947, noted that 
despite high death rates, the lushness of Guinea grass found in the Lower Pacific Piedmont allowed for continued 
growth of cattle herds. Addendum. “Estudio Del Desarrollo de la Industria Pecuária en La Zona Sur de Guatemala,” 




to lift price controls and export restrictions legislated in 1947. Instead, they urged the President 
to tighten regulations on the cattle industry to ensure higher quality meat and milk.78 
The Directorate-General had little sympathy for ranchers and they welcomed the rise of 
new exports and food crops as a more “intelligent utilization of the land.” They argued that the 
cattle industry was being moved to better suited areas “without prejudice to the development of 
agriculture, to which it should be subordinate.”79 Their overt hostility to extensive ranching did 
not extend to the industry-at-large, where they encouraged ranchers to adopt new breeds, pasture 
grasses and feeds. The Directorate dismissed market-led development as a “vulgar gamble” 
which encouraged speculation and profiteering at the expense of consumers and conscientious 
producers. They advocated stringent quality and price regulations because they allowed farmers 
to stop worrying about price fluctuations—the “Sword of Damocles hanging over his head”—
and produce high quality food.80  
The Arbenz government successfully utilized Decree 900 to force recalcitrant landowners 
to diversify and modernize or lose their land. This radical reorganization of land tenure, crop 
regimes and labour relations transformed agriculture but it also entrenched elite hostility toward 
to the Arbenz administration. Landowners across the country defended themselves from 
expropriation by appealing to the government’s emphasis on diversification and conservation. 
For example, the seven Barneond brothers who owned El Pabellón in the municipality of 
Escuintla, argued that they produced sugarcane, citronella, cattle and cereals for internal markets. 
They played on the government’s overt commitment to conservation by emphasizing that they 
had spent all their lives “dedicated to conserve, cultivate intensively and care for this small farm” 
inherited from their ancestors who also supported national production.81 
Large landowners across the Pacific Coast also tried to circumvent expropriation efforts 
by rapidly developing underutilized land. Cotton was popular because it grew quickly, offered 
high returns, and was actively promoted by generous financial incentives from INFOP. When 
Las Delicias, Retalhuleu, was denounced in October 1953, campesinos and workers submitted 
conflicting reports about the amount of land comprised by the farm and its quality. Estimates 
                                                     
78 “Consideración de la Dirección General de Ganadería a la Exposición que la Cooperativo de Ganaderos de 
Guatemala Presento Al Ciudadano Presidente de la Republica,” Min Ag. Leg 421. AGCA. Guatemala. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 “Letter to Consejo Agrario Nacional from Oscar Barneod Ovares, et al.” El Pabellon, Exp. 7 Paq. 1. Ind. 14. DAN 
Decree 900. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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ranged from 38 to 50 caballerias and even the Local Agrarian Committee had difficulty 
confirming the size of the farm.82 Ernesto Rodriguez Briones, a representative for the Sociedad 
Agrícola Las Delicias, wrote to the Departmental Agrarian Commission (CAD) to protest that 
the farm was only 28 caballerias. He argued that his plantation operated coffee, sugar and cattle 
operations for sixty years and had recently diversified into bananas and, in 1950-51, cotton. 
Although it stated its uncertainty about the size of the farm, the CAD eventually approved the 
expropriation of 15 caballerias: substantially less than the 25 caballerias requested by those who 
denounced Las Delicias.83 
Rodríguez Briones failed to disclose to the CAD that over 9 caballerias of Las Delicias 
was sold to Carlos Chessmann Mollidon in March of 1952, a few months before the agrarian 
reform became law. Rodriguez Briones tried to circumvent expropriation by pre-emptively 
dividing his property. This was technically prohibited, but Briones was able to initiate the 
division and secure the sale before restrictions on the transfer of land took effect.84 The new 
plantation was appropriately named El Porvenir, or the future: aerial photos revealed a startling 
transformation of land use between 1947 and 1954 (Figure 12). The wholly forested plantation 
was quickly developed by Chessman, who had planted 140 manzanas in cotton and rice fields by 
1954. He had also deforested 160 manzanas, which he planned to plant with cotton (Figure 13). 
The threat of expropriation drove rapid changes in land use as property owners attempted to 
circumvent Decree 900 to limit their exposure to expropriation. When this case was reviewed by 
the Consejo Agrario Nacional, they discovered the obfuscation but eventually agreed that both 
farms were well developed and cut the amount of expropriated land by two thirds.85 This 
decision drew scorn from Decree 900 beneficiaries who argued that the remaining swathe of land 
                                                     
82 “Denuncia de tierra de la finca ‘Las Delicias,’  propiedad de la Sociedad Agricola Las Delicias, Maria B. de 
Rodríguez y Cía.” Las Delicias, Exp. 3. Paq 5, Retalhuleu, DAN D900. AGCA.  
83 Rodríguez Briones claimed multiple exemptions. First, he argued that María Briones v. de Rodriguez held no land 
directly, rather the Sociedad Agricola Las Delicias managed the property. According to Decree 900, Article 10, 
subsection (d) farms that hosted a company cultivating key exports like lemongrass, bananas, coffee and more were 
inelligible for expropropriation. He also claimed an exemption under Clause (f) which excluded farms that exceeded 
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or between 56 and 60 head per caballeria  and was divided between pastures (19 caballerias), coffee (42 manzanas), 
citronella (1 cab 31 manz), lemongrass, bananas (3 cab 22 manz), sugar (62 manz) and corn (1 cab 32 manz). 
“Appeal to Consejo Agrario Nacional: Denuncia de Tierras de la Finca ‘Las Delicias’,” Las Delicias, Las Delicias, 
Exp. 3. Paq 5, Retalhuleu, DAN D900. AGCA.  
84 Ley de Reforma Agraría. Decreto 900. 1952, chapter 6. 
85 Las Delicias lost roughly one caballeria and El Porvenir lost abour 3 caballerias. Las Delicias, Exp. 3. Paq 5, 
Retalhuleu, DAN D900. AGCA.  
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was too small to share between the 325 petitioners.86 Resident workers protested that El Porvenir 
was undeveloped, suggesting that even long-time residents were taken by surprise by the speed 
and extent of Chessmann’s development work. Anger about the perceived injustice of the 
expropriation process boiled over, and Las Delicias’ owner claimed that campesinos began 
occupying exempt parts of the farm early in 1954. 
 




                                                     
86 They distinguished between “campesinos libres” (150), “mozos colonos” (125), and “arrendantes” (50) Las 









Landowners often juxtaposed their commitment to modern farming with the campesinos 
reliance on allegedly unsophisticated and extractive milpa cultivation. In Finca San Miguel, 
located in Retalhuleu’s cotton zone, Carlos Macal Flores’ farm saw a dramatic fluctuation in 
land use in just 4 years. The cattle rancher rented most of his land to Industrial Schaenuffer 
Hermanos in 1950 so that they could produce citronella and lemongrass that the company later 
refined into oils.87 When the company collapsed in September 1952, the land reverted to Macal. 
He reported that over two-thirds of the farm was planted with oil crops, which replaced extensive 
pasturage. Although Macal insisted that he diligently maintained his field, in March 1953 he lost 
nearly 4 caballerias of citronella to fire. Macal later argued that campesinos burned the fields so 
they could plant corn, although there was no direct evidence to support this claim. More likely, 
Macal’s conviction was fed by his simmering resentment toward campesinos who settled on his 
land shortly after the fire. The now unused land was subject to the Law of Forced Rental, and 
Macal had to rent 2000 cuerdas for corn cultivation. When the property was denounced late in 
1953, almost all of this rented land—much of which still bore the marks of recent burning—was 
expropriated.88  
Although campesinos only received formal property rights late in 1953, the Law of 
Forced Rental enabled them to occupy the same stretch of Finca San Miguel for over two years. 
Unlike many campesinos, they did not have to clear away forest or crops before planting; the fire 
that ravaged Macal’s land left fields open, fertilized by ash, and primed for cultivation. These 
campesinos left few records, but the CAL for Retalhuleu reported in early 1954 that the majority 
of Macal’s six caballerias was rented to third parties. Moreover, the CAL reported that Macal 
had had no crops on his own land and his pastures were in a state of complete abandon.89 This 
juxtaposition is important because after the coup, Macal reclaimed his lost land by emphasizing 
his commitment to modern crops and rational land use. When the Government inspector arrived 
in October, 1955, he backed Macal’s assertion that campesinos exhausted their land—planting 
“excessive” corn crops without crop rotations—forcing Macal to rehabilitate the rented fields 
with Chilean Nitrates. Macal’s commitment to modern farming practices was reiterated 
                                                     
87 The contract was cancelled because the company failed. “Letter to Comision Agraria Departamental from Carlos 
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throughout the inspector’s report. He reported that the whole property was well-tended and 
planted with a mixture of cotton, lemongrass, citronella, and milpa for tenant farmers and tractor 
drivers. Macal had refocused production on cotton, which represented over half of the acreage 
under production and was supported with state-of-the-art machinery.90 
Although planters emphasized the importance of soil and forest conservation, they did so 
because this mirrored the Revolutionary government’s rhetoric and thereby limited their 
exposure to expropriation. In practice, landowners’ defined conservation very narrowly as 
deriving immediate financial benefits from resource extraction and farm improvements. Hence, 
many of the reports about campesino deforestation emphasized the peasantry’s failure to sell 
high quality lumber. Elite definitions of conservation generally did not focus on the long-term 
sustainability of extraction, especially as landowners rapidly increased production to fend off 
expropriation claims. This was evident in the case of Tulula, a huge industrial enterprise that 
covered 125 caballerias before the Bouscayrol family divided it in May, 1952. The new property 
was called Finca Buenos Aires, and the family maintained it was a distinct farm operated by the 
seven Bouscayrol brothers. The DAN inspector rejected this claim when he saw cattle travelling 
freely between both farms.91 Even if there was no real difference between owners, the agro-
ecological conditions on the farms influenced the Bouscayrol’s approach to development.  
The Bouscayrol brothers managed the newly formed Buenos Aires farm collectively. 
Unlike Tulula proper, the newly created farm was essentially undeveloped, blanketed by forests 
and a limited amount of pasture land. However, the brothers tried to use this to their advantage 
by emphasizing their concern for conservation and reforestation. They claimed that their father 
had protected the forest since the turn of century and there was no comparable stand of virgin 
forest anywhere on the Pacific Coast.92 After they received the land, the brothers began 
aggressively extracting lumber: fine lumber like mahogany and cedar was sent to urban markets 
and lesser wood was used for construction, railroad ties and fuel for campesinos and Tulula’s 
sugar refinery (Figure 14). They signed a contract with Ferrocarriles Internacionales of C.A. to 
                                                     
90 Rodolfo Johannessen was overseeing Macal’s cotton operations. Macal had purchased the best machinery, 
including a liquid fumigation unit which the inspector claimed was the first of its kind in Guatemala. “Inspeccion 
Ocular de Haciencda San Miguel,” October 13, 1955, San Miguel. Paq 1. Exp 1. Ind. DAN Decree 900 AGCA. 
91 “José Luis Bouscayrol to President Arbenz,” October 26, 1953; “Marco Antonio Blanco Mendoza Report to 
Inspector General, DANs,” November 3, 1953, Tulula, Exp. 9. Paq. 3, Reu.  DAN Decree 900. AGCA. Guatemala. 
92 “Exposición Del Gerente de Bouscayrol Hermanos Sobre el Movimiento de Madera en Nuestra Propiedad ‘Finca 
Buenos Aires,” October 15, 1953, Tulula, Exp. 9. Paq. 3, Reu.  DAN Decree 900. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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supply them with 55,000 railroad ties. Moreover, they pledged that they would redouble their 
efforts to extract lumber in 1954, reaching 3 million feet of lumber.93 This new pressure on 
Buenos Aires’ forests reshaped the landscape (Figure 15). By 1954, roughly nine caballerias of 
the farm were rented by three men who sublet the property to 380 campesinos who paid 5% of 
their annual crop in rent (Figure 16). Most of this land was forested in 1953.94 The Bouscayrol’s 
extraction of lumber helped them reduce the land expropriated from 42 caballerias—the entire 
forested area of the farm—to 11 caballerias. 
 
Figure 14: Buenos Aires, Forestry 
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94 “Inspección Ocular Agraria: Dirección General de Asuntos Agrarios,” May 2, 1956, Tulula Exp. 9. Paq. 3, Ind. 




Figure 15: Buenos Aires (1953), land use divided between pastures and forests 
 
Figure 16: Buenos Aires, increased land use after the coup 
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At the time of the split that created Buenos Aires, Tulula was an industrial-scale 
operation with a sugar cane refinery, an airstrip, and a diversified collection of crops including 
sugar cane, cotton, rice, corn, coffee and rubber. The Bouscayrol’s tried to limit Tulula’s 
exposure to expropriation by increasing sugar, rice, and cotton production and stocking the 
pastures with more cattle. They insisted that the sugar refinery needed at least eight caballerias of 
forested land for fuel.95 Like many farms on Pacific Coast, the Bouscayrol’s used cotton to turn 
underutilized pasture—liable to expropriation—into cropland. Like Arbenz, the Bouscayrol’s 
soon discovered that cotton did not thrive on the Pacific Coast without significant technical 
interventions. Cotton production grew from 150 to 260 manzanas in 1953, even though the crop 
suffered two large pest outbreaks in 1952 (Figure 18). Though they eradicated the first outbreak, 
the second arrived as the plants were bearing bolls and the plantation suffered significant losses 
because they ran out of pesticides.96 By 1956, the farm had cut back its cotton fields to roughly 
130 manzanas and was refocusing production on citronella.97 In the interim, the Bouscayrol’s 
intensification persuaded Arbenz to reduce the final expropriation from 23 to 17 caballerias. 
Though they insisted on their commitment to conservation, the combination of intensive export 
agriculture, railroad construction and lumbering cleared forest faster than it could be replanted. 





                                                     
95 “Report Perito Agricola Oliverio Soto S,” January 26, 1953, Tulula Exp. 9. Paq. 3, Ind. DAN Decree 900. AGCA. 
96 Rice was abandoned by 1956. A specific breakdown was not available for 1953, but in 1952 they grew roughly 3 
times as much cotton as rice: 150 manzanas of cotton to 1 caballeria of rice. (Img 7082) “Appeal to President: 
Recurso de Alzada en la denuncia agraria de la finca Tululá, Jose Luis Bouscayrol” October 27, 1953, May 2, 1956, 
Tulula Exp. 9. Paq. 3, Ind. DAN Decree 900. AGCA. 
97 This succession pattern mimicked that on Arbenz’s finca, although the reasons for the shift are not clear. 
98 After the coup, the Guatemalan government consulted Cuban forestry experts for advice about how to restore 
damaged woodlands with quality lumber. “La Dasonomia en el Area de Demostracion,” Min. Ag 421. AGCA. For 
deforestation in Cuba, see Reinaldo Funes, From Rainforest to Cane Field in Cuba: An Environmental History since 
1492 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2008). For the interaction between cattle, deforestation, and soil 
erosion in the tropics see Sterling Evans, The Green Republic: A Conservation History of Costa Rica (Austin: 








Figure 18: Finca Tulula after 1954, cotton land put back into pasture 
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The Bouscayrol’s legal maneuvers successfully delayed expropriation, but petitioners 
finally received over 28 caballerias late in 1953. Even after their long-awaited legal victory, 
various unidentified “enemies” who supported the Bouscayrol’s prevented beneficiaries from 
settling on their new parcels. They appealed to the DAN in June 1954, threatening that unless the 
government stepped in they would “make our justice according to Decree 900.”99 With the coup 
days away, no action came and the campesinos never received their land. When the case of 
Tulula was reviewed by the Castillo Armas government after the coup, the Dirección General de 
Asuntos Agrarios (DGAA) found in favor of the original campesinos, approving the 
expropriation of three caballerias from Tulula and five and a half caballerias from Buenos Aires. 
However the expropriations—which were fairly rare—were just 5 manzanas. This was below the 
15 manzanas awarded to campesinos through Decree 900 and it signified the Castillo Armas’ 
government’s efforts to capitalize on the symbolism of land reform without challenging 
structural inequalities that created endemic rural poverty. 
The case of Tulula demonstrated the unintended side-effects of the agrarian reform: 
savvy planters used their political, legal and economic power to prevent expropriation by 
expanding production. Under Decree 900, landowners who produced items vital for the national 
economy like cotton, citronella, and cattle could claim protection from expropriation. This policy 
stimulated crop diversification and modernization, but it also encouraged large landowners to 
rapidly clear new land without careful planning. Cotton production rose rapidly throughout this 
period, but in many cases—like El Cajón and Tulula—land that was first planted in cotton was 
often quickly transitioned to alternative crops or pastureland because of concerns about pests 
(Figure20). Cotton’s allure was as a transitory crop that enabled planters to rapidly deforest, 
colonize, and monetize new land. Between the agricultural censuses of 1950 and 1964, the 
amount of forested land fell by half or more across the Pacific Coast. In Escuintla, the 1950 
census reported that nearly 310,000 manzanas was forested but the 1964 census recorded only 
100,000 manzanas as forested. This pattern was repeated in Suchitepéquez and Retalhuleu. A 
large percentage of this newly opened land was used for semi-permanent tree crops like bananas 
and coffee (Figure 19). However, there was also a growth in cultivated pastures—a category that 
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did not exist in 1950—that highlights the effectiveness of Revolutionary-era cattle regulations 
and the intimate connection between cattle and cotton.100  
 
1950 Escuintla Suchitepéquez Retalhuleu 
    
Farms 10 662 12 735 8943 
    
Crops 183 602 81 817 52 125 
Fallowed Land 20 445 13 089 16 553 
Semi-Permanent Crops 13 905 37 182 10 370 
Permanent, Planted Pasture * * * 
Temporary Pastures * * * 
Natural Pasture 75 325 44 151 42 052 
Forest and Bushland 309 044 57 717 56 926 
Other 47 267 20 154 14 943 
Total 649 588 254 110 192 969 
    
1964 Escuintla Suchitepéquez Retalhuleu 
    
Farms 17 189 15 367 10 545 
    
Crops 126 221 33 293 57 495 
Fallowed Land 37 752 13  199 13 373 
Semi-Permanent Crops 69 312 72 534 23 931 
Permanent, Planted Pasture 215 671 79 454 60 309 
    
Temporary Pastures 6 965 3 494 2 225 
Natural Pasture 44 424 13 778 7 848 
Forest and Bushland 100 388 26 871 20 682 
Other 29 969 10 140 12 447 
Total 630 702 252 763 198 310 
    
Figure 19: Land use compared between 1950 and 1964, measured in manzanas101 
 
                                                     
100 Robert Williams argued that the transition to cattle on the Pacific Coast “preserved the economic logic of cotton, 
but not cotton’s appetite for a large labor force.” Robert Williams, Export Agriculture and the Crisis in Central 
America, 45, 67.  
101 Note that the totals are larger than combined categories, indicating that roads, rivers and other infrastructure or 
geographic features were omitted. Land unsuited to agriculture was in the other category.  Crop category includes 
crop failures, to indicate intended use of land. Permanent pasture and temporary pastures were not recorded in the 
1950 census. “Cuadro 16: Uso de la Tierra,” Censo Agropecuario, 1950 vol. 1 (1950); “Cuadro 7, 7-1, 7-2: Número 
de fincas y superficie según uso de la tierra. República por tamaño,” II Censo Agropecuario, 1964. Vol. 2 (1964). 
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Departments 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 
      
Escuintla 10 540 16 234 24 226 15 518 20 387 
Retalhuleu 2 110 2 700 2 872 1 560 2 540 
Suchitepéquez 573 1 601 1330 830 1 010 
Santa Rosa 329 508 948 6 323 
El Progreso 160 282 370 265 0 
Zacapa 610 876 70 0 0 
Chiquimula 10 12 103 140 45 
Others 169 20 65 0 600 
Small Growers 804 * * * * 
      
Figure 20: Area planted in cotton by Department, measured in manzanas.102 
 
Conclusion  
Arbenz and his followers believed that the state needed to restructure land tenure in order 
to create the social and economic conditions for equitable development and economic growth in 
Guatemala. The Agrarian Reform Law distributed land to nearly 100,000 families and 
beneficiaries were supported with hybridized seeds, fertilizers, and credits. Over two years, 
campesinos and technicians laboured together to bring new land into production. The Arbenz 
government worked diligently to support beneficiaries but the scale and speed of the agrarian 
reform overwhelmed the state’s limited resources. Campesinos frequently pushed the state to 
fulfil its commitments to support beneficiaries, sending letters directly to the Minister of 
Agriculture. Though their requests bypassed the National Agrarian Department, they were 
almost always quickly fulfilled by bureaucrats who believed earnestly in the reform. To ensure 
prompt resolution, campesinos also carefully framed their requests in the language of 
conservation and organized through the National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala (CNCG). 
Working through the agrarian reform together created opportunities for experts and campesinos 
to break down seemingly immutable ethnic and class differences. Decree 900 demonstrated that 
an agrarian reform could redress the food production problems that had plagued Guatemala for 
decades by engaging campesinos and giving them access to good farmland.  
Large landowners benefitted tremendously from both the agrarian reform and its rapid 
reversal in 1954. During the reform, landowners aggressively expanded the land under 
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cultivation to avoid expropriation. This led to a surge in coastal deforestation that has not 
previously been recognized by historians. Newly cleared land was often planted with cotton, a 
lucrative and quick growing annual that was heavily supported by the Revolutionary 
government. INFOP offered generous loans to promote cotton cultivation and the Ministry of 
Agriculture encouraged modernization that allowed farmers to access the pesticides and tractors 
they needed to clear and plant new land. Harnessing mechanization, hybridized seeds, fertilizers, 
and pesticides, large landowners on the Pacific Coast produced record-breaking yields on newly 
opened land.  
Though they benefited from modernization initiatives, most Guatemalan elites did not 
share Arbenz’s belief that improving the peasantry’s quality of life would bring collective 
prosperity. They saw the agrarian reform as a challenge to their power because it undermined the 
competitive advantages of Guatemalan agriculture: cheap labour and abundant land. Where 
Arbenz and his followers saw a growing web of small producers becoming citizens, landowners 
saw nightmarish invaders ready to revenge themselves on the elite that had exploited them for 
generations. The coup that reversed the agrarian reform helped large landowners to assert 
unprecedented control over labour and land. They reclaimed expropriated land from campesinos, 
complaining that agrarian reform beneficiaries deforested protected land. However, landowners 
quickly developed this land after it was returned. They replaced small corn fields with exports 
like cotton that created rapid wealth but caused significant food production problems. The coup 
enabled large landowners to suppress activists so that they could create an agrarian landscape 




Chapter 6: “An Anchor of Sweat and Blood” 
The strength of Guatemala is in the earth, which is her support. When the 
country interrupts the multi-millennial alliance of the peasant and the land, 
we are at the mercy of any eventuality…Man anchors himself, then, to the 
land as if it was an anchor of sweat and blood. With her he remains 
faithful, like the biblical Sower.  
            Tierra (1959)1  
The success of the agrarian reform alarmed Guatemalan elites, who feared the 
empowerment of Guatemala’s long oppressed indigenous population. For centuries, landowners 
depended on the cheap, skilled labour of Guatemala’s indigenous campesinos to pick coffee, cut 
cane and collect bananas. Their labour was an essential part of Guatemala’s vaunted fertility.2 By 
giving campesinos enough land to live well on, the agrarian reform threatened to increase labour 
costs and reduce the profitability of export agriculture. It also upset an established social and 
racial hierarchy that benefitted Guatemala’s elite, tapping into long-held fears about an 
indigenous uprising.3 In June of 1954, the US covertly assisted Castillo Armas and his ragtag 
band of soldiers when they invaded Guatemala in June of 1954.4 Conservatives cited the Arbenz 
government’s expropriation of private property—including large swathes of UFCo land—and the 
perceived power of communists in his administration to justify the coup. Guatemalan elites and 
their US allies justified the coup as an effort to strengthen democracy in Guatemala, but it 
                                                     
1 “Cosecha de Ciudaños Libres: Importante Jira del Director de Asuntos Agrarios, Coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia: 
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enabled powerful landowners to reclaim their lost land and persecute labourers and campesinos 
who tried to improve their lives.  
The violent reversal of Decree 900 created a landscape dominated by private capital, 
where the rural poor had fewer labour rights, less access to land, and struggled to afford food. 
Landowners and the UFCo persecuted campesinos, workers and labour organizers under the 
pretext that they were purging communists. 5 A witness in Alta Verapaz recalled the overthrow 
of Arbenz as a dramatic transition between an age of liberty and oppression.  
When Arbenz died [referring to the coup] the Mayor called on us and told us that now we 
won’t be working like before, that they don’t listen to anybody. Here ended our work in 
the committees and we began our work on the haciendas.6 
 
This campaign was especially vicious on the Pacific Coast, where landowners wanted retribution 
against organized labour and campesino ‘invaders.’7 Although it was poorly documented, 
roughly a thousand campesinos and workers were killed in at Finca Jocotán in Tiquisate. Forster 
notes, “networks of popular organizing were slashed to the root in Escuintla.”8 Terrified by the 
prospect of persecution many campesinos fled before the land claim adjudication process even 
started. One witness from Escuintla recalled his harrowing escape from Finca Caobanal shortly 
after the coup. He and his family left their land immediately after they learned about orders to 
torch the houses of Arbenz supporters, burning anything or anyone inside.9 Campesinos across 
the country abandoned their crops to save their lives, this resulted in large crop losses and caused 
widespread food shortages and speculation for several years after the coup. Manuel Galich, a 
member of the Revolutionary government, later described the “revanchist fury” of large 
landowners as a “catastrophe” for campesinos who lost their crops, land and often lives during 
                                                     
5 Forster, The Time of Freedom, 197-213. For the anti-communist campaign and purges of the civil service and 
union, see Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution, 37-41. 
6 Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, vol. 1 (Guatemala, 1999), 110. 
7 The periodical Tiquisate celebrated the 2nd anniversary of the Liberation government with an issue dedicated to the 
seventeen local men killed by Arbenz supporters. They claimed the Revolutionary government sanctioned torture 
and assasinations, likely a reference to land invasions that Arbenz struggled unsuccessfully to control. The invasions 
were driven by campesino frustration that the agrarian reform was proceeding too slowly.  For more on the land 
invasions see Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 105-106. “Tiquisate en el II Aniversario de la Liberación: El 
Porque de Esta Revista,” Tiquisate, no. 1. (1956): 1. 
8 Forster, The Time of Freedom, 202-204; Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 194; Ricardo Falla, Masacres de la 
Selva, Ixcán, Guatemala (1975-1982) (Guatemala City: Editorial Universitaria, 1992), interview 61. 
9 Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, vol. 1 (Guatemala, 1999), 110. 
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the counter-reform.10 For most Guatemalans, 1954 marked a retreat from activism and a return to 
penury and peonage in a nation dominated by unfettered private capital. 
The military regimes that ruled Guatemala after 1954 used a combination of state 
violence, generous public financing, and international aid to transform Guatemala into a highly 
productive and radically unequal agro-exporter. Large landowners reclaimed their lost land 
and—using techniques and technologies introduced during the revolution—planted lucrative 
exports like cotton on land cleared by campesinos. In this atmosphere of violence and 
intimidation, the rights of workers and environment protections were pleasant fictions with little 
substance. However, President Castillo Armas and his successor, Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, 
could not entirely ignore the Revolution because the social and economic policies introduced 
during this period demonstrably improved the lives of most Guatemalans. Instead, they tried to 
capture and deploy the rhetoric of the agrarian reform to stem social unrest caused by repression 
and escalating food prices after the coup. The government promoted carefully controlled 
Agrarian Development Zones as ideal models for coastal colonization and agrarian reform. 
These planned agrarian colonies resettled an insignificant fraction of Guatemala’s campesino 
population. 
The Liberación government used the majority of the international loans and aid funds 
they received to develop a road infrastructure that facilitated the export of crops from 
Guatemala’s Pacific Coast. They also offered cotton growers generous loans to stimulate the 
rapid expansion of this industry across the Pacific Coast. This focus on infrastructure buried the 
state in debts but it did little to improve the lives of campesinos, who struggled under the burden 
of hunger, political repression and growing environmental problems including pesticide 
exposure. Castillo Armas and Ydígoras Fuentes spoke in the discourse of agrarian 
modernization—improving productivity with new technologies—but their policies only 
deepened structural inequalities. Without regulations to conserve natural resources or support 
campesinos and workers, agrarian modernization created increased yields at the expense of the 
poor and the environment. 
 
                                                     
10 Forster notes that in San Marcos, the few campesinos who defended their land claims did so carefully, 
emphasizing need over rights or class. Forster, The Time of Freedom, 205, 207; Manuel Galich, “Diez años de 
Primavera (1944-54) en el País de la Eterna Tiranía (1838-1974),” Revista Alero, No. 8, (1974), 57.  
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“Ghostly Army of Hunger” 
The self-styled Liberación government argued that Decree 900 failed because it restricted 
the large landowners whose plantations generated economic benefits for the entire country. A 
military junta, led by Castillo Armas and Colonel Elfego Monzón, reversed the agrarian reform 
with Decree 31. This new law that established a legal process for the state to review all of the 
expropriations. To maintain a veneer of legitimacy, they required the original owners to prove 
that their land had been expropriated illegally. In a small percentage of cases, the Dirección 
General de Asuntos Agrarios (DGAA)—the body that re-evaluated Decree 900 cases—endorsed 
expropriation. However, the amount of land redistributed to campesinos was almost always 
significantly less than under Decree 900.11 There were also provisions that allowed campesinos 
to collect their harvests before they were resettled on land that suitable for small-scale 
production, but many fled fearing repression by the state and aggrieved landowners.12 Through 
Decree 31, landowners successfully reclaimed more than 80% of the 765,233 manzanas 
expropriated by the Arbenz government.13 
Though government functionaries often manipulated the appeals process to ensure that 
landowners were able to reclaim their property, the Revolutionary government successfully 
established the productivity benefits of agrarian modernization.14 To secure the return of their 
land under Decree 31, landowners had to present a detailed plan that demonstrated how they 
                                                     
11 Cases when land was returned were rare and often accompanied by unique circumstances. Decree 900 
beneficiaries at El Barretal in Palin claimed that their land had been taken decades ago by the dictator Jorge Ubico. 
They also complained that anti-communists who were actively intimidating campesinos. To limit further agitation, 
the DGAA distributed 61 manzanas to be shared between 33 families. This was less than the 4 caballerias and 53 
manzanas awarded by the Consejo Agrario Nacional (CAN), and the resulting 1.8 manzana plots fell below the 
government’s own norms for appropriate farm size. “Letter to Head of DAN, Alfonzo Martínez from Union 
Campesina de San Vicente Pacaya,”December, 12, 1952. El Barretal. Exp. 10. Paq 1. Ind 14 Decree 900. AGCA. 
Guatemala. “Letter to Director DGAA from Dadislao Revolorio y Compañeros,” April 26, 1955. For another 
example of a protracted land conflict where an indigenous community used activism and legal means to seek 
restitution of stolen land generational struggled to reacquire land see also Irmalicia Velásquez Nimatuj, “‘A 
Dignified Community Where We Can Live’: Violence, Law, and Debt in Nueva Cajolá’s Struggle for Land,” 173-
174. 
12 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 194-195. 
13 603,775 manzanas were returned. The DGAA noted in 1956 that roughly 0.4% of beneficiaries were still on their 
original land, though this number may have been higher in practice. Handy, 197, fn.17. 
14 Even where a sound legal reason did not exist for returning the land, officials used “imaginative justification[s]” 
to justify their decisions. One common reason given was absence of beneficiaries on the land, but the Liberation 
government’s agrarian decrees had no rules requiring tenancy. Alternatively, they were required to prove they had 
not invaded the property in question, which was a difficult proposition because DAN records contain relatively few 
details about D900 beneficiaries. Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 197, 199. 
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would modernize production on their plantation once the land was returned.15 Agronomists 
travelled to the plantations to assess the viability of modernization plans and describe how 
Decree 900 beneficiaries had used the land. These reports were laden with precise scientific 
observations about the quality of the land, but their main purpose was to justify the reversal of 
the Agrarian Reform Law. Landowners often claimed that campesinos had wasted the productive 
potential of their land, clearing land indiscriminately and planting it with milpa. Inspectors found 
evidence for this in the destruction of forests and the exhaustion of soils allegedly caused by 
over-cropping corn. As a whole, their reports created a consistent narrative: productive, orderly 
industrialists suffered at the hands of wasteful, chaotic campesinos.  
For example, the DGAA’s inspection of Finca Santo Domingo in Escuintla reported that 
campesinos disobeyed the DAN’s expropriation orders and settled instead on prime pasture. The 
inspector criticized beneficiaries for wasting land, using 2 caballerias of an 8 caballeria area that 
they occupied. In some cases, they alleged that campesinos planted only 3 to 4 cuerdas16 on a full 
caballeria and erected no fences to protect their crops from livestock. They concluded that many 
beneficiaries failed to clean up their fields after harvest, and others simply abandoned them in the 
initial stages of planting. The unruly expropriation coincided with multiple land invasions that 
prevented the owner from accessing river water. As a result, she had to sell off cattle and lost her 
small cotton crop due to lack of irrigation. Reports submitted by the DGAA’s inspector and the 
landowner depicted a landscape impoverished by campesinos who failed to conserve valuable 
natural resources.17  
Fundamentally, landowners rejected the Arbenz government’s claim that the agrarian 
reform improved national production and they endeavored to prove how campesinos undermined 
Decree 900’s goals. For example, Buena Vista’s owner Manuel Batres rejected any notion that 
the Arbenz government sought to secure or improve cattle production for the public good. He 
told the DGAA that the government “did not try to develop the cattle industry only destroy it” in 
its efforts to destroy private capital.18 His survey of the farm indicated that campesinos cleared 
                                                     
15 Secretaría de Propaganda y Divulgación de la Junta Gobierno. Estatuto Agrario: Decreto 31. 1954, articles 5 and 
6. 
16 A cuerda varied in size depending on location, but was roughly .3 acres.  
17 “Letter to Director of DGAA from Junta Agraria Departamental,” Santo Domingo Exp. 5 Paq.1 Ind14. DAN 
Decree 900. AGCA. 
18 It is unclear if Ricardo and Manuel Batres were related, however, properties were often distributed between family 
members to lessen exposure to expropriation. “Manuel Batres to Junta Agraria Departamental, Escuintla,” 
December 15, 1954, Buena Vista Exp. 4 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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forested land in protected areas, where the inclination was over 30% or close to a watershed. The 
DGAA’s Inspector condemned campesinos for clearing land with fire, because they wasted 
quality lumber and caused deforestation and soil erosion that damaged downstream pastures.19 
The inspectors failed to mention that the DAN had preserved the integrity of Manuel Batres’ 
pastures by giving campesinos land in the forested section of the plantation.20 The rocky 
topography of Guanagazapa, Escuintla made it difficult to find land suitable for cultivation. Even 
the agronomist who inspected the farm in May 1955, noted that the farm had suffered years of 
erosion and the best land for cultivation was interspersed throughout the forested tract. He also 
observed that Manuel Batres continued to plant to land cleared by campesinos, demonstrating the 
mismatch between landowner rhetoric and practice.21 Although they sometimes criticized 
landowners, overall inspectors helped Guatemalan elites discredit rural development initiatives 
that empowered the rural poor.  
Landowners benefitted from the agrarian reform’s reversal, using the opportunity to 
modernize production on the plantation and remake labour relations. The case of La Isla in La 
Democracía, Escuintla demonstrates how angry landowners tried to punish campesinos by 
repealing customary privileges and lowering wages after the coup. Ricardo Batres’ 18 caballeria 
ranch, La Isla, was denounced in 1953 and roughly 4 caballerias were expropriated by August of 
the same year. Batres launched an unsuccessful appeal, arguing that he was a progressive rancher 
who experimented with new production methods and cared for his workers, offering them free 
medical care and high wages. 22 After the coup, a vindictive Batres described the expropriation as 
an “invasion” of campesinos who settled on his land, cutting down protected trees and 
                                                     
19 “Inspección Ocular de Revisión,” April 5, 1955, Buena Vista Exp. 4 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900 AGCA.  
20 “Consejo Agraro Nacional, Guatemala,” March 23, 1954 and “Acuerdo de Expropriation No. 901: Buena Vista,” 
Buena Vista Exp. 4 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900. AGCA.  
21 “Inspección Ocular de Revisión,” April 5, 1955. Buena Vista Exp. 4 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900. AGCA. 
Guatemala. 
22 The appeal was ill considered on Batres part, as the CAN decided to significantly increase the amount of land 
expropriated because the ranch did not meet the regional threshold of 55 head per caballeria. Despite Batres’ claims 
that the farm was dedicated to raising cattle, campesinos reported the majority of La Isla’s pasture land was 
dedicated to fattening imported cattle. President Arbenz subsequently revised this number to 4 caballerias, 
presumably an attempt to compromise with Batres. “Ricardo Batres S. to President Arbenz,” August 26, 1953. La 
Isla Exp. 3 Paq. 1 Ind. 14 DAN Decree 900 AGCA. 22 The CAN raised the amount from 3 caballerias to 5 because 
the cattle to land ration in La Isla was far below the ideal of 55 head per caballeria. Batres argued unsuccessfully 
that the number of cattle on the ranch normally met the government threshold for rational land use, but he had sold 
270 cattle in 1952 because of water shortages. President Arbenz subsequently revised this number to 4 caballerias, 
presumably an attempt to compromise with Batres. “Ricardo Batres to Comisión Agraria Departamental de 
Escuintla,” June 1, 1953; “Declaración, Consejo Agrario Nacional,” 11 August, 1953. La Isla Exp. 3 Paq. 1. Ind. 14 
DAN Decree 900 AGCA. 
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introducing their cattle into his pastures.23 Campesinos interviewed by the DGAA rejected this 
invasion narrative. They stated that Batres cooperated with state engineers who came to measure 
the land, and they received abandoned and unworked land that they cleared and planted with 
corn, rice and other crops at their own expense.24 In August 1954, the municipal mayor for La 
Democracía threatened campesinos with eviction even though they had the right to remain at La 
Isla until their harvest was collected.25 After a failed appeal to the Department’s Governor, 
campesinos fled the farm fearing recrimination. When questioned about the location of the 
campesinos, Ricardo Batres’ wife told the DGAA simply that the “invaders” left the farm in 
August before the official inspection.26 
The bitterness generated by the agrarian reform process coupled with the repression and 
displacement of campesinos after the coup transformed rural labour relations. The owners of La 
Isla abandoned the pretext of a patron-client relationship that they had invoked just a year earlier. 
They requested, and received, legal permission to shift resident workers to new parts of the La 
Isla farm as they saw fit. They argued that their increased authority over land tenure allowed 
them to better manage the land by encouraging crop rotations, preventing campesinos from 
mindlessly exhausting soil fertility. This attack on campesino productivity ignored the 
advantages Batres and other landowners derived from their willing transformation of abandoned 
or forested land into cropland.  
                                                     
23 “Recurso de Revision Administrativa de la Hacienda ‘La Isla,’ July 13, 1954. La Isla. Exp. 3 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN 
Decree 900 AGCA. Landowners often characterized legal expropriations as invasions, because they disagreed with 
the legality of the process. The majority of campesino-led invasions were not condoned by the government, although 
some groups were able to prolong their occupation by emphasizing the injustice of the finca’s landowner or 
administrator. Forster, The Time of Freedom, 187-188; Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 105-106 
24 Pedro Guicoy Hernandez was a single farmer from San Martin Jilotopeque, Chimaltenango who resided in Los 
Arcos Provincias. When he was interviewed by the DGAA in 1954, Guicoy noted that the lack of land at Los Arcos 
forced him to accept land at La Isla. Guicoy and others maintained that the land distributed to peasants was not 
prime pasture but rather swampy and abandoned. Another campesino, 50 year old Juan Mejia Gil, reported that he 
had tried to pursue all “licit” methods for supporting his family and had asked Batres directly for a piece of land that 
was never cultivated, but was refused. Guicoy received 15 manzanas of land from the state, but had only planted 2 
manzanas with corn by July of 1954. Other campesinos reported planting more of their land: Juan Mejia Gil had a 
third of his 16 manzanas with rice and corn and Pablo Tuy was able to plant 8 of his 15 manzanas with milpa. 
“Testimony Pedro Guicoy Hernandez,” “Testimony Juan Mejia Gil,” 10 August, 1954. La Isla. Exp. 3 Paq. 1 Ind. 
14. DAN Decree 900 AGCA. 
25 The eviction plan was brokered between Doctor Oscar Batres and two leaders of the Committee of Guachipilin 
who were being held in custody as “precommunist agitators.” Their release would only be secured if they could 
convince campesinos to leave the plantation without conflict by the end of August. “Letter to Department Governor 
from Oullana Paiz, Juez Municipal,” September 3, 1954. La Isla. Exp. 3 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900 AGCA. 
Guatemala. 
26 “Inspector Agrario, DGAA,” June 4, 1956. La Isla. Exp. 3 Paq. 1 Ind. 14. DAN Decree 900 AGCA. Guatemala.  
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Elites argued that agrarian modernization—defined narrowly as the use of new 
agricultural technologies—could only be carried effectively by unfettered private capital. 
However, they frequently relied on the state to control labour and distribute aid to desperate 
campesinos. The reversal of Decree 900 displaced thousands of campesinos and created 
destabilizing food shortages throughout the country. This was worsened by a drought following 
the coup. Castillo Armas forestalled a potential famine by securing food aid from the United 
States. The Liberación government told Guatemalans and international donors that the 
‘communist’ Arbenz government had left the country in shambles, weeks away from bankruptcy 
and on the verge of famine. In November 1956, Jorge Arenales, the Minister of Economy and 
Labour, told US allies that “hunger was in sight” in July 1954 “as a result of government 
meddling in the field of agriculture, food crops were left uncared for, and there was a critical 
shortage of corn and beans – the indispensable staples of the mass population.”27 US grant aid 
and shipments of corn helped the Guatemalan government stabilize the country immediately 
after the coup and avoid scarcity and speculation, at least temporarily.  
In July 1955, the popular student newspaper El Estudiante reported that Guatemala was 
suffering a widespread and under-reported food crisis.28 They argued that the coup unleashed “a 
politics of rancor and vengeance” among landowners who “systematically” destroyed 
campesinos crops with fire or fed them to animals, scant months before they could be harvested. 
El Estudiante’s editors criticized the Castillo Armas government for Guatemala’s humiliating 
dependency on food aid.29 Instead of enabling campesinos to produce their own food on 
Guatemala’s fertile land, they argued that government food stalls perpetuated dependency and 
scarcity. Campesinos arrived in the middle of the night to claim their place, waiting in 
“interminable” lines to buy barely enough corn to last a day. These desperate Guatemalans 
constituted a “ghostly army of hunger.”30 
                                                     
27 At its height, corn was 15 cents a pound and beans 23 cents. “Proposed Speech by Jorge Arenales in US,” 
November 15, 1956,” RG 59, Entry A1 5730 Box 2, folder: in “Guatemala – ICA – Grant Aid.” 
28 The newspapers editors were vocal opponents of Castillo Armas, and in 1956 they choose to shut down shortly 
after their offices were raided by the government and they were interrogated. Heather Vrana, “‘Our Ongoing Fight 
for Justice’: The Pasts and Futures of Genocidio and Justicia in Guatemala,” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol 18, 
No. 2-3 (2016): 249. 
29 In August of 1955, El Estudiante reported that beans became the newest item of speculation, after corn. Beans 
purchased in Mexico at Q8 were being sold in local markets at between Q20 and Q26 per quintal in local markets. 
They accused the government of collusion with key importers whose criminal speculation caused hunger. “Fiesta de 
Acaparadores,” El Estudiante, August 18, 1955, 3. 
30 “Editorial: Hambre en el Pueblo,” El Estudiante, July 28, 1955, 1, 4. 
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The Guatemalan government sold the corn provided by the US in local markets at 
discounted rates to generate local currency for development projects. The estimated revenue 
from the sale of corn in Guatemalan markets was $3.8 million (1955) and $2.3 million (1956).31 
This was a key stipulation of a larger US grant aid package to the Guatemalan government, but it 
exacerbated instabilities in Guatemala’s food production system. Tying aid to the sale of cheap 
US corn harmed small producers trying to compete in local markets, and in 1956 Castillo Armas 
formally asked the US to halve its anticipated corn shipments from 50,000 to 25,000 tons citing 
local market saturation. John W. Fisher of the Office of Middle American Affairs also cautioned 
the Ambassador that International Cooperation Administration’s (ICA) use of corn as source of 
aid revenue caused a “significant delay” in project funding, which had to wait on the shipment 
and sale of corn. The US modified its shipment to 30,000 tons of corn and completed this with 
alternate commodities, like wheat, but their attempts to manage Guatemalan grain prices masked 
local speculation and systemic instabilities in basic food production.32 
After 1954, food production in Guatemala experienced an exaggerated yearly oscillation 
between scarcity and plenty. Campesinos living in the highlands harvested their corn in 
November and their crop lasted until May. Corn purchased from the market was often from the 
lowlands, which had two annual harvests. This cycle naturally created a hungry time between 
June and October, when supplies were scarce but demand was high. By late October of 1955, the 
government office controlling corn distribution reported a significant drop in demand for corn 
and declared an end to Guatemala’s corn shortages.33 However, field reports from across 
Guatemala warned that the recent shortages were going to be repeated in the coming year.34 The 
Ministry of Agriculture speculated that the 1955-56 yields would be down by at least 85% from 
                                                     
31 The Guatemalan Quetzal was pegged to the US dollar during this period. 
32 “Guatemala: Economic Development Assistance Program (Draft)” n/d; “Memorandum of Conversation: 
Guatemala, ICA Grant Aid Program,” January 11, 1956.; “Letter to Edward J. Sparks, American Ambassador, 
Guatemala from John W. Fisher,” January 1, 1956.; “Letter to Edward J. Sparks, American Ambassador, Guatemala 
from John W. Fisher,” January 10, 1956. RG 59, Entry A1 5730 Box 2, ICA, folder: “1956 Guatemala ICA Grant 
Aid.” NARA. 
33 “Letter to Jefe de la Oficina Controladora de la Distribución de Maíz del Estado from Carlos Porres Meza, 
Contralor” Guatemala, 28 Octubre, 1955. Guatemala. Min. Ag. 437. AGCA.; “Letter to Contralor Carlos Porres 
Meza from Min. Ag. Lazaro Chacon Pazos”, 3 Noviembre, 1955. Guatemala. Min. Ag. 437. AGCA. 
34 Across the Verapaces corn shortages were predicted between March and June, depending on the region. For 
example. Santa Cruz Verapaz anticipated shortages in March because the extension planted was insufficient to meet 
demands. This was due, in part, to the region’s focus on Maguey production. In Rabinal bean production was down 
and corn production was considered normal, but still insufficient to meet demand beyond June at which point 
imports would be needed. “Señor Jefe de la Oficina Controaldora de la Distribución de Maíz del Estado, Ingeniero 
don Rodolfo Perdomo M.,” November 17, 1955. Min. Ag. 437. AGCA. Guatemala. 
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the previous year, citing late rains. This meant that demand in 1956 would exceed production by 
roughly a million quintales, resulting in further shortages.35  
This cycle had long preoccupied the Guatemalan government and in the early 1950s 
INFOP took steps to bolster the country’s silo infrastructure, so that domestic grain supplies 
could be stored and released in times of shortage to prevent inflation and speculation.36 The 
collapse of coastal corn production after 1954 forced the state to acquire large shipments of corn 
from international donors. The influx of international corn created significant problems. Selling 
excess corn at market prices harmed local producers, but storing the corn was a serious 
infrastructure problem that the Liberación government was unprepared to handle. In September 
1956, the Office for Controlling Corn Distribution advised that over 80% of Guatemala’s corn 
reserve was at risk of spoilage unless it was immediately treated or sold at a discount. They 
concluded that only 20% of the national supply was stored appropriately, housed in INFOP’s 
modern silos. The rest of the national reserve was at risk of humidity and pests and one of the 
warehouses was already infested with moth larvae.37 Large landowners consolidated their control 
over land and labour after the coup, but for campesinos the Liberación revoked political liberties 
and saddled them with chronic hunger. 
                                                     
35 The production 1955-56 was projected. Consumption was estimated by tallying imports and production, minus 
exports. The report’s author warned readers strenuously this was an estimate. The rapid growth and collapse of 
Decree 900 properties created a large margin of uncertainty about the actual amount of corn produced. This was 
compounded by government’s historic inabilty to accurately measure household production. “Estimación del 
Faltante de Maíz que Habra Como Resultado de la Cosecha 1955/56” Min. Ag. Leg. 437. AGCA. Guatemala. 
36 Monitor Del INFOP, 2, no. 6: (1951). By 1958, INFOP had built new silos in Coatepeque, Retalhuleu, La 
Democracia, Chiquimulilla. By locating silos closer to production centers, they hoped to offer farmers better prices. 
Centralized storage hurt producers and consumers, since the cost of shipment to Guatemala City added significant 
costs. When INFOP bought corn at Q2.50, it had to selll that corn at Q3.50 to compensate for transportation costs. 
This still did not solve the production problem. INFOP told the US Agricultural Attache was boosting production 
through fertilizers and pest control remained a key government priority. “Memorandum of Conversation: Jorge 
Nanne, Manager of INFOP, John Scholl, Apricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Guatemala; Charles K. 
Ludewig, American Embassy, Guatemala,” Rg 59, Entry # 5730, Box 4, 1958 Folder: “1958 – Guatemala – 
Agriculture.” NARA. 
37 The spoilage problem was compounded by the fact that much of this corn arrived with impurities. Their plan was 
to transfer 1955 corn from INFOP silos to warehouses, since it was already treated. 1956 corn would be shipped to 
INFOP silos and treated immediately, to limit further spoilage. The state held an estimated 290,000 quintales. 
“Letter to Minister of State in the Office of Agriculture from Daniel de J. Rodriguez Juarez, Jefe de la Oficina 
Controladora de La Distribución de Maíz del Estado” September 21, 1956.  Min. Ag. 437. AGCA. The health risks 
of corn spoilage are considerable. Modern studies have identified high levels on fungus and aflatoxins and 
mycotoxins on improperly dried and stored corn. See Martinez-Herrera’s survey of maize sold in Guatemala’s rural 
markets, which recorded the highest aflatoxin levels during the rainy season. M.L. Martínez-Herrera, Efecto de 
ciertos hongos sobre valor nutritive, calidad y conservación del maíz en Guatemala, Thesis, Universidad de San 
Carlos de Guatemala, 1968; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Maize in Human Nutrition, 
Food & Agriculture Organization, (1992), 32. 
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Creating “Authentic Human Beings”  
Though many aspects of the Revolution were overturned after 1954, progressives 
expanded public expectations about the responsibilities of the state. The legitimacy of the state 
depended on the ability of lawmakers to demonstrate sympathy for impoverished campesinos. In 
1957, Castillo Armas insisted that the role of government was to facilitate the expansion of 
private capital by building roads and infrastructure. The President conceded, however, that the 
“new currents of social justice” introduced during the Revolution required the government to 
guarantee the social welfare of the masses. 38 The government initially used food aid supplied by 
the United States as a temporary panacea to prevent famine and quell rural discontent.39 In 1956, 
Jorge Arenales, the Minister of Economy and Labour, argued that US relief allowed Guatemala 
to embrace progressive, democratic principles instead of “liquidating the communists…[and] 
instituting a hard-fisted rule based on rigid order.”40 However, this approach did little to inspire 
support for the Liberación among campesinos trying to feed their families. The Castillo Armas 
government recognized in 1956 that they had to engage in some form of land reform to assuage 
growing anxiety and unrest about the cost of food and the scarcity of land. The State Department 
cautioned that negligible increases in the living standards for rural and urban workers had 
already fostered “disillusionment in the Castillo Armas regime.” If the government did not take 
immediate action, they were concerned that simmering resentment could explode into 
destabilizing violence.41 
In 1956, the Castillo Armas regime tried to appropriate the language and symbolism of 
the agrarian reform with Decree 559. This law bore striking similarities to the original Agrarian 
                                                     
38 Ministerio de Economia, Political Economica del Gobierno de Liberacion: Reunion con los Sectores de la 
Iniciativa Privada, July, 1957, 1. 
39 Castillo Armas supporters like the Partido De Trabajadores Democráticos tried to coordinate food relief with the 
assistance of the US, the UFCO and UNICEF because “empty stomachs feed on communism.” They planned to feed 
the poor on powdered milk and rejected bananas, donated by UNICEF and the United Fruit Company. The US 
Ambassador wrote they “spoke with more eloquence than realism” about the possibility of “harmonizing relations 
between labor and capital in an effort to raise the standard of living and strengthen the economy so that President 
Castillo could continue his efforts to develop the country.” “Memorandum of Conversation,” March 5, 1955, RG 59, 
Entry A1 5730, Box 2. Folder: “Photos: 1956 – Guatemala – Political – Local.” and “Memorandum: Del Gobierno 
de Guatemala que contiene algunas consideraciones políticas sobre la situación actual del país.” RG 59, Entry A1 
5730 Box 2, “Folder: 1956 Guatemala ICA Grant Aid” NARA; For Castillo Armas’ philosophy of “New Life.” See 
Handy, Gift of the Devil, 151. 
40 “Proposed Speech by Jorge Arenales in US,” November 15, 1956,” RG 59, Entry A1 5730 Box 2, folder: in 
“Guatemala – ICA – Grant Aid.” NARA. 
41 “An Analysis of the Guatemalan Economy with Specific Reference to the U.S. Aid Program,” RG 59, Entry A1 
5730 Box 2 Folder: “1956 Guatemala – ICA.” NARA. 
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Reform Law: it encouraged efficient land use by levying taxes on underutilized lands and created 
a legislative framework for expropriation of land for the “public good.”42 Yet where the Arbenz 
government believed that land was one part of a package of social and economic reforms, 
Castillo Armas and his successors used land reform as a symbolic tool to defuse criticism. Unlike 
the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law that empowered campesinos and encouraged them to organize, 
Decree 559 centralized the process of expropriation and the distribution of land to campesinos. 
The Dirección General de Asuntos Agrarios (DGAA) was the main arbiter of land redistribution 
and it focused its efforts on developing Agrarian Development Zones, areas of concerted 
investment where the state tried to engineer new agrarian colonies populated by market-oriented 
farmers. The resettlement of campesinos in planned agrarian communities was meant to bolster 
basic grain production and, more importantly, foster the growth of an agricultural middle class. 
Residents were carefully selected and educated through supervised credit programs, hygiene and 
education services. Families were encouraged to abandon their indigenous culture and adopt 
progressive, modern, and ladino values. 
The emphasis on development over reform was a minor, but significant rhetorical shift 
that indicated the state’s emphasis on technical oversight as the safeguard preventing popular 
appropriation of the reform process. Where Decree 900 facilitated the transfer of land to self-
organized communities—brought closer during the process of denunciation—the Liberation 
government believed that young, devout campesino families would be the bedrock for its new 
agrarian development initiative. The 1956 Agrarian Statute stressed the importance of private 
landownership as the only means to incentivize campesinos to “care for the land, defend it, and 
make it productive.”43 Conservatives argued that Decree 900 suppressed individual initiative by 
forcing campesinos to accept land in usufruct and it undermined the stability of the community 
by diminishing the power of the Church. They defended Decree 559 as a more controlled and 
deliberate attempt at land reform, and they hoped that the campesinos who benefitted would 
place their faith in the state.44 Decree 559 distributed land to individuals who were selected by 
                                                     
42 See Article 60 for taxes, assessed based on land quality. “Estatuto Agrario:  Emitido por el Gobierno de la 
República, Decreto 559 (Guatemala City: Imprenta Liberación, March 1, 1956); Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside, 196. 
43 Secretaría de Propaganda y Divulgación de la Junta Gobierno. Estatuto Agrario. Decreto 559 (Guatemala City: 
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44 “Tierra en Propiedad, Matriomonio que Dignifica al Hogar, Acercamiento de la Familia Social, y Mantenimiento 
de la Fe en Dios,” Revista Tiquisate, No. 2. September 30, 1956. 
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the state and this unequal relationship between generous benefactor and poor recipient 
discouraged political agitation by campesinos. The government also could use Decree 559 to 
take land away from campesinos who violated laws protecting forests and rivers and “disobeyed 
technical instructions” meant to promote agricultural development.45   
A review of Guatemala’s agrarian development projects in 1957 emphasized the 
importance of drafting ladino families to settle frontier land on the Pacific Coast. Indigenous 
farmers were considered unprepared for the “modern techniques” being taught.46 Since the 
colonies were supposed to create the nucleus for a new middle class and strengthen Guatemalan 
democracy, giving political and economic power to “primitive Indians” was dismissed as 
politically irresponsible.47 Though planners rejected Indigenous settlers as unprepared for 
modernization, Guatemala’s complicated racial dynamics rendered these attempts to discriminate 
difficult. The difference between ladino and indigenous was largely a geographic one, defined by 
the assumption that Guatemala’s indigenous population lived in the highlands. Barring direct 
signs of indigenous culture like traditional clothing or the inability to speak Spanish, individuals 
could often represent themselves as ladino. Indeed, it was the fluidity in this ascription that 
encouraged Guatemalan officials to pursue a policy of cultural assimilation. Government 
officials believed that participation in the market and purchasing new material goods—clothing, 
radios, credit and debt—was a sign of rural development that symbolized the transition from 
indigenous campesino to ladino farmer.48  
The Liberación government’s actions did not measure up to their rhetoric about private 
                                                     
45 Secretaría de Propaganda y Divulgación de la Junta Gobierno. Estatuto Agrario. Decreto 559 (Guatemala City: 
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of Illinois Press, 2011); Virginia Tilley, Seeing Indians: A Study of Race, Nation, and Power in El Salvador, 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005). 
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landownership as a requirement of a successful land reform and increased rural productivity. A 
year after Decree 559’s implementation, US observers criticized the government’s handling of 
the land reform: “Legal recognition of the new campesino holdings has been slow in forthcoming 
with the result that the new landowners have been reluctant to initiate improvements.”49 The 
government maintained that the distribution of land was continuing apace. However, even 
generous estimates concluded that the Liberación government distributed just under 8,000 land 
titles by the end of 1956. The government showed little sign that it could—or wanted to—rapidly 
increase the speed of land titling. Instead, Guatemala’s elite focused on campesino productivity 
as key agrarian issue problem facing Guatemala. Sandoval Alarcón, a key adviser of Castillo 
Armas, noted, “[T]he real agrarian problem of Guatemala is not the scarcity of land but rather 
that the lands be made to produce more.”50  
The Castillo Armas government encouraged more technical outreach and mechanization 
work to improve yields but placed special emphasis on hybrids, promising to import new 
varieties from Mexico and Cuba to boost productivity. The government argued that while nearly 
69% of Guatemala’s arable land was planted with corn, yields were very low at 605 lbs per 
acre.51 The government’s slow movement on agrarian reform was compounded by persistent 
public anxiety about food shortages and growing rural poverty. President Castillo Armas’ 
emancipatory rhetoric about a new Guatemala was betrayed by his government’s reputation for 
repressing labour and popular organizing.52 By the time President Castillo Armas was 
assassinated in the summer of 1957, he had already suppressed four major coup attempts.53  
A former government official under Jorge Ubico, General Ydígoras Fuentes, returned 
from exile and ran for the Presidency after the death of Castillo Armas. He had already run for 
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the Presidency against Jacobo Arbenz during the 1950 election and was one of the candidates the 
US considered to lead the coup, but he claimed that the US conditions were too restrictive.54 His 
campaign capitalized on widespread insecurity and food scarcity with the campaign slogan: 
“Ley, Alfabeto, Pan y Salud [Law, Literacy, Bread, Health].” A week before he was finally 
elected, he promised that every Guatemalan would be able to buy a chicken a week. Despite his 
populist campaign language, privately he assured the U.S. that he would support private capital 
and strengthen the military. A month after he was elected Ydígoras began to suppress organized 
labour and agricultural labourers.55 
Ydígoras garnered support from the United States and Guatemala’s elite because they 
believed he would suppress growing rural resentment more effectively than his predecessor. 
Ydígoras, however, was often bombastic and his opponents and allies saw his ideological 
inconsistency as a major liability, he often vocally challenged international allies and 
Guatemalan elites when they obstructed his ambitions.56 His approach to development 
emphasized the importance of a strong state and international aid, but like Castillo Armas he 
recognized that the “social conquests of the revolution” could not entirely be undone.57 Like 
Castillo Armas, Ydígoras Fuentes invoked the threat of communism to persuade the United 
States to fund Guatemalan projects with grant aid, instead of loans. In 1958, the President 
declared that the Guatemalan government urgently needed funds to buy new land for 
resettlement because they had run out of public land. Unlike Decree 900, the government’s land 
reform efforts avoided expropriation and resettled campesinos on land that was already owned 
by the state. The Guatemalan government made a failed 1958 bid for a $95 million dollar aid 
packaged. When it failed, Ydígoras warned Eisenhower that “‘[t]he common enemy of 
Communism, will not invade us from outside but flourishes among our hungry people. 
Krushchev is waiting at the door.’”58  
The U.S. responded by facilitating IBRD and Export-Import Banks loans, but the 
Guatemalan Government continued to pursue credit aggressively. In 1959, they made four 
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distinct Development Loan Fund applications in 1959. One of the applications focused on 
resettlement, asking the United States for an additional $7.5 million dollars so that the 
Guatemalan government could buy private land and resettle 4, 500 families by 1962. This was 
roughly equivalent to the number settled to date, and just a fraction of the nearly 100,000 
families Decree 900 benefited.59 They justified the settlement program as an integral part of their 
mission to build a new agrarian middle class. To Ydígoras’ consternation, their application was 
refused. Indeed, of four Development Loan Fund applications submitted, all the public works 
projects were rejected and only the project supporting private rubber cultivation was approved.60  
Though the state lacked the financial means and political willpower to use Decree 559 to 
compel landowners to surrender underutilized land, they repeatedly touted the success of their 
Agrarian Development Zones. The Guatemalan government used the distribution of land in these 
Agrarian Development Zones as a moment of political theatre—a public demonstration of their 
commitment to the peasantry—and an opportunity to reform recipients. Their goal was not 
simply to increase food production, but rather to create ideal citizens by removing them from the 
influence of the masses. As the major periodical El Imparcial noted, the Agrarian Development 
Zones were each loosely governed by “civic cores” that exercised “a gentle teaching” over 
recipients of land, encouraging them to become good citizens. 61 The DGAA justified its Rural 
Development Plan as an opportunity to transform the exploited campesino, crippled by an 
absence of initiative and their “indifference and fatalism.” They argued that campesinos who 
received land through Decree 559 were transformed into productive citizens and “authentic 
human beings.”62  
The 1959 Development Loan Fund application followed an ideal family—a couple with 5 
children—as they established a farm at Nueva Concepción. This large swathe of land in 
Tiquisate had once belonged to the UFCO, but it became an international showcase for the 
Guatemalan government’s use of agrarian development to quell political discontent under 
Castillo Armas. The name Nueva Concepción referred directly to the Liberación government’s 
efforts to create a new model of agrarian reform, which leveraged private property to transform 
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rustic campesinos into modern farmers.63 The DLF application argued that as they cleared “raw 
jungle” and established a modern farm, this family of impoverished campesinos became 
“progress minded” farmers who embraced mechanization and the market. This powerful 
narrative was supported by a carefully planned crop rotation that began with campesino fare—
corn, plantains, and beans—and ended with a diversified 50-acre (28 manzanas) farm planted 
with livestock, tobacco, sesame, and rice. They also noted that the state had to establish a “rigid 
set of qualifications” because previous initiatives recruited settlers based on “political necessity.” 
The DLF application concluded that disregard for the “applicant’s farm background or other 
essential qualification…has seriously impaired successful colonization in many cases.”64 This 
was a veiled reference to political tensions between the state and frustrated campesinos that 
marked early efforts to colonize Nueva Concepción after the coup. 
The struggle to establish Nueva Concepción was featured in newspapers that ran large 
spreads extolling the virtues of the new colony and the patriotism of its settlers.65 Personal 
interviews reiterated the transformation of campesinos into small farmers, with savings, homes, 
and modernized farms. Early challenges, like sanitation and electricity issues, were 
downplayed.66 Local officials did, however, emphasize the sinister threat posed by the rural poor, 
euphemistically described as “the floating population, people that approach the agrarian 
development zone without having passed any selection requirements.”67 The importance of 
agrarian colonies as symbols of progress and prosperity encouraged the Liberation government 
to regulate membership in the colony and patrol their borders, preventing free entry. For newly 
settled campesinos, this restriction on its freedom of movement and association was unexpected 
and unwelcome. Shortly after campesinos received land in Nueva Concepción, they began to 
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complain that the parcels meant to liberate them from want served instead as de facto prison 
cells.  
A Prensa Libre article in February, 1958, reported that a “prison regime” existed in 
Nueva Concepción. Two rivers—the Coyolate and the Madre Vieja—and the Pacific Ocean, 
marked the boundaries of the new Agrarian Development Zone. A barbed wire fence enclosed 
the remaining border, with a single gate watched by a “guard with police powers.” Residents 
complained that they were prohibited from selling timber that they felled while readying their 
land for planting. Lumber was an important supplementary source of income for campesinos 
who often waited months before they received their agrarian credits. The National Agrarian Bank 
made loans conditional on a visual inspection, but delays meant that many campesinos could see 
their corn fields grow to near maturity before they received the loans they needed.68 Campesinos 
urged the DGAA to remove the gates and allow them free passage, because “they were given 
parcels in property and they continue being free citizens.”69 Decree 559 proponents emphasized 
that beneficiaries were landowners not renters, a key distinction from Decree 900 that 
encouraged usufruct. However, the debts campesinos incurred to buy land at market value from 
the state or private landowners limited both their freedom of movement and their ability to 
express political dissent.  
The Agrarian Development Zones created by Decree 559 were promoted through high 
profile tours and personal stories of salvation. The DGAA focused on the story of Catalino 
Arredonto Mayén, a landless labourer and his small family who received 20 manzanas of land on 
Santa Isabel, close to Puerto San José. Though the piece was meant to highlight the benefits of 
the Agrarian Development Zones, read closely it also exposed fractures in government’s 
development scheme. Arredonto Mayén borrowed nearly Q1000 to purchase his new land from 
the state and acquire the materials he needed to work the land. After several years he had reduced 
his outstanding debt by half, but his personal diligence did not protect him from distressing crop 
losses caused by forces beyond his control. “I try to pay punctually,” he told the reporter, 
“although at times our crops go badly, like it happened to me who lost a crop of sesame and they 
said it was because of powdered pesticide applied with an airplane in a cotton plantation that is 
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close to here.”70 This offhand comment exposed the untenable contradiction at the heart of the 
Liberación government’s agrarian development strategy: fostering a diverse web of small and 
medium scale farms was not truly viable so long as export agriculture was encouraged to grow 
with minimal regulation. The latter’s insatiable hunger for land, labour and capital slowly 
enclosed and encircled the colonias, limiting their expansion and threatening residents and the 
local environment with pesticides. The continuing dominance of agro-exports on the Pacific 
Coast ensured that these development zones remained spaces for propaganda instead of social 
change. 
Guatemalan elites were largely unfazed by the complaints of campesinos and they 
embraced the transformational promise of new colonias. In 1959, the Director of the DGAA and 
future president Enrique Peralta Azurdia toured the Agrarian Development Zones throughout the 
Pacific Coast. He lauded the humble, hardworking campesinos he met as the backbone of 
Guatemala’s agrarian prosperity. He reminded them that they had complete political freedom and 
that their only obligation to the state was to work their new land.71 The campesinos who received 
parcels were praised by the DGAA as the “architects of secure bread for the grandchildren.”72 
Peralta Azurdia lauded beneficiaries of Decree 559 as humble folk, rooted to the earth. “He 
encountered men upright like trees,” wrote the DGAA about his visit, “subject to the earth by 
roots of love and sacrifice, surely with such adherence as if to challenge the storms.”73 
Guatemalan elites were largely unfazed by the complaints of campesinos and they 
embraced the transformational promise of colonias like Nueva Concepción (Figure 21). In 1959, 
the Director of the DGAA and future president Enrique Peralta Azurdia toured the Agrarian 
Development Zones throughout the Pacific Coast. He lauded the humble, hardworking 
campesinos he met as the backbone of Guatemala’s agrarian prosperity. He reminded them that 
they had complete political freedom and that their only obligation to the state was to work their 
new land.74 The campesinos who received parcels were praised by the DGAA as the “architects 
of secure bread for the grandchildren.”75 Peralta Azurdia lauded beneficiaries of Decree 559 as 
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humble folk, rooted to the earth. “He encountered men upright like trees,” wrote the DGAA 
about his visit, “subject to the earth by roots of love and sacrifice, surely with such adherence as 
if to challenge the storms.”76 
 
 










The article describing Peralta Azurdia’s tour emphasized the primordial connection 
between the campesino and the tree, both bound to the land, both growing roots—familial and 
literal—that bound them to the soil.77 The DGAA cautioned that severing the timeless 
connection between campesino and land invited social and economic instability, a comment that 
alluded to 1952 agrarian reform and the social unrest that followed. They argued that devout and 
hardworking campesinos that benefited from Decree 559 were “the best weapon against 
communist preaching and agitation.78 The Guatemalan state used colonias as reformatory spaces, 
where loyal, productive, and modern citizens could be created from humble campesinos. As they 
transformed the wild Pacific Coast into a space of industry, the state would inculcate them with 
civic virtues that they deemed essential for Guatemala’s future prosperity.  
The government’s attempts at agrarian reform did not generate the enthusiasm or public 
support they craved. In 1959, the Indigenista Congress was held in Guatemala City, but this 
opportunity to showcase Guatemala quickly turned into a debacle. Guatemalan attendees used 
the forum to denounce unequal land tenure and call for substantive agrarian reforms modelled on 
Decree 900. El Imparcial, often a proxy for establishment opinion, harshly rebuked these critics. 
They emphasized the “illusory results” of the reform that gave campesinos land in usufruct 
instead of property and then failed to give them needed technical assistance.79 Though these 
rebuttals were well rehearsed by 1959, that they needed to be continually deployed demonstrated 
the lasting political support for substantive land reform. Though millions had been spent on new 
Agrarian Development Zones, food shortages were still common and inequality was widespread. 
The demand for a new Decree 900 was not just a call for land reform, but also for a government 
that took an active interest in the well-being of its citizens.  
The Rise of Cotton 
The fantastic growth of cotton from a fledgling industry to one of Guatemala’s most 
import exports occurred after the coup. The cotton industry insisted that this was evidence of the 
productivity of unfettered private capital. However, the dramatic growth of cotton was only 
possible because the Liberación embraced the state-led model of development practiced by 
INFOP during the Revolution. The Liberación government invested heavily in road construction 
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and agricultural financing. Government spending in these areas enabled cotton growers to 
rapidly expand production across the Pacific Coast during the 1950s. They made large profits, 
while the state bore the financial risks. This approach forced campesinos to deal with the 
complex health consequences of chemical intensive cotton production, which manifested as 
pesticide poisonings and chronic hunger. 
During his administration, Castillo Armas boasted that more roads were built between 
1954 and 1956 than in all previous years. This infrastructure binge was financed with grants and 
loans from the United States, the IBRD and the Guatemalan state. The International Cooperation 
Administration, the precursor to US AID, was the most important funder for the ambitious 
highway project that connected coastal departments to the interior and linked Guatemala to the 
Inter-American Highway.80 The Guatemalan government also contracted $18.2 million in loans 
for road construction from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.81 Roads 
were also a major priority in the five year development plan (1955-60) released by Guatemala’s 
semi-autonomous Economic Planning Council (CNPE). Their plan dedicated 55.6% of the 
projected 250 million dollar plan to roads. By comparison, public health and housing received 
10% of the available funding and agriculture received 16.8%.82 This massive expenditure on 
infrastructure did little to ameliorate food production problems, but new roads enabled export 
agriculture to quickly move crops out of the country. Castillo Armas claimed that roads were 
necessary for rural development because they helped campesinos in the highlands to access 
markets where they could sell their food and labour. However, even Guatemala’s US allies were 
concerned that the Liberación government’s development strategy was flawed. In 1956, U.S. 
Ambassador Edward Sparks worried that the Guatemalan government was overspending on 
highway infrastructure and neglecting the welfare of his citizens, a view shared by many officials 
in Washington.83 Although corn production fell 10% between 1954 and 1956, only 2% of 
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agricultural loans were designated to support food crops.84  
Castillo Armas dismissed these concerns, arguing “private enterprise is timid to the point 
of being unwilling until the Government has shown the way.”85 He believed the government’s 
role was to create conditions that would stimulate capital.86 The Liberación government 
complemented its infrastructure spending with large investments in agricultural financing and, to 
a lesser extent, colonization. In 1956-57, half of the CNPE’s $8.6 million budget for agriculture 
was spent on capitalization for banks that offered discounted loans to landowners that planted 
exports like cotton. Another $2.9 million from the agriculture budget was supposed to support 
large colonization efforts, including Nueva Concepción.87 Colonization projects gave the 
impression that the government was working to improve rural wellbeing, but they also created 
accessible pools of labour close to rapidly expanding plantations.88 An internal memo to the 
Under Secretary of State encouraged the US to keep funding colonization efforts because the 
1952 agrarian reform “succeeded in deluding many simple people in its short-lived career toward 
chaos.” The memo argued that resettling campesinos on the Pacific Coast would help “build up 
the agricultural middle class essential to national advancement.”89 With their focus on 
developing conditions for private capital to flourish, the state invested very little in agricultural 
extension and experimentation that might have benefited campesinos. In a country where 73% of 
the population worked on farms and 46% of the GNP was generated by agriculture, this was a 
shocking surrender of government initiative to the private sector at a time of rural crisis.90 The 
economic rationale was more sensible, chronic poverty drove down wages and this enabled 
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plantation owners to produce exports more cheaply.  
Cotton was the primary beneficiary of the Liberación’s infrastructure and agricultural 
policies. During the Revolution, INFOP stimulated cotton production with generous loans, 
research, and a fixed price for cotton.91 Cotton production rose from almost nothing in 1949 to 
42,703 in 1951-52 quintales and it grew by another 50% the following year. INFOP successfully 
encouraged small producers with technical advice and free seeds. After the 1953-54 harvest was 
collected, the government estimated that there were 96 large producers and 679 producers 
growing cotton on three manzanas or less. Together they produced nearly 100,000 quintales of 
cotton.92 After nearly a century of failed schemes, INFOP transformed cotton into a viable export 
grown by large and small producers. 
Although the coup devastated corn production, cotton fared well in the 1950s and rapidly 
overtook bananas as Guatemala’s second most important export. During the 1954-55 harvest 
cotton growers expanded the land under production and collected a record shattering harvest of 
200,000 quintales.93 Many landowners planted cotton on land that they reclaimed from 
campesinos, creating a surge in production that could not be sustained without government 
intervention. The rapid growth of the cotton industry after 1954 was facilitated by a combination 
of minimal regulation, expanding road infrastructure, and the colonization of new, fertile land 
that was temporarily free of disease or pests. However, it would not have been possible without 
generous loans from state banks that enabled cotton growers to modernize their farms by 
purchasing the seeds, pesticides and machinery needed to grow production rapidly. This created 
a problem for the Liberación government, because they rejected the state-led development 
policies of the Arbenz government in favor of free markets with minimal regulation. Castillo 
Armas and his supporters tried to work around this issue by discrediting INFOP and its 
interventionist brand of rural development. 
In July 1954, El Imparcial publicized the names of Arbenz supporters who received loans 
for cotton from INFOP and other lenders, including the CHN and the Bank of Guatemala. El 
Imparcial charged that one and a half million Quetzales in loans and credits were extended to the 
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“‘big fish’ and politicones [obsequious officials] of the Arbenz regime that know little or nothing 
of agriculture.”94 Detractors argued that INFOP favored government officials with cheap loans 
and bought their cotton crops at a substantial loss.95 This inflammatory article provoked a torrent 
of letters to the newspaper, people named by the article denied they had received loans or that 
they had been obtained for different ends and paid off long ago. The first Director of INFOP, 
Carlos Leonidas Acevedo, was among the accused. He denied the charges and called for a “calm 
and dispassionate” analysis of the loans given out by INFOP, which he believed would 
demonstrate the rigorous loan application process and confirm that there was no “political 
discrimination.”96 The IBRD also joined the chorus calling for substantive reforms to INFOP.97 
They threatened to withhold their loans to the organization, unless the Guatemalan government 
rewrote INFOP’s basic rules so that they were focused only on financing farmers with credits 
and loans.98 Though INFOP jumpstarted the cotton industry, Guatemalan elites narrowly 
redefined the organization’s mandate so that it was no longer able to offer technical advice and 
was limited to financing. The sustained attack on INFOP by large landowners was driven by a 
new development ideal that praised private capital and tried to curtail state power. Large 
                                                     
94 The source for this information is not given. The detail on financial transactions and El Imparcial’s vocal criticism 
of the revolutionary government makes it very likely that the information came directly from the government.  
Arbenz at top of list with Q96, 800. (top recipient of INFOP loans). His Minister of Agriculture, Nicolas Brol, was 
also accused. “Millón y Medio de Quetzales en Préstamos a los Arbencistas: Cultivo de Algodón Era un Monopolio 
en Manos de un Grupo Políticos,” El Imparcial, July 20, 1954. 
95 “Arbencistas Vendían a Q40 su Algodón al INFOP; Este a Q28: Climax de una Operación Inmoral por 
Funcionarios del Gobierno Comunistoid,”El Imparcial, March 29, 1955. 
96 “Constancia del Señor Carlos O. Zachrisson P.: Sobre su Crédito de 8,000 Quetzales,” El Imparcial, July 22, 
1954.  “Otra Aclaración del Lic. Carlos Leonidas Acevedo: No Se Dedica a Cultivar Algodón,” El Imparcial July 
27, 1954. “Indebidamente Incluído en el Millón y Medio: Explica el Sr. J. A Reyes Cardona,” El Imparcial July 23,  
1954. One recipient named in the article, acknowledged that he received a loan to finance his cotton farm but he was 
dismissed from his position as Director of the Civil Guard because of his anti-communist beliefs. “F. Antonio Girón 
Aclara su Crédito para el Algodón: Aseveraciones que no le Tocan,” El Imparcial, July 22, 1954. 
97 Some of these were positive, including payment on debts that the Guatemalan government owed INFOP and a 
pledge to meet a funding minimum equal to 2% of the national budget. Without additional financial support the 
IBRD was concerned that INFOP would lack the administrative and finacial ability to manage a growing credit 
program. The notion of internal debts between government agencies was rebuked by Klein & Saks but the IBRD 
leveraged development funds that the Castillo Armas government wanted for INFOP to extract concessions, 
including repayment of $1 million sterling debt cancelled by the Guatemalan government in 1944 and “back 
capitalization” for INFOP. They calculated that these requirements added nearly $6 million to the public debt and 
the IBRD was uncertain about the reaction from Guatemalan Congress. “Letter to Senor Don Jorge Echeveria, 
Ministro de Hacienda y Credito Publico from J. Burke Knapp, Director of Operations, Western Hemisphere, IBRD,” 
May 16, 1956; “Letter to US Ambassador from David Gordon” November 1, 1956; “Confidential: Appointment 
with Mr. Burke Knapp, IBRD” April 23, 1956. RG 59, Entry A1 5730 Box 1 Folder: “1956 – Guatemala – 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)” NARA. 
98 “Letter to Klein & Saks from Marc P. Quinn,” April 20, 1956   RG 59, Entry A1 5730 Box 2, Folder: “1956 – 
Guatemala – ICA – Klein & Saks” NARA. 
230 
 
landowners who lost land during the agrarian reform were deeply suspicious of any state agency 
that might limit or constrain their ability to extract wealth from their land and labourers. 
Several months after the coup a new national growers association, the Asociacion 
Guatemalateca de Productores del Algodón (AGUAPA), was formed that supplanted INFOP as 
the main advocate for cotton producers. Although AGUAPA criticized the agrarian policy of the 
Arbenz government, it copied the centralized model used by INFOP and tried to establish a 
private monopoly on cotton production. By 1955, AGUAPA controlled almost 65% of domestic 
cotton production. AGUAPA predicted that yields in 1955-1956 would exceed 240,000 
quintales. This anticipated production increase was driven by the influx of new producers, many 
of whom had little experience with cotton but were attracted by record returns of previous years. 
Incessant rains in the fall of 1955 destroyed plants and damaged cotton bolls, causing 
Guatemala’s first cotton crisis. Despite a substantial increase in land under cultivation, 
production per manzana fell 30% when compared to the previous year. The problem was 
compounded by a decline in global cotton prices, caused by the US putting excess cotton on the 
market.99 Speculators and large landowners who gravitated toward cotton production after the 
coup quickly abandoned their newly planted land. 
 Farmers who invested in cotton expecting lucrative returns lashed out, attacking INFOP 
and demanding that the state implement a more liberal loan policy to save them from 
bankruptcy.100 Cotton farmers had invested heavily in machinery and chemicals to improve 
production. They hoped production would reach 40 or 50 quintales per manzana, but the rains 
halved yields and farmers were left with huge debts. They called for INFOP to either write off 
debts or freeze repayments.101 AGUAPA estimated that 80% of cotton farmers needed urgent 
financial assistance before they could begin planting their next crop. With good yields they 
believed that 40% of cotton farmers could pay off their debts the following year, if just barely, 
but roughly 20% would need additional assistance to help cover their loans. AGUAPA urged the 
state to increase financial support for cotton farmers because cotton was a source foreign 
exchange, rural employment, and the only way out to escape “the monoculture politics” of 
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coffee.102 AGUAPA warned that if INFOP and the Bank of Guatemala failed to increase the 
loans available to cotton farmers, there would be a rapid decline in production and a surge in 
rural unemployment that threatened the fiscal well-being of the nation.103 AGUAPA criticized 
INFOP’s handling of loans, but their cotton growers were heavily dependent on the cheap loans 
provided by the state.  
Throughout the 1950s, the cotton industry was divided between members of the dominant 
AGUAPA group and its opponents, which grew in power over the decade and eventually formed 
the more powerful Consejo Nacional de Algodón.104 In December 1955, AGUAPA’s critics 
wrote several editorials for El Imparcial analyzing the crisis facing the cotton industry. 
AGUAPA bore the brunt of their criticism. Though rains were acknowledged as the direct cause 
of the “calamitous” crop failures of 1955, critics cited AGUAPA’s “tyrannical monopoly” over 
cotton growers as the structural cause of the industry’s malaise. In a xenophobic tirade, they 
alleged that AGUAPA’s Directors were from El Salvador and that they acted against the interests 
of Guatemalan planters, making decisions that were advantageous to themselves and their 
mother country.105 They accused the foreign-controlled AGUAPA of repeating INFOP’s 
mistakes, trying to control private initiative instead of giving landowners the financial means to 
prosper independently: “AGUAPA turned out like an ill-mannered servant, mouthy.” The 
editorial maintained that “not all cotton growers emerged in the shadow of INFOP or prospered 
by sucking blood.”106 AGUAPA’s critics argued that the cotton industry was full of 
“opportunists who passed themselves of as revolutionaries” whose poorly managed farms were 
ripe for failure.107 This heated rhetoric revealed the deep schisms among large landowners, who 
fought amongst themselves for preferential access to state funds. Many landowners who had only 
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recently secured the return of their land refused to join AGUAPA because they did not want to 
surrender control to an outside organization, but they also needed plentiful loans to support 
capital intensive cotton production.  
There was also a third faction of technicians, industry critics, and government officials 
who supported technical and fiscal oversight of the cotton industry. With its ties to the previous 
administration, INFOP was a convenient patsy used by landowners eager to avoid responsibility 
for their debts incurred by poor management or the failure to invest in production. “Those 
producers,” they wrote, “make a double planting: cotton and antagonism against INFOP among 
their workers.”108 Though it was often attacked, INFOP had muted international support and 
vocal domestic allies who praised the organization for incubating the cotton industry. INFOP’s 
defenders believed that government regulation was essential for the development of a healthy, 
productive and sustainable cotton industry. Shortly after the coup, observers voiced their concern 
that cotton farmers were overusing pesticides so that they could prevent pests and guarantee high 
annual returns. 
In 1955, the head of health and safety for Guatemala’s Institute for Social Security 
(IGSS) travelled through cotton producing regions in Escuintla, investigating a sudden surge in 
pesticide poisonings. He found that workers were not given the proper protective equipment and 
received minimal safety training. When he asked a 19 year-old hospitalized for pesticide 
poisoning in Escuintla if he used safety equipment when spraying cotton plants, the worker 
responded: 
No. At two in the afternoon I leave work and I go to the milpa.—Do you always wash 
yourself after fumigating? –Sometimes I wash in the river. – But you know that you 
should wash yourself because otherwise it intoxicates you? –No. I was when the skin 
itches me a lot.109 
 
Even when workers were given masks and gloves, they were often worn and torn such that the 
IGSS official considered them more hindrance than protection. IGSS strongly encouraged 
landowners to conduct regular safety training, because turnover was high and many workers 
were poorly educated and illiterate. Warning labels were indecipherable to workers who could 
not read. The article featured an image of food and beverages resting innocently on a barrel of 
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pesticides with the subtitle: “Carelessness like this, captured unexpectedly by the camera, is the 
cause of intoxications on cotton plantations.”110 While he applauded the efforts of a few 
progressive farmers who educated workers and supplied them with appropriate protective gear, 
the official concluded that most cotton farmers did little to protect workers leading to a “massive 
and generally tragic accidents.”111 IGSS encouraged planters to protect the health of cotton 
workers but also called for the state to regulate pesticide use.  
These reports were provocative, but there is no indication that the government took 
measurable steps to regulate pesticide use until the early 1960s. By that time, pesticides had 
become synonymous with cotton and the potential for regulation provoked frenzied opposition 
from cotton growers who believed that the productivity of the industry depended on cheap and 
plentiful pesticides. Nevertheless, sustained criticism from INFOP and IGSS demonstrates that 
even under the relatively repressive regimes of Castillo Armas and Ydígoras Fuentes there was a 
small space for critique of landowners. Those criticisms had to stress wise use and rational 
development, but in this space of contention critics continued their efforts to regulate and reform 
private power.112 Only with the democratic opening of 1966, did these technicians, bureaucrats 
and journalists find the political opportunity to openly criticize the cotton industry, the most 
repressive and abusive agricultural sector in Guatemala.113 
Cotton production experienced a painful contraction in 1955, but the industry rebounded 
with the financial assistance of their nemesis and benefactor INFOP. Despite sustained criticism 
from the private sector and concerns about the health consequences of cotton production, INFOP 
financed almost all of the cotton grown during the 1950s.114 AGUAPA tried to retain its control 
over cotton growers by emphasizing their successful lobbying efforts, boasting that they pushed 
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INFOP to increase loan percentages from 30% to 60% of crop value.115 The downturn in 1955 
shook farmer confidence, and many landowners let their land lie fallow or planted alternative 
crops including corn. It took several years for the scale of cotton production to surpass its 1955 
peak of 22,480 manzanas. The industry experienced renewed growth in 1957-58, with 25,135 
manzanas planted in cotton.116 This renewed growth was spurred by changes to INFOP’s fiscal 
situation. The Bank of Guatemala offered Q 1,500,000 in rediscounted loans to INFOP, 
earmarked specifically for the cotton industry. This nearly doubled the funds available to cotton 
farmers.117 These loans recognized the growing importance of cotton as a lucrative new export 
crop, but they also indicated the growing moral and financial bankruptcy of the Liberación 
government that supported private capital at the expense of most Guatemalans. Even US 
observers were concerned that the state’s generous distribution of credits and cheap loans to 
cotton growers was financial unsustainable and diverted funds from other development 
initiatives.118 
 The Guatemalan government’s financial support encouraged cotton growers to plant 
cotton. In 1958-59 the cotton industry hit a production peak, with nearly 40,000 manazanas 
planted in cotton and an estimated harvest of 350,000 quintales of cotton. Landowners were 
planting more cotton and getting higher yields per manzana. Throughout the 1950s, yields grew 
from 3.6 to 11 quintales per manzana.119 By 1960, Guatemala boasted one of the highest yields 
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per manzana in the world, at 13 quintales per manzana, bested only by Israel (Figure 22).120 High 
yields were a by-product of both technical interventions and the cultivation of newly cleared and 
highly fertile coastal land. The cotton industry benefited tremendously from an antitrust suit filed 
by the Department of Justice against the United Fruit Company weeks after the coup. The 1958 
decision in this case forced the United Fruit Company to restructure its organization and sell its 
Guatemalan holdings.121 Most of this land was located in Tiquisate, a region identified as ideal 
for cotton cultivation as early as 1956.122 This influx of new land, highly fertile and apt for 
mechanization, allowed cotton growers to continuing expanding their operations rapidly 
throughout the early 1960s.123 




   
1949-50 -- 13 140 -- 
1950-51 -- 19 858 -- 
1951-52 11 712 42 703 3.6 
1952-53 13 000 74 954 5.7 
1953-54 16 031 132 194 8.2 
1954-55 22 840 175 341 7.6 
1955-56 30 374 208 032 6.9 
1956-57 18 519 218 524 11 
1957-58 25 135 286 770 11 
1958-59 39 562 352 513 8.8 
1959-60 25 291 *350 000 *13 
    
Figure 22: Area cultivated and production per manzana, 1949 to 1960124 
 
 Though the government enabled the cotton industry to grow rapidly with cheap loans and 
financial assistance, cotton planters were zealous defenders of private property and they rejected 
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even limited efforts to redistribute land to address food production problems. In 1958, the state 
attempted to subdivide INFOP’s Cuyuta plantation so that it could be distributed to campesinos 
for corn production. Cuyuta was the birthplace of modern cotton production in Guatemala. 
Despite the economic and social turmoil generated by the coup, it remained under INFOP’s 
control and it was still one of Guatemala’s largest cotton producers in 1958. INFOP used the 
farm to experiment with new corn hybrids and new cotton varieties; over half of the 240 
caballeria plantation was dedicated to cotton production and annual yields were roughly 60,000 
quintales. Cotton farmers acknowledged the importance of corn as the “indication of the well-
being of the campesino,” but they were adamant that the plantation remain focused on “white 
gold.” They argued that subdividing Cuyuta was a threat to crop diversification in Guatemala.  
In a profound reversal of Revolutionary-era agricultural policy, they encouraged the state 
to focus on increasing corn production in the highlands so that coastal land could be wholly 
dedicated to exports.  
It is well know that our Indian produces a large quantity of the vital grain [corn], which is 
never well monitored by our statistics, and we constantly suffer cycles of abundance and 
scarcity, or unjustified variations in the price in one zone or another, we must actually 
control the situation of corn using silos and the derivation of its use for cattle and 
subsidiary industries.125 
 
This analysis echoed that invoked during the 1930s and 1940s, when farmers shifted the blame 
for instability in corn production onto campesinos while ignoring systemic barriers to production 
including capital, technical assistance and access to land. Moreover, their emphasis on creating 
alternative markets for corn including the cattle industry contravened technical advice given by 
INFOP agronomists during the Revolution. They argued that using corn as cattle feed was 
dangerous, because it undermined domestic food supplies and ignored other cheap and plentiful 
carbohydrates including bananas.126 
The deal to subdivide Cuyuta was brokered with SCIDA, one of servicios created by ICA 
to offer technical advice to the Ministry of Agriculture. The US allegedly made over 10 million 
dollars in financial assistance dependent on the subdivision of large government properties 
including Cuyuta. Cotton planters dismissed SCIDA’s assistance as well-intentioned but 
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misguided meddling in Guatemala’s economic development. Their perspective was heavily 
influenced by lingering animosity about the perceived injustices visited upon large landowners 
during the agrarian reform during “the days of the wild agrarian reform that took advantage of 
the lands of the Finca Cuyuta for their demagogic propaganda.”127 They warned the government 
that subdivision of cotton lands was a financial folly that wasted the money already spent 
preparing fields for the upcoming harvest and undermined the competitiveness of the country’s 
most important cotton producing region. To reinforce this point, there was passing mention of a 
private offer to buy Cuyuta for 16 million Quetzales. Cotton growers alleged that the government 
was forced to reject the offer because SCIDA’s financial assistance was contingent on the 
subdivision of Cuyuta for corn production.128 
Sustained resistance from the private sector significantly delayed the subdivision of 
Cuyuta, despite agreements made with SCIDA. In September 1960, several officials fired from 
the DGAA revealed to reporters that the plan to parcel Cuyuta had been suspended because 
renters refused to surrender their land. Those implicated included the Minister of National 
Defense, Coronel Rubén González Sigui, the Director-General of Roads, Coronel Heculano 
Hernández and other members of the military. The head of the DGAA, Crisóstomo Castillo, 
denied the accusations, reminding Guatemalans that INFOP itself had rented to members of the 
military during the agrarian reform.129 Castillo insisted that the government remained committed 
to agrarian reform and that Cuyuta would be divided and distributed to campesinos and members 
of the middle class in the coming month. Yet Castillo also tried to minimize the Cuyuta story by 
refocusing media attention on the new land being offered to middle-class Guatemalans willing to 
migrate to Sebol in Alta Verapaz. He projected that this would soon be the Houston of 
Guatemala because of its proximity to oil reserves.130 Despite entrenched opposition, Cuyuta was 
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subdivided several years later. Roughly 220 hectares were reserved for agricultural 
experimentation where new corn hybrids like Cuyuta 63 were developed, capable of producing 
more than 80 quintales per manzana. The rest of the plantation was subdivided, creating 
approximately 275 parcels of 15 hectares each. As of 1972, the majority of these parcels were 
dedicated to corn.131 Like Nueva Concepción, Cuyuta became an island of very small farms 
stranded in a sea of large plantations. 
 The government’s focus on infrastructure spending and agricultural financing after the 
coup was a blessing for cotton growers and a disaster for campesinos. Guatemalan progressives 
began to solve food production problems during the Revolution by supporting campesino 
production and instituting an ambitious agrarian reform: the reversal of the agrarian reform 
displaced thousands and precipitated widespread food shortages. The Liberación government 
entrenched food shortages with an economic policy that empowered large landowners and 
limited campesino access to land, capital and new agricultural technologies. The brutal 
suppression of campesinos during the Liberación and the government’s focus on nurturing 
private capital created widespread chronic hunger and malnutrition. In a report on infant 
mortality presented to the 3rd Central American Congress in 1956, Doctor Ernesto Cofiño argued 
that Guatemala’s most pressing problem was the “illness of hunger.”132   
This diagnosis was confirmed by the US Mutual Security Program. Their 1956 report on 
the grant aid program in Guatemala reported that the health of the population was “deplorable.” 
Despite considerable international investment, Guatemalans had some of the highest morbidity 
and mortality rates in the Americas. Not only was the mean lifespan for Guatemalans shockingly 
low—43.64 years for the general population and 38.34 for indigenous adults—deaths of children 
under 5 accounted for 49% of deaths. Deaths and illness were blamed on a combination of poor 
sanitation, protein deficiencies, and a lack of dietary diversity. 133 They concluded that the 
Liberación government overspent aid money on highways and made no substantive 
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improvements in the welfare of Guatemala’s poor.  
The Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) was at the forefront 
of diagnosing and treating hunger in Central America. Between 1949 and 1959, INCAP 
performed nutritional surveys of Guatemalan indigenous communities that identified chronic 
malnutrition and high infant mortality as key public health issues.134 A report by INCAP and US 
economic advisors Klein & Saks reported widespread deficiencies in the basic diet of the rural 
poor. Using basic calorie requirements for a traditional diet, the 1956 report found that 
Guatemala produced only 68% of the cereals required to feed its population, 29% of the fats and 
oils, 26% of the milk and 50% of the meat needed. Only sugar exceeded national requirements, 
by nearly 62%.135 The report confirmed that state’s prioritization of exports over food crops 
forced Guatemala’s poorest to live in extreme privation.136 
INCAP began research on an affordable, plant-based nutritional supplement that was high 
in protein and used local ingredients during the Revolution.137 After testing different flour 
mixtures derived from plants and seeds, the organization finally settled on formula number nine. 
In 1957, 2-year old Jose Valentín Coroy was the first subject to receive Incaparina to deal with 
problems associated with extreme protein deficiency. He rapidly put on weight, regained energy 
and was considered cured within 3 months.138 In August 1959, the Ministry of Public Health and 
Social Assistance declared that the new product would lead to a “revolution” in Central 
American nutrition. The Number 9 mix used ingredients that were common in Guatemala like 
corn, millet, and cotton seed flour—formerly considered toxic—and was fortified with Vitamin 
A. The final mixture was selected over a previous mixture based on sesame, which INCAP 
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scientist believed was too expensive for poor families.139 Nutrition and development experts 
regarded INCAP’s use of cotton flour in Incaparina an impressive technical achievement that 
used a by-product of industrial agriculture to feed the poor.140 This invention not only helped to 
mask structural inequalities, it actually deepened them by further enriching cotton growers who 
profited from hunger. 
The growth of cotton production during the 1950s created an abundance of cotton seed 
and plantation owners searched for revenues that could be extracted from the seed. Hand-picked 
cotton yielded a high price on international markets, but the market for cotton seed was initially 
much smaller. The oily, high-protein seed was refined into a cattle feed and pressed to extract 
oil. Both of these products were sold domestically by cotton producers, yielding further profit 
that helped planters subsidize cotton plantations. Incaparina created a new market for cotton seed 
flour, which was refined, packaged and sold to families as an affordable and innovative solution 
to chronic malnutrition and infant mortality in Guatemala. The newspaper Impacto argued that 
Guatemala should capitalize on global demand for this “soluble marvel” by building factories 
that could export Incaparina throughout the developing world. Though some Guatemalans sought 
a silver-lining in the story of Incaparina, this nutritional supplement only existed because the 
state had abandoned the country to the private sector. The “nutritional miracle of the era” was a 
timely palliative for the illnesses caused by inequality.141   
Conclusion  
After the coup, landowners used new crops and techniques introduced by the 
Revolutionary government to rapidly develop land cleared by industrious campesinos. The wild 
success of agro-exporters after the coup—especially cotton growers—would not have been 
possible without the agrarian reform and its violent reversal. As it purged activists, the Castillo 
Armas administration implemented a more controlled and limited agrarian reform that was 
designed to appease rural demand for land reform. They criticized the Arbenz administration for 
its chaotic implementation of Decree 900, but Decree 31 and 559 shared the same language as 
the 1952 law. The difference lay almost entirely in the implementation. While the Arbenz 
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administration encouraged workers and campesinos to organize themselves into Local Agrarian 
Committees and pressure for expropriation, the Castillo Armas administration mandated that 
expropriation would be handled by the state. A small number of campesinos successfully used 
Decree 31 to retain land they had received through the Agrarian Reform Law. However, the 
parcels awarded by the DGAA were almost always below the minimum size for a financially 
viable family farm. By giving petitioners small lots, they virtually ensured that beneficiaries 
would need to supplement household production with labour on coastal plantations.  
Visible development projects like Nueva Concepción were utilized to reassure the public 
that land reform—controlled and deliberate—was being undertaken. Yet very few campesinos 
were able to partake in the bounty promised by these Agrarian Development Zones because there 
was too little land available. The state lacked the capital and the will to expand the program after 
it exhausted government land. As a result, these agrarian colonies remained largely symbolic: 
Nueva Concepción offered a glimpse of a more equitable agrarian landscape whose potential was 
contained by the exploitative industrial farms that surrounded it. Although there were a limited 
number of Agrarian Development Zones, they became important corn producers that enabled 
their neighbours to pour resources into cotton and sugar. Throughout the 1960s and 70s the state 
depended on the largest development zones like Nueva Concepcion to help attenuate 
Guatemala’s growing production problems.142 Each farm produced large amounts of cereals, but 
alone they could not compensate for grain shortages that were caused by overpopulation and the 
continued impoverishment of Guatemalan campesinos.  
The displacement of the campesinos and workers after 1954 enabled landowners to 
reassert control over the countryside, repealing political and material gains that campesinos 
gained during the Revolution. Communist purges dismantled organized labour and forced Decree 
900 beneficiaries to flee their land, allowing landowners to exerted unprecedented power over 
labour. As during the Ubico period, the government facilitated the growth of private capital by 
expanding a large networks of roads and ports that allowed landowners to extract goods from 
Guatemala’s coastal frontier. Unlike the 1930s, plantation owners could now depend on state not 
just to limit popular dissent but also utilize productive technologies like food aid and nutritional 
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supplements to dull the edge of hunger. Cotton planters especially combined agrarian 
modernization with cheap labour to produce large profit margins, allowing them to remain 
competitive even while investing heavily in pesticides to control pests. By remaking the Pacific 
Coast into a space dominated by industrial scale plantations, Guatemala’s largest landowners 
also transformed the rest of the country. The seasonal demand for labour drove massive 
migration to the coast, where labourers were exposed to pesticides, worked long hours and 
received low wages. Illness or death would often turn meagre earnings into debt and force 
families to return to the plantation the next year. These cycles of debt and credit became the 
“anchor of sweat and blood” that shackled campesinos to the earth and liberated landowners to 












Conclusion: “A Cosmic Protest” 
In the 1960s, Guatemalan poet Otto René Castillo penned a moving indictment of the 
country’s lucrative cotton industry. His poem, Obreros de Algodón, recounted the toil of 
hundreds of thousands of workers who began harvesting cotton before dawn and continued long 
after dusk. “They say that cotton workers,” wrote Castillo, “have so many suns accumulated in 
their face[s] that with these they could light a thousand planets.” 1 For Castillo, the inhumanity of 
the cotton industry was embodied by the cotton worker Macario Santiago. The humble Macario 
looked at Castillo with eyes that radiated a “cosmic protest against hunger” and inequality. Why, 
asked Macario, do I work so hard and get paid so little? In the final lines of the poem, Macario 
and his fellow cotton workers awoke and began to grasp the extent of their exploitation. Castillo 
hoped that their awakening would “impregnate the dawn” and inspire a rural uprising against 
Guatemala’s large landowners. Unfortunately Castillo’s vision of change was too hopeful. He 
tragically underestimated the Guatemalan state’s determination to protect the economic interests 
of large landowners. Castillo was not just a poet, he was also a committed revolutionary who 
eventually became a member of the clandestine insurgency group the Rebel Armed Forces 
(FAR). In 1967, Castillo and his female partner, Nora Paíz, were captured by Guatemalan 
security forces, tortured for 4 days and burned alive in the military barracks of Zacapa.2  
Born in 1936, Otto René Castillo came of age during the Guatemalan Revolution. He was 
just eight years old when a coalition of students and workers overthrew the dictator Jorge Ubico. 
These progressives envisioned a new, more modern Guatemala free of its dependency on coffee 
production. Since the rise of coffee in the 1870s, wealthy landowners had dictated Guatemala’s 
economic policy. Legal reforms and violence enabled large landowners to displace indigenous 
communities from ancestral land and claim control of Guatemala’s most fertile land. 
Guatemala’s indigenous population was increasingly concentrated in the highlands, where the 
topography was rugged and there was far less arable land. As the population increased, 
indigenous farmers had to supplement their small subsistence plots with work on coastal 
plantations. Prior to 1944, the Guatemalan state ensured that export agriculture prospered at the 
expense of the health and well-being of Guatemala’s indigenous population. The nation’s 
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dependency on coffee kept the indigenous population in poverty and stifled the growth of the 
middle class. 
Throughout the Revolution, progressives fought to create a state that protected the rights 
of workers and campesinos by modernizing the economy, reforming government services and 
diversifying agricultural production. Politicians, intellectuals and activists attacked the 
inefficiency and inequality of Guatemalan agriculture, which they frequently compared to 
feudalism. This short-hand signified the antiquated labour relations and production methods that 
prevailed on these plantations and progressives encouraged large plantations to modernize so that 
they could improve yields and offer workers better wages with their newfound profits.3 The 
government’s eagerness to create rural change also reflected widespread apprehension about 
environmental and social costs of deforestation, which was attributed to traditional peasant 
agriculture. Experts who inherited centuries of ethnic discourse about the inefficiency of 
indigenous agriculture and the innate conservatism of campesinos often overlooked the benefits 
of existing agricultural systems like milpa that coaxed good yields out of land the state deemed 
marginal by interplanting and careful fertilization.  
Experts initially believed that modernization alone would solve food production problems 
and end deforestation. The Ministry of Agriculture aggressively promoted new crops to farmers 
large and small, especially hybridized corn and cotton. These crops and new production 
technologies were supposed to liberate Guatemala from perennial food shortages and encourage 
the growth of a middle class of farmers and workers. Fieldwork helped government officials 
realize that campesinos were often interested in new crops and technologies, but they lacked the 
land or capital to improve their farms.  The Arévalo government created INFOP to spur rural 
development, giving the organization broad financial powers and technical responsibilities. 
INFOP effectively pushed hybridized seeds into circulation after moments of crisis like the 1949 
rainstorms. They also stimulated the growth of the cotton industry with generous loans and 
experimented with new hybrids and forms of land tenure like usufruct that emphasized the 
human role as a steward of natural resources. These crops, credits and new production 
technologies were supposed to liberate Guatemala from perennial food shortages and encourage 
the growth of a middle class of farmers and workers. However, modernizers underestimated the 
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long-term social, financial, and environmental consequences of modern agriculture, which 
fostered a dependency on chemicals and discredited local knowledge. 
Though progressives were sometimes misguided, the increased visibility and activity of 
the state in the countryside during the Revolution changed popular expectations about the role of 
government. Activists believed that the state had a moral responsibility to translate new political 
freedoms into material improvements in the lives of citizens. This aspiration was realized 
through the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law that redistributed land to 100,000 families and supported 
beneficiaries with technical and financial assistance. Guatemalan campesinos were active 
participants in agrarian modernization throughout the Revolution, but they were especially 
persistent in their efforts to acquire new seeds, fertilizers and more during the agrarian reform. 
Working together technicians, bureaucrats and campesinos briefly reversed Guatemala’s chronic 
food production deficit and began to diversify agricultural production.  
This new social and political landscape terrified Guatemalan elites, who saw Decree 900 
as an attack on their property and a threat to their political power. In 1954, a U.S. backed coup 
ousted President Jacobo Arbenz and opened the door to decades of military rule. When 
Guatemalan conservatives retook power, they persecuted supporters of the Revolution. Otto 
René Castillo and many other progressives fled into exile and watched as the Guatemalan 
government dismantled the Revolution piecemeal, reversing land reform and persecuting 
organized labour.4 The coup of 1954 has often been identified as the moment when aspirations 
for social justice ended and decades of dictatorship, repression and civil war began. By focusing 
on 1954 as a moment of traumatic disjuncture scholars lose sight of the long-tail of the 
Revolution: its social, economic and environmental policies shaped Guatemalan politics and 
agriculture for generations. 
After 1954, Guatemalans, rich and poor, expected their leaders to profess a commitment 
to modernization as a tool for economic and social change. Though the land reform was 
immediately reversed by Castillo Armas after the coup—with devastating consequences for 
campesinos, food production, and the environment—the new President continued to speak about 
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reform and modernization. He publicly advocated for a more controlled resettlement project, 
symbolized by the government sponsored Rural Development Zones that were established across 
the Pacific Coast. These projects were justified with language borrowed directly from the 
Revolution, including claims that modernization would eradicate hunger and poverty. In practice, 
Castillo Armas utilized the new development zones to establish a new political base for his party 
and these initiatives did little to mitigate the extreme inequality of land tenure in Guatemala. 
President Castillo Armas freely borrowed the language of agrarian modernization and promoted 
the technological aspects of agrarian modernization: mechanization, fertilizers, pesticides and 
hybridized seeds. Yet his government largely rejected the systematic changes to land tenure that 
Arbenz viewed as essential for meaningful social change and modernization.  
The broad appeal of modernization and reform outlasted Castillo Armas, who was 
assassinated in 1957. After a bitterly contested election, the ‘old general’ Miguel Ydígoras 
Fuentes finally secured the Presidency in 1958. His Presidency was characterized by widespread 
corruption and a failure to embrace modernization, which culminated in a revolt of a third of the 
Guatemalan military in November 13, 1960. Though the revolt was suppressed, some soldiers 
fled to mountains of Sierra de las Minas in the East. They organized themselves as the November 
13 Rebel Movement, subsequently known as the FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes). Their 
manifesto articulated their frustration with the “lies and theft of Ydígoras Fuentes” and his 
advisors whom they accused of “simulating a prosperity and economic bonanza that doesn’t 
exist.” They criticized the “ruinous” state of rural hospitals and schools, and indicted the 
administration for tolerating the hunger in the countryside. “One only has to go,” they concluded, 
“15 kilometers outside the capital to see that the dogs of the wealthy eat better than our 
campesinos.”5 According to the rebels, widespread unemployment and poverty was the product 
of economic mismanagement that protected large, unproductive plantations at the expense of the 
poor. “It makes us sad, Guatemalans,” wrote the rebels, “to see a dreary future for our country, 
where one has to import even corn to make tortillas.”6  
The 1960 revolt marked the beginning of a thirty-year civil war in Guatemala. The 
military and Guatemalan elites used murder, kidnappings and torture as tools of governance. 
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They were haunted by the Revolution, which demonstrated that social change was not only 
possible it was also productive. After the revolt, the space for public dissent shrank as 
intellectuals, labour activists and campesinos were killed by the state or fled into exile. Many 
Guatemalans hoped that the 1966 election of Julio César Méndez Montenegro represented a 
return to some of the political and economic liberties that existed during the Revolution. Méndez 
Montenegro was the first civilian to hold office since Arévalo and he promised to institute 
democratic reforms and control the power of the armed forces. He failed to do either and his 
government was a captive of the military. They used the cover of a progressive President to 
deepen the war on the left, brutally suppressing guerillas and activists like Otto René Castillo 
who fought for a more equitable future.7 
In this politically volatile moment, the 2nd National Forum on Cotton’s Problems 
gathered industry advocates and critics to discuss the uncertain future of the cotton industry. 
Buoyed by several years of successful expansion, cotton growers recklessly expanded the 
amount of land under cultivation in 1966. The Consejo Nacional de Algodón warned the 
government that cotton growers needed at least 25% more labourers to collect their anticipated 
crops.8 Cotton growers were unable to get the labourers they needed and the 1966 harvest fell far 
short of their lofty projections. The industry blamed labour shortages on the government’s failure 
to move the elections to accommodate the harvest. They continued their public condemnation of 
the new government throughout the summer of 1966, until they finally engaged with critics at the 
forum.  
The bureaucrats, agronomists and student leaders who criticized the cotton industry spoke 
in a language of conservation and modernization that was directly linked to development 
initiatives undertaken during the Revolution. Hector Sierra, the Director General for Agriculture 
during the Arévalo administration, criticized the cotton industry for prioritizing immediate 
profits over sustainable production. Sierra cited the “anti-technical” actions of cotton growers 
who tried to lower costs by mixing insecticides and solvents with “disastrous results.” These 
noxious chemical cocktails were applied by untrained workers who routinely fell violently ill or 
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died. Sierra called for a more technical oversight of cotton production to increase yields and limit 
worker exposure to deadly pesticides.9 Since labour regulations and inspections instituted by 
IGSS had little effect on pesticide usage, agronomists urged the state to mandate harsher 
regulations.10 
According to these critics, proper development depended on technicians who could strike 
the right balance between the well-being of humans and the environment. Cotton planters 
violated this balance by eschewing technical assistance and regulation by the state that reduced 
yields in the short-term to ensure long-term productivity. Engineer Mario Penagos pointed out 
that cotton growers exploited the national economy, demanding credits for fertilizers and 
pesticides to sustain productivity. They promised mutual wealth but the harvest, argued Penagos, 
resulted in the “almost complete destruction” of Guatemala’s precious soils. El Imparcial 
summarized his criticism as a “fantastic vision” of an industry that “produces destruction and 
death” across the 134,000 manzanas where cotton is cultivated. Penagos’ critique reiterated the 
concern about soil fertility and conservation that had been used to justify state intervention into 
the countryside since the 1940s. However, in this case the criticism was focused directly on large 
landowners instead of campesinos.11 
Cotton grower Roberto Castañeda Felice confidently pushed aside criticism from 
progressives and technocrats.12 He argued that cotton was a key export for Guatemala and its 
cultivation drove the economy and national development. He promoted the high wages received 
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by cotton workers, higher than those paid to sugar or coffee workers.13 Castañeda did not 
elaborate that high wages were needed to attract reticent campesinos to the Pacific Coast where 
migrants laboured in debilitating heat and lived in substandard housing. They frequently fell ill 
and contracted debts trying to treat malaria, dysentery and the side-effects of pesticide 
poisonings. El Imparcial reported that Castañeda was interrupted by Julio Seguara, a leader in 
the University Students Association. Seguara called for an investigation of the “subhuman” 
labour conditions cotton plantations and the “exploitation of man by man” that accompanied the 
annual migration of 150, 000 labourers from the highlands to work on coastal plantations. He 
was adamant that the environmental and human costs of cotton cultivation were too high to 
justify cultivation.14 
Castañeda dismissed Seguara’s interruptions as naive enthusiasm. He assured the forum 
that the problem was not modern plantation owners, but rather superstitious campesinos. They 
allegedly reneged on contracts—collecting advances and then moving to other plantations with 
better wages—and refused rations and housing because it violated indigenous customs. 
Castañeda was unable to recognize these small acts of disobedience as campesino resistance to a 
system that exploited their labour under the guise of modernization. “We try,” said Castañeda, 
“to give them Incaparina to add to their diet of beans, tortillas, and chile but they resist taking it. 
Damn if it’s not serious work cultivating cotton!” His offer of Incaparina to campesinos captured 
the devastating effect of cotton on Guatemala’s food system and highlighted the social 
consequences of agrarian modernization that focused narrowly on productivity without engaging 
in social and economic reforms.  
Though historians have recognized the important political and social changes that 
occurred during the Revolutionary-era, the emphasis on periodization has prevented scholars 
from fully acknowledging the social and environmental legacy of this formative period in 
Guatemalan history. The discourse of modernization, hunger and social change that animated the 
Revolution persisted well-past the 1954 coup. It became the language of contention that radicals 
and progressives and used to engage with the state and large landowners. As William Roseberry 
                                                     
13 Lester Schmid, “The Role of Migratory Labor in the Economic Development of Guatemala,” Land Tenure Center 
No. 22 (1967), 38. 
14 Seguara claimed that the quality and quantity of corn produced on the coast also suffered as cotton expanded: cobs 
now bore traces of pesticides used to control cotton pests. Julio Santos, “Del Segundo Foro Sobre Problemas 
Nacionales del Algodon,” August 10, 1966, El Imparcial. 
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notes, hegemony is “not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework 
for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.”15 
This was a narrow political space where experts could criticize and debate the merits of state 
policy if they framed their concerns in the language of productivity. This emphasis on expertise 
almost entirely excluded campesinos from public debates: campesinos were spoken about and 
spoken for at the forum but they did not represent their own interests. Unlike the Revolution that 
created political forums for campesinos to participate in agrarian modernization policies, after 
the coup there was very little space for campesinos to engage with the state. Campesinos who 
tried to defend their rights were demonized as communists and criminals. The military regimes 
that ruled Guatemala for decades after 1954 idealized compliant labourers and workers who 


















                                                     
15 William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1994), 361. 
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__________. Una historia ambiental del café en Guatemala: la Costa Cuca entre 1830 y 1902. 
Ciudad de Guatemala: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala, 
2009. 
Garrard Burnett, Virginia. “God and Revolution: Protestant Missions in Revolutionary 
Guatemala, 1944-1954.” The Americas Vol. 46, No. 2 (Oct., 1989): 205-223. 
Gibbings, Julie. “The Shadow of Slavery”: Historical Time, Labor, and Citizenship in 
Nineteenth-Century Alta Verapaz, Guatemala.” American Historical Review 96, No. 1 
(2016): 74-97. 
Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
González de Molina, Manuel and Víctor M. Toledo. The Social Metabolism: A Socio-Ecological 
Theory of Historical Change. Springer, 2014. 
Gould, Jeffrey L. and Aldo A. Lauria-Santiago. To Rise in Darkness: Revolution, Repression, 
and Memory in El Salvador, 1920-1932. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2008.  
Gould, Jeffrey L. “Indigenista Dictators and the Problematic Origins of Democracy in Central 
America.” The Great Depression in Latin America. eds. Paulo Drinot and Alan Knight. 




__________. To Die in This Way: Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998. 
 
__________. To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, 
Nicaragua, 1912-1979. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990.  
 
Grandia, Liza. Enclosed: Conservation, Cattle and Commerce among the Q’eqchi’ Maya 
Lowlanders. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012.  
 
__________. “Modified Landscapes: Vulnerabilities to Genetically Modified Corn in Northern 
Guatemala.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 1 (2014): 79-105. 
 
Grandin, Greg, Deborah Levenson, and Elizabeth Oglesby, eds. The Guatemalan Reader: 
History, Culture, Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
 
Grandin, Greg. The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2000. 
Grieb, Kenneth J. Guatemalan Caudillo, the Regime of Jorge Ubico: Guatemala, 1931-1944. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979. 
Grossman, Lawrence S. The Political Ecology of Bananas: Peasants, Contract Farming, and 
Agrarian Change in the Eastern Caribbean. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998. 
Hale, Charles, Darío Euraque and Jeffrey L. Gould. Memorias del Mestizaje. Guatemala: 
CIRMA, 2004. 
Hale, Charles. “Más que un indio”: Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in 
Guatemala. Santa Fe, New Mexico: SAR Press, 2006. 
Handy, Jim. “‘A Sea of Indians": Ethnic Conflict and the Guatemalan Revolution, 1944-
1952." The Americas 46, no. 2 (1989): 189-204. 
__________. “Enfrentándose al Pulpo: Nacionalismo Económico y Cambio Político en 
Guatemala y Costa Rica en la Década de 1920,” Mesoamérica 17, no. 31 (June 1996): 
11-39. 
__________. Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. Boston, Massachusets: South End Press, 
1984. 
__________. “The ‘non-economy’ and the Radical Dreams of Food Sovereignty,” Paper 
Presented at Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue. Yale University, September, 2013. 
__________. “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution’: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform.” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review. 68, No. 4 (Nov., 1988): 675-705. 
__________. Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 
1944-1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 
259 
 
Harms, Patricia. “Imagining a Place for Themselves: The Social and Political Roles of 
Guatemalan Women, 1871-1954.” PhD Dissertation. Arizona State University, 2007. 
Harvey, David. A Companion to Marx’s Capital. London and New York: Verso, 2010. 
Hays Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999. 
Henry, O. Of Cabbages and Kings. New York City: Doubleday, Page, & Company, 1904. 
Higbee, Edward C. “The Agricultural Regions of Guatemala.” Geographical Review, Vol. 37. 
No 2 (1947): 177-201. 
Holdridge, L.R. “Determination of World Plant Formations from Simple Climatic Data.” Science 
105 (1947): 367-368 
__________. Life Zone Ecology. San José, Costa Rica: Tropical Science Center, 1967. 
__________. Los Bosques de Guatemala. INFOP: Guatemala, 1950. 
Hurtado Paz y Paz, Laura. Dinámicas Agrarias y Reproducción Campesino en la Globalización: 
El Caso de Alta Verapaz, 1970-2007. Guatemala, C.A.: F&G Editores, 2008. 
Huxley, Aldous. Beyond the Mexique Bay: A Traveler's Journal. London: Chatto & Windus, 
1950. 
Immerman, Richard. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982. 
Janzen, Daniel. Guanacaste National Park: Tropical, Ecological, and Cultural Restoration. San 
José: Editorial UNED, 1986. 
__________. “Tropical Dry Forests: The Most Endangered Tropical Ecosystem,” in Biodiversity, 
ed. E. O. Wilson. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988. 
Jiménez, Julio M. “A Critique of the Policies and Attitudes Affecting Cotton Agriculture in 
Guatemala through a Study of its Development.” M.A. Thesis. University of Texas, 
Austin, 1967.  
Khatun K, Imbach P, Zamora JC. “The Implications of Climate Change Impacts on Conservation 
Strategies for Central America using the Holdridge Life Zone (HLZ) Land 
Classification.” iForest 6: (2013), 183-189. Accessed May 8, 2014. 
http://www.sisef.it/iforest/ contents/?id=ifor0743-006 
Kirkpatrick, Michael. “Optics and the Culture of Modernity in Guatemala City since the Liberal 
Reforms.” Ph.D. diss. University of Saskatchewan, 2013. 
Kirksey, S. Eben. “Interspecies Love in an Age of Excess: Being and Becoming With a Common 
Ant, Ectatomma ruidum (Roger).” Yale Program in Agrarian Studies Colloquium, 
October 2011. 
Kloppenburg, Jack Ralph. First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-
2000. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 
260 
 
Kraussman, Fridolin. “Milk, Manure, and Muscle Power: Livestock and the Transformation of 
Preindustrial Agriculture in Europe.” Human Ecology vol. 32 (2004): 735-772. 
Larsen, Brooke. The Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 
1810-1910. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
Lauria-Santiago, Aldo. An Agrarian Republic: Commercial Agriculture and the Politics of 
Peasant Communities in El Salvador, 1823-1914. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1999. 
 
Loker, William. “‘Campesinos’ and the Crisis of Modernization in Latin America,” Journal of 
Political Ecology vol. 3 (1996): 69-88. 
Lovell, George. Conquest and Survival in Colonial Guatemala: A Historical Geography of the 
Cuchumatán Highlands, 1500–1821. 3rd ed. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2005. 
MacLeod, Murdo J. Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720. Berkeley: 
University of Californian Press, 1973. 
Maher, Neil. Nature's New Deal: The Civilian Conservation Corps and the roots of the American 
Environmental Movement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Mallon, Florencia E. Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
__________. Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailío and the 
Chilean State, 1906-2001. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.  
Manz, Beatriz. Paradise In Ashes: A Guatemalan Journey of Courage, Terror, and Hope. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.  
 
Marglin, Stephen. “Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists: Systems of Agriculture and Systems of 
Knowledge.” in Decolonizing Knowledge: From Development to Dialogue. eds, 
Frédérique Apffel-Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Mariategui, José Carlos. Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1997. 
Marquardt, Steve. “Green Havoc": Panama Disease, Environmental Change, and Labor Process 
in the Central American Banana Industry.” The American Historical Review 106, no. 1 
(2001): 49-80.  
Marsh, George P. and David Lowenthal. Man and Nature. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2003. 
Martin, Paul S., et al., eds., Gentry’s Rio Mayo Plants: The Tropical Deciduous Forest and 
Environs of Northwest Mexico. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998. 
Martínez Muñoz, Anibal and Bruno Busto Brol, “Agricultura,” Historia General de Guatemala, 





Martínez Peláez, Severo. La Patria del Criollo: An Interpretation of Colonial Guatemala. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2009. 
Martínez-Herrera, M.L. Efecto de Ciertos Hongos Sobre Valor Nutritive, Calidad y 
Conservación del Maíz en Guatemala. Thesis. Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 
1968.  
Mata, Leonardo J. The Children of Santa María Cauqué: A Prospective Field Study of Health 
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